Colin D. Sullivan

• Judd B. Kessler, Corinne Low, Colin Sullivan (2019), Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception, American Economic Review, 109 (11), pp. 3713-3744. Abstract

  We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

• Colin Sullivan, Eliciting Preferences over Life and Death: Experimental Evidence from Organ Transplantation. Abstract

  Optimal allocation of scarce, life-saving medical treatment depends on society’s preferences over survival distributions, governed by notions of equality and efficiency. In a novel experiment, I elicit preferences over survival distributions in incentivized, life-or-death decisions. Subjects allocate an organ transplant among real cats with kidney failure. In each choice, subjects allocate a single organ based on the expected survival of each patient. The survival rates imply a price ratio, allowing me to infer the shape of indifference curves over survival bundles. I find that the vast majority (80%) of subjects respond to increases in total expected survival time, while a small minority display Leontief preferences, providing the transplant to the shortest-lived patient at all price ratios. Hypothetical decisions may not be reliable in this context: a large share (46%) of subjects allocate a hypothetical transplant differently than a real transplant, though estimates of aggregate preferences are the same across incentivized and unincentivized conditions. Finally, I show that aversion to wealth inequality is a good predictor of aversion to survival inequality.

• Colin Sullivan, Clayton Featherstone, Eric Mayefsky, Why Do Some Clearinghouses Yield Stable Outcomes? Experimental Evidence on Out-of-Equilibrium Truth-Telling. Abstract

  In two-sided settings, market designers tend to advocate for deferred acceptance (DA) over priority mechanisms, even though theory tells us that both types of mechanisms can yield unstable matches in incomplete information equilibrium. However, if match participants on the proposed-to side deviate from equilibrium by truth-telling, then DA yields stable outcomes. In a novel experimental setting, we find out-of-equilibrium truth-telling under DA but not under a priority mechanism, which could help to explain the success of DA in preventing unraveling in the field. We then attempt to explain the difference in behavior across mechanisms by estimating an experience-weighted learning model adapted to this complex strategic environment.  We find that initial beliefs drive the difference in agents’ ability to find strategic equilibria, rather than alternative explanations such as differences in the learning process.

Past Courses

• BEPP2500 - Managerial Economics

  This course will introduce you to "managerial economics" which is the application of microeconomic theory to managerial decision-making. Microeconomic theory is a remarkably useful body of ideas for understanding and analyzing the behavior of individuals and firms in a variety of economic settings. The goal of the course is for you to understand this body of theory well enough so that you can effectively analyze managerial (and other) problems in an economic framework. While this is a "tools" course, we will cover many real-world applications, particularly business applications, so that you can witness the usefulness of these tools and acquire the skills to use them yourself. We will depart from the usual microeconomic theory course by giving more emphasis to prescription: What should a manager do in order to achieve some objective? That course deliverable is to compare with description: Why do firms and consumers act the way they do? The latter will still be quite prominent in this course because only by understanding how other firms and customers behave can a manager determine what is beswt for him or her to do. Strategic interaction is explored both in product markets and auctions. Finally, the challenges created by asymmetric information - both in the market and within the firm - are investigated.

• BEPP9500 - Managerial Economics

  Public goods, externalities, uncertainty, and income redistribution as sources of market failures; private market and collective choice models as possible correcting mechanisms. Microeconomic theories of taxation and public sector expenditures. The administration and organization of the public sector.

Knowledge @ Wharton

• Fed Leadership, Rate Cuts, and Geopolitical Risks Ahead, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/27/2026
• Manscaped CMO, Marcelo Kertész, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/26/2026
• Understanding Crypto Sentiment and Market Signals, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/25/2026
• Inside the National Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum’s Evolving Mission, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/25/2026
• AI Is Killing the Cover Letter, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/24/2026
• When Does AI Assistance Undermine Learning?, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/24/2026
• How AI Is Reshaping Human Intuition and Reasoning | Gideon Nave and Steven Shaw, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/24/2026
• Consumer Cryptocurrency Confidence Report 2025, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/23/2026
• How Geopolitics Is Hitting Local Gas Stations, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/20/2026
• Zillow’s VP of Brand and Product Marketing, Beverly Jackson, Knowledge @ Wharton - 02/19/2026