Stephen Glaeser

• Jeremy Michels, Stephen Glaeser, Robert E. Verrecchia (2020), Discretionary Disclosure and Manager Horizon: Evidence from Patenting, Review of Accounting Studies, 25 (), pp. 597-635. 10.1007/s11142-019-09520-0 Abstract

  We examine the relation between manager horizon and discretionary disclosure, using patenting as a measure of disclosure. Patenting reflects, in part, a manager’s decision to disclose the successful outcome of research and development (R&D). When a firm invests in R&D but does not patent, investors are unsure whether this reflects a failed R&D project or the manager choosing not to patent. We suggest that investors’ beliefs about a manager’s horizon—whether the manager seeks to maximize short-term stock price or long-term profits—moderates their reactions. When investors believe a manager’s horizon is short, they expect the manager to disclose successful outcomes and therefore discount nondisclosure more. We predict that managers will patent more per dollar of R&D spending when their horizons are short and that investors will discount the value of nondisclosing firms more when they believe the manager’s horizon is short. We find evidence consistent with these predictions.

• Stephen Glaeser, Daniel Taylor, Christopher Armstrong, Sterling Huang (2017), The Economics of Managerial Taxes and Corporate Risk-Taking, The Accounting Review. Abstract

  We examine the relation between managers’ personal income tax rates and their corporate investment decisions. Using plausibly exogenous variation in federal and state tax rates, we find a positive relation between managers’ personal tax rates and their corporate risk-taking. Moreover — and consistent with our theoretical predictions — we find that this relation is stronger among firms with investment opportunities that have a relatively high rate of return per unit of risk, and stronger among CEOs who have a relatively low marginal disutility of risk. Importantly, our results are unique to senior managers’ tax rates –– we do not find similar relations for middle-income tax rates. We also find that the tax-induced risk-taking relates to idiosyncratic rather than systematic risk, suggesting that it will not be priced by well-diversified shareholders. Collectively, our findings provide evidence that managers’ personal income taxes influence their corporate risk-taking.

• Stephen Glaeser and Wayne Guay (2017), Identification and generalizability in accounting research: A discussion of Christensen, Floyd, Liu, and Maffett (2017), Journal of Accounting and Economics.
• Stephen Glaeser (Working), The Effects of Proprietary Information on Corporate Disclosure and Transparency: Evidence from Trade Secrets.
• Christopher Armstrong, Stephen Glaeser, John Kepler (Working), Accounting Quality and the Transmission of Monetary Policy.
• Christopher Armstrong, Stephen Glaeser, S. Huang (Working), Controllability of Risk and the Design of Incentive-Compensation Contracts.
• Christopher Armstrong, Stephen Glaeser, John Kepler (2016), Strategic Reactions in Corporate Tax Avoidance, Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), Forthcoming.

Knowledge @ Wharton

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• Oil, AI, and the Fed: What’s Next for Markets?, Knowledge @ Wharton - 07/31/2026
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