Kevin Chen

• Philip Tetlock, Christopher Karvetski, Ville Satopää, Kevin Chen (2024), Long-range subjective-probability forecasts of slow-motion variables in world politics: Exploring limits on expert judgment, Futures and Foresight Science. Abstract

  Skeptics see long-range geopolitical forecasting as quixotic. A more nuanced view is that although predictability tends to decline over time, its rate of descent is variable. The current study gives geopolitical forecasters a sporting chance by focusing on slow-motion variables with low base rates of change. Analyses of 5, 10 and 25-year cumulative-risk judgments made in 1988 and 1997 revealed: (a) Specialists beat generalists at predicting nuclear proliferation but not shifting nation-state boundaries; (b) Some counterfactual interventions—e.g., Iran gets the bomb before 2022—boosted experts’ edge but others—e.g., nuclear war before 2022—eliminated it; (c) accuracy fell faster on topics where expertise conferred no edge in shorter-range forecasts. To accelerate scientific progress, we propose adversarial collaborations in which clashing schools of thought strike Bayesian reputational bets on divisive issues and use Lakatosian scorecards to incentivize the honoring of bets.

• Philip Tetlock, Christopher Karvetski, Ville Satopää, Kevin Chen (2023), Exploring the limits on Meliorism: A commentary on Tetlock et al, Futures and Foresight Science.
• Kevin Chen, The Role of Information Disclosure in Corporate Bankruptcy (Job Market Paper). Abstract

  Bankruptcy is an important mechanism for resolving insolvency and reallocating resources in the economy. Despite the common belief that transparency is central to the bankruptcy system, there is little evidence on how it affects bankruptcy outcomes. In this paper, I exploit two sources of plausibly exogenous variation in disclosure during a bankruptcy: the random assignment of bankruptcy judges who may differ in interpreting the disclosure requirements of the law, and a significant change in regulation that increased the disclosure by certain creditors but not others. I show that more information disclosure improves recovery rates and other outcome variables by alleviating inefficiencies stemming from stakeholders’ conflicting interests. I also identify the potential costs and distributional effects of disclosure, as well as the underlying mechanisms for the efficiency gains. My findings provide some of the first evidence on the role of information disclosure within the corporate bankruptcy process and offer new insights to the broader accounting literature on disclosure.

• Kevin Chen and Wayne Guay (2020), Busy Directors and Shareholder Satisfaction, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55 (7), pp. 2181-2210. Abstract

  Prior research has examined the firm-level performance implications of “busy” boards. Firm-level analysis, however, masks important heterogeneity in the time constraints and expertise of individual busy directors. We develop and validate shareholder voting as a proxy for shareholders’ satisfaction. Our director-specific tests provide compelling evidence that the potential costs of busy directors outweigh their benefits. At the same time, we uncover new sources of heterogeneity among busy directors. For example, the downsides are more pronounced for directors who sit on boards where fiscal year ends cluster in the same month. Our analysis highlights the role of shareholder voting in board composition research.

• Kevin Chen, Wayne Guay, Richard A. Lambert, Multidimensional Corporate Governance: Board Independence, Board Expertise, and Equity Incentives. Abstract

  Corporate governance is a multidimensional construct, with many interactive mechanisms that must be simultaneously managed for efficiency. We develop a model where three ubiquitous governance mechanisms—board independence, board expertise, CEO equity incentives—are endogenously selected to encourage information sharing by the CEO and to optimize the board’s ability to monitor and advise the CEO. We find that, in equilibrium: (i) board expertise and equity incentives are substitutes (complements) when the board has high (low) independence; (ii) boards with greater independence also have higher expertise; and (iii) equity incentives may be positively or negatively related to board independence, depending on the nature of board advice.

Past Courses

• ACCT1010 - Acct & Financial Report

  This course is an introduction to the basic concepts and standards underlying financial accounting systems. Several important concepts will be studied in detail, including: revenue recognition, inventory, long-lived assets, present value, and long term liabilities. The course emphasizes the construction of the basic financial accounting statements - the income statement, balance sheet, and cash flow statement - as well as their interpretation.

Winkelman Fellowship, The Wharton School of Business, 2019-Present
“Awarded annually to one rising 3rd year PhD student who has shown the greatest academic job potential across all departments at Wharton.”

The Wharton School Fellowship for Doctoral Studies, 2017-Present

 Lawrence Klein Prize for Outstanding Research by an Undergraduate, University of Pennsylvania, 2017

Knowledge @ Wharton

• How Dynamic Electricity Pricing Can Improve Market Efficiency, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• Is Algorithmic Management Too Controlling?, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• The Hidden Cost of AI Energy Consumption, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• Charitable and Political Giving | Pinar Yildirim, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• The Future of Banking, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/11/2024
• Election Statistics, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/06/2024
• Robots Are Taking Over Low-skilled Jobs — and Changing Votes, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/05/2024
• Crypto Politics: Liberals’ and Conservatives’ Confidence in Cryptocurrencies, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/05/2024
• Leadership and Elections | Mike Useem, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/05/2024
• Automation Is Harming Low-skilled Workers and Possibly Their Voting Preferences, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/01/2024