The role of corporations in society is again the subject of debate across finance, law, and management. This essay aims to expand the debate beyond whether social benefits and costs be included in the corporation’s objective function. I make the following two arguments. First, corporate purpose is broader than the debate recognizes. It is a mechanism for social choice, defining which problems a firm takes up, which solutions it pursues, whose interests count, and how conflicts among them are adjudicated. Purpose thereby shapes the admissible domain of corporate action, guides judgment among incommensurable alternatives, and helps form an organizational constituency capable of acting on that ordering. Second, polarization creates a larger divergence in values across the population, reducing consensus on the social issues raised by the modern economy. The appropriate locus of social choice—and therefore the appropriate scope of corporate purpose —depends on both the breadth of the parties materially affected and the degree of contestation over the end. Purpose has its greatest capacity and legitimacy within bounded constituencies, while broad and contested effects call for government and the political process. Revisiting the institutional settlement that emerged from the debates of the 1930s, the essay presents corporate purpose and public authority as complementary institutions for governing modern capitalism.
