Jessica Kim-Gina

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EDUCATION

The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania expected 2018
Ph.D. in Accounting
Master in Statistics (joint degree)

Penn Law School, University of Pennsylvania expected 2018
Masters in Law (joint degree). *Intellectual Property and Technology Law Track*

The Stern School, New York University
Bachelor of Science in Finance, Mathematics. *Magna Cum Laude* 2011

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Information problems arising from corporate intellectual properties (intangibles); Information sharing in supply chains; Contracting role of accounting

WORKING PAPERS

1. **External Verifiability of Accounting Information and Intangible Asset Transactions** (*Job market paper)*
2. **Co-opetition and Firm's Information Environment** (*with Brian Bushee and Thomas Keusch)*
3. **Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure on Human Capital**

WORK IN PROGRESS

1. **Implicit Corporate Taxes and Technology Transfer** *(with Jennifer Blouin)*

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor – University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School 2015
Financial Accounting (Undergraduate Core)

Teaching Assistant – University of Pennsylvania, The Wharton School 2013 - 2017
Financial Statement and Disclosure Analysis (Prof. Brian Bushee; MBA Elective)
Problems in Financial Reporting (Prof. Brian Bushee; MBA elective)
Fundamentals of Financial Accounting (EMBA Core)
Fundamentals of Financial and Managerial Accounting (EMBA Core)
Managerial Accounting (Undergraduate Core)

GRANTS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS

Laventhol and Horwath Accounting Scholarship	2017
Mack Institute for Innovation Research Fellowship	2015 – Present
Laventhol and Horwath Accounting Scholarship	2014
Doctoral Fellowship, The Wharton School	2012 – 2017
Beta Gamma Sigma (ΒΓΣ) International Honor Society	2010
Boylan & Sidlik Scholarship	2010
NYU Stern Scholarship, Dean's List, Distinctive Honor Key	2007 – 2011

INVITED CONFERENCE PARTICIPATION

2017: Nick Dopuch Accounting Conference (*poster session*)
Journal of Accounting and Economics Conference
Wharton Innovation Doctoral Symposium (WINDS)
Notre Dame Accounting Research Conference
Wharton Spring Accounting Conference
Northwestern Searle Center Research Roundtable on Patents

2016: Wharton Spring Accounting Conference
Northwestern Searle Center Research Roundtable on Patents (*presenter*)
UNC Tax Symposium
FARS Doctoral Consortium/Midyear Meeting

2015: AAA-Deloitte Foundation-J Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium
UNC Doctoral Tax Seminar

2014: Journal of Accounting and Economics Conference

ACADEMIC SERVICE

Ad-hoc Reviewer
Journal of Accounting and Economics
The Accounting Review

OTHER PROFESSIONAL AND RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant – Cornell University, Ithaca, NY	2011 – 2012
Research Assistant – NYU Stern School, New York, NY	2010
Intern – Goldman Sachs, New York, NY	2008 – 2009

REFERENCES

Brian Bushee	Christopher Ittner	Richard Lambert
Geoffrey T. Boisi Professor	*EY Professor*	*Miller-Sherrerd Professor*
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ABSTRACTS

1. **"External Verifiability of Accounting Information and Intangible Asset Transactions"** (*Job market paper)*

Abstract: Firms commonly use disaggregated accounting information to facilitate efficient contracting over intangible assets. However, reliance on accounting measures creates information asymmetries and thus a role for contract audits. Using a hand-collected sample of technology licensing agreements with royalties based on product-line revenues, I investigate how perceived weaknesses in the licensee's accounting system and reporting flexibility affect the design of two key audit terms—(1) the scope of audit rights, and (2) penalties for adverse audit outcomes. I find that perceived weaknesses in the licensee's reporting system lead to the granting of broader scope audit rights to the licensor, consistent with licensors demanding broader auditor rights when the licensee's accounting system is believed to be less reliable. However, when the licensee has greater reporting flexibility, the contracting parties are more likely to include penalties in their agreements, consistent with the deterrence theory that penalties

ABSTRACTS (CONT'D)

are a more cost-effective means to discourage intentional misreporting. Licenses covering more territory and having longer durations are associated with narrower audit scope terms, consistent with the self-enforcement theory that the greater the opportunity cost of early termination, the greater the licensee's incentives to self-enforce. Overall, my results suggest that audit scope and penalties can improve contracting efficiency in two different ways.

2. **"Co-opetition and Firm's Information Environment"** (*with Brian Bushee and Thomas Keusch)*
Abstract: Some firms in the technology sector choose to cooperate with competitors ("co-opetition") in Standards Setting Organizations (SSOs). These SSOs create technology standards that facilitate rapid market penetration of new technologies such as Wi-Fi and Blue-Ray. Active participation in the standard setting process requires the exchange of proprietary information with competitors. While the goal of such information sharing is to further a technology or a market, firms potentially receive an unintended benefit from access to competitor and industry information. Comparing firms that actively contribute information in SSOs with firms that passively participate (i.e., do not share information), we find that SSO-contributing firms are more likely to issue annual sales forecasts after initiating their collaboration. We also find the SSO-contributing firms experience an improvement in the accuracy of their annual sales and earnings forecasts and a reduction in the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. Our findings contribute to the literature by showing that collaborating with competitors in the product market provides an important unintended benefit of improving the manager's information set.

3. **"Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure on Human Capital"**
Abstract: I examine the determinants of human capital discussions by managers during conference presentations. I consider the conflicting incentives regarding the voluntary discussions: the incentive to resolve uncertainty surrounding human capital versus incentive to withhold information for proprietary reasons. I find that labor mobility of employees makes voluntary disclosure costly while the firm's market power and reliance on knowledge-workers encourage the disclosures. Specifically, firms in knowledge-based industries face a difficult dilemma regarding the disclosures, which are sensitive to labor mobility. Overall, my findings suggest that human capital turnover, especially human capital loss to competitors, contributes significantly to the proprietary cost of human capital-related disclosures.

4. **"Implicit Corporate Taxes and Technology Transfer"** *(with Jennifer Blouin; work in progress)*
Abstract: We examine the existence and magnitudes of implicit taxes at the corporate level by investigating royalty rates in arm's-length technology transfer transactions. Theory predicts that the pre-tax returns of tax-favored assets will be lower than the pre-tax returns of tax-disfavored assets. If firms face higher tax rates on their income from technology transfers, we predict higher royalties rates are charged to their counterparties relative to licensor firms in lower-tax jurisdictions. In preliminary analyses, we find that technology licensing agreements between two US-based entities tend to have higher royalty rates than those involving foreign entities in low-tax jurisdictions. Furthermore, we take advantage of time-series and cross-sectional variations in statutory tax rates of sample licensee and licensor firms to estimate the magnitude of the corporate implicit taxes.