Joshua Lewis

Joshua Lewis
  • Doctoral Candidate

Contact Information

  • office Address:

    526.5 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
    3730 Walnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19104

Research Interests: consumer behavior, consumer judgment, spending under uncertainty; charitable giving

Links: Personal Website, CV

Overview

I am a PhD candidate at Wharton researching consumer behavior. My research focuses on how cognitive biases influence consumer decision making. I aim to answer questions such as:

  • When do consumers overspend on products that increase their chances of attaining their goals?
  • Do charitable donors use cost-effectiveness information to donate more efficiently, or could they use it to donate less efficiently?
  • Why are consumers more sensitive to discounts off of lower prices?
  • ​Does a sales price feel lower relative to a single high list price or a range of high list prices?

​A list of my papers is below, and you can read more about my projects here.​
​My CV is available here.
You can email me at: 
lejoshua@wharton.upenn.edu.

Publications and Manuscripts in the Review Process
(updated October 2019)

Lewis, Joshua, Celia Gaertig, and Joseph P. Simmons (2019), “Extremeness Aversion Is a Cause of Anchoring, Psychological Science, 30(2), 159–173.
 
Lewis, Joshua and Joseph P. Simmons, 
Prospective Outcome Bias: Investing to Succeed When Success Is Already Likely, forthcoming at Journal of Experimental Psychology: General.

Working Papers

Lewis, Joshua and Deborah A. Small, “Ineffective Altruism: Giving Less When Donations Do More Good.”

Lewis, Joshua, Alex Rees-Jones, Uri Simonsohn, and Joseph P. Simmons, “Diminishing Sensitivity to Outcomes: What Prospect Theory Gets Wrong about Diminishing Sensitivity to Price.

Lewis, Joshua and Joseph P. Simmons, “The Directional Anchoring Bias.”

Green, Etan A., Joshua Lewis, “The Forgone-Option Fallacy.”

Green, Etan A. and Joshua Lewis, and David Rothschild, “Barely Plausible Anchor Values Maximize Bias.”
 
Moore, Alexander, Joshua Lewis, Emma E. Levine, and Maurice E. Schweitzer, “Trusting Kind Friends and Fair Leaders: How Relationships Affect the Antecedents of Trust.”

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Research

  • Joshua Lewis and Joseph Simmons (2020), Prospective Outcome Bias: Incurring (Unnecessary) Costs to Achieve Outcomes That Are Already Likely, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 149 (), pp. 870-888. Abstract

    How do people decide whether to incur costs to increase their likelihood of success? In investigating this question, we offer a theory called prospective outcome bias. According to this theory, people tend to make decisions that they expect to feel good about after the outcome has been realized. Because people expect to feel best about decisions that are followed by successes—even when the decisions did not cause those successes—they will pay more to increase their chances of success when success is already likely (e.g., people will pay more to increase their probability of success from 80% to 90% than from 10% to 20%). We find evidence for prospective outcome bias in nine experiments. In Study 1, we establish that people evaluate costly decisions that precede successes more favorably than costly decisions that precede failures, even when the decisions did not cause the outcome. Study 2 establishes, in an incentive-compatible laboratory setting, that people are more motivated to increase higher chances of success. Studies 3–5 generalize the effect to other contexts and decisions and Studies 6–8 indicate that prospective outcome bias causes it (rather than regret aversion, waste aversion, goals-as-reference-points, probability weighting, or loss aversion). Finally, in Study 9, we find evidence for another prediction of prospective outcome bias: people prefer small increases in the probability of large rewards (e.g., a 1% improvement in their chances of winning $100) to large increases in the probability of small rewards (e.g., a 10% improvement in their chances of winning $10).

  • Joshua Lewis and Deborah Small (Working), Ineffective Altruism: Giving Less When Donations Do More Good. Abstract

    Despite well-meaning intentions, people rarely allocate their charitable donations in the most cost-effective way possible. The manner in which cost-effectiveness information is presented can be a contributing factor. In four studies (N = 2,725), when we inform participants of the cost of a unit of impact (e.g. the cost of a mosquito net), they perversely donate less when the cost is cheaper. This result arises because people want their donation to have a tangible impact, and when the cost of such an impact is lower, people can achieve it with a smaller donation. A remedy for this inefficiency is to express cost-effectiveness in terms of “units per dollar amount” (e.g. 5 nets provided per $10 donated) and leave the cost of providing one tangible item unstated, rendering it less salient as a target donation amount.  Across Studies 2 and 3, we demonstrate both the inefficiency and the effectiveness of the remedy for incentive-compatible donations decisions about providing meals, oral rehydration therapy, deworming medication, and measles vaccines.

    Related
  • Joshua Lewis, Celia Gaertig, Joseph Simmons (2019), Extremeness Aversion Is a Cause of Anchoring, Psychological Science, 30 (), pp. 159-173. Abstract

    When estimating unknown quantities, people insufficiently adjust from values they have previously considered, a phenomenon known as anchoring. We suggest that anchoring is at least partially caused by a desire to avoid making extreme adjustments. In seven studies (N = 5,279), we found that transparently irrelevant cues of extremeness influenced people’s adjustments from anchors. In Studies 1-6, participants were less likely to adjust beyond a particular amount when that amount was closer to the maximum allowable adjustment. For example, in Study 5, participants were less likely to adjust by at least 6 units when they were allowed to adjust by a maximum of 6 units than by a maximum of 15 units. In Study 7, participants adjusted less after considering whether an outcome would be within a smaller distance of the anchor. These results suggest that anchoring effects may reflect a desire to avoid adjustments that feel too extreme.

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Joshua Lewis and Joseph Simmons (2020), Prospective Outcome Bias: Incurring (Unnecessary) Costs to Achieve Outcomes That Are Already Likely, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 149 (), pp. 870-888.
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