Zhiying (Bella) Ren

Zhiying (Bella) Ren
  • Doctoral Candidate

Contact Information

  • office Address:

    500 Jon M. Huntsman Hall
    3730 Walnut Street
    Philadelphia, PA 19104

Research Interests: Conversations, negotiations, interpersonal judgements

Links: Personal Website, Curriculum Vitae

Research

  • Zhiying Ren and Rebecca Schaumberg (2024), Disagreement Gets Mistaken for Bad Listening, Psychological Science. 10.1177/095679762412399 Abstract

    It is important for people to feel listened to in professional and personal communications, and yet they can feel unheard even when others have listened well. We propose that this feeling may arise because speakers conflate agreement with listening quality. In 11 studies (N = 3,396 adults), we held constant or manipulated a listener’s objective listening behaviors, manipulating only after the conversation whether the listener agreed with the speaker. Across various topics, mediums (e.g., video, chat), and cues of objective listening quality, speakers consistently perceived disagreeing listeners as worse listeners. This effect persisted after controlling for other positive impressions of the listener (e.g., likability). This effect seemed to emerge because speakers believe their views are correct, leading them to infer that a disagreeing listener must not have been listening very well. Indeed, it may be prohibitively difficult for someone to simultaneously convey that they disagree and that they were listening.

  • Einav Hart, Julia Bear, Zhiying Ren (2024), But what if I lose the offer? Negotiators’ inflated perception of their likelihood of jeopardizing a deal, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 181 (). 10.1016/j.obhdp.2024.104319 Abstract

    When deciding whether to negotiate, individuals typically assess any potential costs of negotiation. We propose that one major cost that individuals are concerned about, particularly in the context of job offers, is an offer being withdrawn from the bargaining table—losing out on a deal entirely. We refer to this heretofore unexamined concern as the perceived likelihood of jeopardizing a deal by negotiating. We investigate job candidates’ perceived likelihood of jeopardizing a deal, as compared to hiring managers’ reports, across seven studies (total N = 3,338), including surveys of academic job candidates and members of academic hiring committees, managers and hiring professionals, and experimental studies with interactive, incentivized negotiations conducted both in person and online. We consistently document that job candidates’ perception of the likelihood of jeopardizing a deal is exaggerated, i.e., discrepant with that of the hiring side. In some cases, this perception is associated with negotiation avoidance. We also theorize and find support for two underlying psychological mechanisms: zero-sum perceptions and psychological power. We further document contextual factors that decrease candidates’ zero-sum perceptions or increase their perceived power, which, in turn, diminish (but do not fully eliminate) the discrepancy between candidates’ and managers’ perceptions of the likelihood of jeopardizing a deal.

  • Zhiying Ren, Eugen Dimant, Maurice Schweitzer (2023), Beyond belief: How social engagement motives influence the spread of conspiracy theories, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 104 (). Abstract

    Across a pilot study and three preregistered experiments (N = 4128), we demonstrated that people knowingly shared conspiracy theories to advance social motives (e.g., to receive “likes”). In addition to accuracy, people seemed to value social engagement (e.g., “likes” and reactions). Importantly, people not only expected most conspiracy theories to generate greater social engagement than factual news, but they were also more willing to share conspiracy theories when they expected such theories, compared to factual news, to generate sufficiently greater levels of social engagement. In an interactive, multi-round, content-sharing paradigm, we found that people were very sensitive to the social feedback they received. When they received greater social feedback for sharing conspiracy theories than factual news, participants were significantly more likely to share conspiracy theories, even when they knew these theories to be false. Our findings advance our understanding of why and when individuals are likely to share conspiracy theories and identify important prescriptions for curbing the spread of conspiracy theories.

  • Zhiying Ren, Einav Hart, Emma E. Levine, Maurice Schweitzer (2022), The shared responsibility model of deception, Current Opinion in Psychology. Abstract

    Deception scholarship has focused on deceivers and has largely conceptualized targets as passive victims. We integrate the articles in this special issue, along with a broad body of literature on deception, moral judgment, and blame, to introduce the Shared Responsibility Model of deception (SR Model). The SR Model conceptualizes deception as a social process to describe how both communicators and targets are responsible for deception. Observers’ perception of the targets’ responsibility is a function of (1) whether targets should have expected deception, (2) whether targets took preventive actions, (3) targets’ inferred motives, and (4) targets’ characteristics. The SR Model also challenges the implicit assumption that as communicators’ responsibility for deception increases, targets’ responsibility decreases. The SR Model has important implications for research on ethics, communication, and behavioral decision making.

  • Zhiying Ren, Andrew Carton, Eugen Dimant, Maurice Schweitzer (2022), Authoritarian Leaders Share Conspiracy Theories to Attack Opponents, Galvanize Followers, Shift Blame, and Undermine Democratic Institutions, Current Opinion in Psychology. Abstract

    Although many virtuous leaders are guided by the ideal of prioritizing the needs and welfare of their subordinates, others advance their self-interest at the expense of the people they purport to serve. In this article, we discuss conspiracy theories as a tool that leaders use to advance their personal interests. We propose that leaders spread conspiracy theories in service of four primary goals: 1) to attack opponents; 2) to galvanize followers; 3) to shift blame and responsibility; and 4) to undermine institutions that threaten their power. We argue that authoritarian, populist, and conservative leaders are most likely to spread conspiracy theories during periods of instability.

Activity

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