Wayne Guay

• Shawn Kim, Wayne Guay, David Tsui (Working), Determinants of Insider Trading Windows. Abstract

  We use observed insider trades to assess the economic determinants that explain the enforcement of company-imposed quarterly open trading windows. We find that insider trading restrictions reflect concerns about information asymmetry, the strength of external monitoring, and executives’ liquidity needs. We also show that enforced trading windows constrain opportunistic insider trading activity, with insiders generating larger trading profits when boards set trading policies that are abnormally loose. We also identify and explore the enforcement of event-specific “ad hoc blackout windows,” by firms engaged in material corporate events. Interestingly, the absence of trading in these windows is associated with contemporaneously higher information asymmetry. These periods are then followed by increased trading volume and higher stock returns, suggesting investors may not immediately incorporate all information conveyed by unscheduled trading restrictions.

• Kevin Chen and Wayne Guay (2020), Busy Directors and Shareholder Satisfaction, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 55 (7), pp. 2181-2210. Abstract

  Prior research has examined the firm-level performance implications of “busy” boards. Firm-level analysis, however, masks important heterogeneity in the time constraints and expertise of individual busy directors. We develop and validate shareholder voting as a proxy for shareholders’ satisfaction. Our director-specific tests provide compelling evidence that the potential costs of busy directors outweigh their benefits. At the same time, we uncover new sources of heterogeneity among busy directors. For example, the downsides are more pronounced for directors who sit on boards where fiscal year ends cluster in the same month. Our analysis highlights the role of shareholder voting in board composition research.

• Kevin Chen, Wayne Guay, Richard A. Lambert, Multidimensional Corporate Governance: Board Independence, Board Expertise, and Equity Incentives. Abstract

  Corporate governance is a multidimensional construct, with many interactive mechanisms that must be simultaneously managed for efficiency. We develop a model where three ubiquitous governance mechanisms—board independence, board expertise, CEO equity incentives—are endogenously selected to encourage information sharing by the CEO and to optimize the board’s ability to monitor and advise the CEO. We find that, in equilibrium: (i) board expertise and equity incentives are substitutes (complements) when the board has high (low) independence; (ii) boards with greater independence also have higher expertise; and (iii) equity incentives may be positively or negatively related to board independence, depending on the nature of board advice.

• Wayne Guay, John Kepler, David Tsui (2018), The Role of Executive Cash Bonuses in Providing Individual and Team Incentives, Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming.
• Stephen Glaeser and Wayne Guay (2017), Identification and generalizability in accounting research: A discussion of Christensen, Floyd, Liu, and Maffett (2017), Journal of Accounting and Economics.
• Wayne Guay, Delphine Samuels, Daniel Taylor (2017), Guiding Through the Fog: Financial Statement Complexity and Voluntary Disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 62 (2), pp. 234-269.
• Wayne Guay and Robert E. Verrecchia (Working), Conservative Disclosure.
• Karthik Balakrishnan, Jennifer Blouin, Wayne Guay (Under Review), Does Tax Aggressiveness Reduce Financial Reporting Transparency?.
• John Core and Wayne Guay (Working), The Other Side of the Trade-Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation: A Revised Comment.
• John Core and Wayne Guay (Working), When are Executive Compensation and Incentives Appropriately Measured by Their Market Values?.
• All Research from Wayne Guay »

Current Courses

• ACCT6130 - Fundamentals Of Financial And Managerial Accounting

  This course provides an introduction to both financial and managerial accounting, and emphasizes the analysis and evaluation of accounting information as part of the managerial processes of planning, decision-making, and control. A large aspect of the course covers the fundamentals of financial accounting. The objective is to provide a basic overview of financial accounting, including basic accounting concepts and principles, as well as the structure of the income statement, balance sheet, and statement of cash flows. The course also introduces elements of managerial accounting and emphasizes the development and use of accounting information for internal decisions. Topics include cost behavior and analysis, product and service costing, and relevant costs for internal decision-making. This course is recommended for students who will be using accounting information for managing manufacturing and service operations, controlling costs, and making strategic decisions, as well as those going into general consulting or thinking of starting their own businesses.

  ACCT6130003 ( Syllabus )

  ACCT6130004 ( Syllabus )

• ACCT9420 - Research In Accounting Iii

  This is Part III of a theoretical and empirical literature survey sequence covering topics that include corporate disclosure, cost of capital, incentives, compensation, governance, financial intermediation, financial reporting, tax, agency theory, cost accounting, capital structure, international financial reporting, analysts, and market efficiency. Please contact the accounting doctoral coordinator for information on the specific upcoming modules/topics that will be taught.

  ACCT9420301 ( Syllabus )

Past Courses

• ACCT3990 - Independent Study

  Intensive reading and study with some research under the direction of a faculty member. Approval from one of the departmental advisers must be obtained before registration. Also a 3.4 average in major related subjects required.

