Elaine S. Pak

Elaine S. Pak
  • Doctoral Candidate

Contact Information

  • office Address:

    3116 SH-DH
    3620 Locust Walk
    Philadelphia, PA 19104

Research Interests: Corporate Strategy, Corporate Governance, Entrepreneurship, Labor Markets, Human Capital

Overview

Elaine is a PhD candidate whose research spans two broad areas. The first examines how active institutional investors (PE, VC, and hedge funds) influence firms’ strategies and capabilities. The second studies how social forces (social comparison and ideologies) shape collaborations across firms and workers.

Elaine holds a BA in public policy studies from Duke University and MS in industrial engineering from Seoul National University. Before entering academia, she worked as a consultant at Booz Allen Hamilton in Washington, DC.

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Research

  • Elaine Pak, Prasanna Tambe, David Hsu, Startup Jobs in a Polarized Era: How Dobbs v. Jackson Shifted the Geography of Remote and In-Person Applications. Abstract

    We examine how local political shifts affect startup applicant behavior, using data from a leading job search platform for technology startups. Analyzing patterns around the Supreme Court’s Dobbs v. Jackson ruling, we find that applications to in-person jobs in trigger-law states (where abortion became illegal) dropped by 9% relative to states where abortion remained legal. Applications to remote jobs in these states, however, were unaffected. Following the ruling, startups in trigger-law states had to offer 9.6% higher compensation to sustain applicant interest. These findings indicate that while unexpected shifts in the local political environment may adversely impact startups’ talent attraction, flexible job designs that leverage remote work and higher salary may offset this effect.

  • Claudine Gartenberg and Elaine Pak (2024), Internal versus Market Pay References in Knowledge-Intensive Firms, . Abstract

    How do firms balance market competitiveness with internal cohesion when setting employee pay? We examine this question using confidential compensation data on 19 million U.S. employees across 479 firms varying in knowledge intensity. We construct precise pay reference groups: internal benchmarks based on skill-equivalent peers across functions and market benchmarks based on same occupation, skill level, and region at other firms. We find that, in low knowledge-intensity firms, pay is equally sensitive to both internal and market benchmarks, while in high knowledge-intensity firms, pay becomes decoupled from market forces and aligns with internal benchmarks. Internal pay alignment also increases following CEO transitions that prioritize innovation. These patterns are driven by high-skilled employees in roles requiring complex problem-solving and collaboration. Moreover, firms with greater internal pay alignment generate more patents, including breakthrough innovations. Altogether, our findings reveal that, while some firms maintain close market alignment, knowledge-intensive firms appear to decouple pay from market forces. This is particularly the case for their skilled workers, consistent with firms prioritizing internal social dynamics in contexts where complex problem-solving and collaboration are important for value creation.

  • Claudine Gartenberg and Elaine Pak (Under Review), Corporate Ownership and Employee Compensation. Abstract

    The rise of active corporate owners has raised questions about their influence on stakeholder outcomes, particularly regarding employee compensation. Using detailed compensation records from 20 million employees across 896 U.S. firms, we document that firms controlled by active owners—hedge funds and private equity firms—pay 2 to 4% less for comparable work relative to other firms. These differences arise through lower base pay, particularly for lower-skilled workers, as well as flatter incentive structures, particularly for higher-skilled workers. These compensation differences are concentrated among workers in routine jobs, with active owners paying 2-5 % less and 7-20% lower bonus-to-base ratio for comparable work, while showing minimal difference among workers in non-routine positions. Through analyses of private equity buyouts, matched comparisons, and lead-lag tests, our evidence suggests these patterns reflect, at least partially, an ownership treatment effect. Altogether, our results suggest that these owners either place less value on routine work or substitute financial incentives with input monitoring and control. These patterns suggest that differences in ownership structure manifest not only in firm strategy and governance, but also in fundamental approaches to motivating and managing employees.

Teaching

Past Courses

  • MGMT1010 - Intro To Management

    We all spend much of our lives in organizations. Most of us are born in organizations, educated in organizations, and work in organizations. Organizations emerge because individuals can't (or don't want to) accomplish their goals alone. Management is the art and science of helping individuals achieve their goals together. Managers in an organization determine where their organization is going and how it gets there. More formally, managers formulate strategies and implement those strategies. This course provides a framework for understanding the opportunities and challenges involved in formulating and implementing strategies by taking a "system" view of organizations,which means that we examine multiple aspects of how managers address their environments, strategy, structure, culture, tasks, people, and outputs, and how managerial decisions made in these various domains interrelate. The course will help you to understand and analyze how managers can formulate and implement strategies effectively. It will be particularly valuable if you are interested in management consulting, investment analysis, or entrepreneurship - but it will help you to better understand and be a more effective contributor to any organizations you join, whether they are large, established firms or startups. This course must be taken for a grade.

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