Many U.S. states are launching state-sponsored auto-enrollment retirement plans, with the goal of boosting retirement savings among private-sector workers lacking access to employer-sponsored retirement plans. This paper provides an analysis of state-sponsored auto-enrollment plans, and specifically, the plan’s default contribution rate. We develop a tractable framework to derive the optimal default contribution rate taking into account workers’ decisions on adhering to the default contribution rate. The optimal default contribution rate is shaped by the social benefits of increased savings due to adherence to the default that keeps workers from undersaving, while reducing reliance on means-tested social transfers. The optimal default contribution rate is also counterbalanced by the social benefits of action when an undesirable default option compels workers to make an active decision. To estimate these counterbalancing social welfare forces, we use individual-level administrative and survey data from OregonSaves, the state-sponsored plan offered by the Oregon state government, and suggest the optimal default contribution rate to be 8%.