• ACCT6130 - Fin and Mngl Acct

  This course provides an introduction to both financial and managerial accounting, and emphasizes the analysis and evaluation of accounting information as part of the managerial processes of planning, decision-making, and control. A large aspect of the course covers the fundamentals of financial accounting. The objective is to provide a basic overview of financial accounting, including basic accounting concepts and principles, as well as the structure of the income statement, balance sheet, and statement of cash flows. The course also introduces elements of managerial accounting and emphasizes the development and use of accounting information for internal decisions. Topics include cost behavior and analysis, product and service costing, and relevant costs for internal decision-making. This course is recommended for students who will be using accounting information for managing manufacturing and service operations, controlling costs, and making strategic decisions, as well as those going into general consulting or thinking of starting their own businesses.

• ACCT9410 - Research in Acct II

  This is Part II of a theoretical and empirical literature survey sequence covering topics that include corporate disclosure, cost of capital, incentives, compensation, governance, financial intermediation, financial reporting, tax, agency theory, cost accounting, capital structure, international financial reporting, analysts, and market efficiency. Please contact the accounting doctoral coordinator for information on the specific upcoming modules/topics that will be taught.

• ACCT9420 - Research in Acct IIi

  This is Part III of a theoretical and empirical literature survey sequence covering topics that include corporate disclosure, cost of capital, incentives, compensation, governance, financial intermediation, financial reporting, tax, agency theory, cost accounting, capital structure, international financial reporting, analysts, and market efficiency. Please contact the accounting doctoral coordinator for information on the specific upcoming modules/topics that will be taught.

• ACCT9810 - Workshop Colloquium I

  Students attend workshops in departments outside of accounting to provide student exposure to theory, research designs and methods that are being explored outside of accounting to provide breadth of exposure to foster innovative research ideas. Students are required to attend 7 non-accounting workshops over the semester and write up a referee report for 4 of those workshop papers. They are also required to write up at least one research proposal that stems from theories or research methods gleaned from one or more of the workshops attended.

• ACCT9820 - Workshop Colloquium II

  Students attend workshops in departments outside of accounting to provide student exposure to theory, research designs and methods that are being explored outside of accounting to provide breadth of exposure to foster innovative research ideas. Students are required to attend 7 non-accounting workshops over the semester and write up a referee report for 4 of those workshop papers. They are also required to write up at least one research proposal that stems from theories or research methods gleaned from one or more of the workshops attended.

• Wharton MBA Core Curriculum Teaching Award, 2015
• Best Paper Award, Australian Journal of Management, 2011
• Best Paper Award – The Accounting Review Article of the Year, selected by the Financial Executive Research Foundation, 2002
• Wharton Undergraduate Excellence in Teaching Award, 2002
• Best Paper Award – second prize, Journal of Accounting & Economics Conference, 2001
• WorldatWork Compensation Research Camp, 2001
• American Compensation Association Research Grant, 1997
• Deloitte & Touche Doctoral Fellow, 1997

• Volkswagen Just Nuked The Public's Trust In Companies Trying To Save The Planet, Huffington Post - 09/21/2015
• Why Disgraced CEOs Get Insanely Generous Payout Packages When They’re Fired, Time - 09/11/2015
• Putting your money where your mouth is: companies link green goals to pay, The Guardian - 06/26/2014
• CEO PAY Average pay of local corporate chieftains rose last year; shareholders seem more interested in own returns than in curbing executive compensation, San Diego Union-Tribune - 06/09/2013
• Shareholders Cut CEO Pay in Backlash, ABCNews.com - 05/21/2012
• CEO pay rises again in 2011, while workers struggle to find work, USA Today - 03/28/2012
• Prof. of Accounting Wayne Guay writes an op-ed about whether US companies should be forced to disclose CEO pay ratios (subscription may be required)., Financial Times - 09/07/2010
• The opposition's rebuttal remarks, Economist - 08/15/2010
• Picking Big 'Peers' to Set Pay: Executive Compensation Is Often Skewed by Comparisons, The Wall Street Journal - 08/17/2009

Knowledge @ Wharton

• How Dynamic Electricity Pricing Can Improve Market Efficiency, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• Is Algorithmic Management Too Controlling?, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• The Hidden Cost of AI Energy Consumption, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• Charitable and Political Giving | Pinar Yildirim, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/12/2024
• The Future of Banking, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/11/2024
• Election Statistics, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/06/2024
• Robots Are Taking Over Low-skilled Jobs — and Changing Votes, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/05/2024
• Crypto Politics: Liberals’ and Conservatives’ Confidence in Cryptocurrencies, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/05/2024
• Leadership and Elections | Mike Useem, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/05/2024
• Automation Is Harming Low-skilled Workers and Possibly Their Voting Preferences, Knowledge @ Wharton - 11/01/2024