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Undergraduate and Master Studies:
B.A. (Honors), International Relations – Political Economy, University of Southern California, 2008
M.C.P., Urban and Regional Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011

Doctoral Studies:
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2012 to present
Thesis Title: Essays in Public Economics and International Trade
Expected Completion Date: May, 2018

Thesis Committee and References:
Professor Gilles Duranton (co-chair)
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
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Professor Benjamin Keys
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Teaching and Research Fields:
Applied Microeconomics, International Trade and Labor Markets, Public Economics, Urban Economics

Teaching Experience:
Fall/Sp, 2016   *Urban Fiscal Policy* (Undergraduate, MBA), Wharton School
                  - TA for Professor Robert Inman [teaching reference]
Fall, 2014   *Intermediate Microeconomics and Game Theory* (MBA), Wharton School
                  - TA for Professors Matthew Friedman, Corinne Low, and Michael Sinkinson
Fall 2011   *Intermediate Microeconomics and Urban Economics,* MIT Urban Planning
                  - Tutor for Master in City Planning students, Professor Frank Levy

Research Experience and Other Employment:
2016 – Present   Special Sworn Status researcher at U.S. Census Bureau
2012 – 2013   Research Assistant for Santosh Anagol (Wharton) and Thomas Fujiwara (Princeton)

2011 – 2012	Research Associate for Michael Greenstone (MIT), Rohini Pande (Harvard), Nick Ryan (Harvard), Anant Sudarshan (Harvard), J-PAL Poverty Action Lab, India
2010 – 2011	Research Assistant, Private Council for Competitiveness, Bogotá Colombia

Professional Activities:

Presentations: NBER Trade and Labor Markets Conference, 2017; Applied Economics Faculty Seminar, 2017 (UPenn, Wharton)

Conferences Attended: NBER Summer Institute, 2017 (Labor Studies and Urban Economics); Frontiers In Urban Economics (Columbia University), 2015; Price Theory PhD Workshop, 2015 (University of Chicago); Handbook of Urban and Regional Economic Vol. 5, 2014 (UPenn, Wharton); AEA Annual Meetings 2014, 2016; CIBER Globalization of Innovation Workshop (Duke, Fuqua); Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Community Development Research Forum, 2013

Refereeing: Journal of Development Economics, Journal of Public Economics

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2017	Kauffman Dissertation Fellowship ($20,000)
2016	Lincoln Land Institute, Lowell Harris Dissertation Fellowship ($10,000)
2016	J-PAL North America, Project Development Grant ($5,000)
2016	Wharton Public Policy Initiative, Ibrahim Family Fellow ($12,000)
2013-15	Wharton Mack Institute for Innovation Research Grants ($18,500 cumulative)
2012-16	Wharton Doctoral Education Fellowship
2011	MIT Caroll L. Wilson Award ($7,000)

Research Papers:

Can Displaced Labor Be Retrained? Evidence from Quasi-Random Assignment to Trade Adjustment Assistance (JOB MARKET PAPER)

Presented at: *NBER Trade and Labor Markets conference, October 2017*

The extent to which workers adjust to labor market disruptions in light of increasing pressure from trade and automation commands widespread concern. However, surprisingly little is known about efforts that deliberately target the adjustment process. This project studies 20 years of worker-level earnings and re-employment responses to Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)—the United States' largest and longest standing public incentive program for retraining. I estimate causal effects from the quasi-random assignment of TAA cases to investigators of varying approval leniencies. Using employer-employee matched Census data on 300,000 displaced workers, I find large initial returns to TAA. Ten years out, TAA-trained workers have $50,000 higher cumulative earnings, driven by both higher incomes and greater labor force participation. Yet annual returns fully depreciate after ten years. TAA appears to have no effect on formal education, and decaying returns are restricted to states with low training durations. Combined with evidence that effects are driven by training rather than transfer components of TAA, this suggests that the program augments transient rather than permanent human capital. Returns are further concentrated in the most disrupted regions, where workers are more likely to switch industries and move to labor markets with better opportunities in response to training—consistent with adjustment frictions.

When Do Firms Go Green? Comparing Price Incentives with Command and Control Regulations in India with Ann Harrison, Leslie Martin, and Shanthi Nataraj. *NBER Working Paper #21763.*

India has a multitude of environmental regulations but a history of poor enforcement. We compare the effectiveness of command-and-control (CAC) environmental regulations versus price incentives for manufacturing enterprises. Our measures of effectiveness include investment in pollution abatement, reducing use of dirty fuels like coal, and productivity growth. Between 1996 and 2004, India's Supreme Court required 17 cities to enact Action Plans to reduce air pollution through a variety of CAC regulations. We find that the Action Plans affected firm behavior at the extensive margin, increasing the share of large firms investing in pollution control, and reduced the entry of new firms. In contrast, price incentives appear to have been more effective at influencing the intensive margin of firm behavior; we find that higher coal prices are associated with lower coal use within firms, with price elasticities similar to those found in the US.

Imported Inputs and Productivity Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment

This paper considers how input market liberalization affects host country productivity spillovers from multinational corporation (MNC) investments. The standard "Backward Linkage" measure used to estimate technology and learning spillovers to local upstream suppliers—pioneered by Javorcik (2004) and replicated across several influential papers—implicitly assumes domestic and foreign firms share the same input structure. I show that this assumption constitutes an omitted variable bias of imported inputs in TFP spillover estimation. Using a novel Colombian firm panel that isolates imported from domestic inputs, mean backward linkage productivity spillovers reduce in half when the share of locally sourced inputs is adjusted to reflect MNCs' observably higher propensity to import inputs. However in some industries, productivity spillovers increase in response to the adjustment. I demonstrate that the sign and magnitude of this bias are proportional to the elasticity of substitution between imported and domestic inputs. The results highlight how input market liberalization can have important feedback effects on local productivity spillovers from MNCs.

Research In Progress:

Tax Credit Instruments and Labor Market Outcomes: Do Targeted Incentives Outperform Lotteries?

Note: *Project approved for analysis with U.S. Census Bureau confidential microdata (April, 2016), and by State of California Governor's Office of Business and Economic Development (May, 2016)*

States continue to attract employers with location-based tax credits. In an effort to reduce inframarginal (i.e. wasteful) tax expenditures, some states have attempted to target these incentives to firms most likely to relocate. I exploit two natural policy experiments in California to study the efficacy of these incentives under both targeted and untargeted assignment mechanisms. Prior to 2013, California awarded tax credits in part via a randomized lottery, but the state has since switched to a targeted formula that ranks firms based on their likelihood of exiting the state absent the subsidy. Because the formula uses a score cutoff to assign tax credits, I can compare results from the lottery to those from a regression discontinuity design around this acceptance threshold, implicitly testing whether states can identify marginal-mover firms *a priori*. Combining state administrative data on the universe of tax credit applicants with Census Bureau microdata, I can estimate effects on employer relocation, local employment, firm revenue and implied tax revenue.

Other: Author of "Open-Source GIS Tutorial for Applied Economists – Application: Quantifying the Externality Costs of Pollution Diffusion". MIT Poverty Action Lab, 2013. (Links: Tutorial | R Code)

Languages: English (native), Spanish (fluent), French (fluent), Hindi (beginner)

Computer: Stata, SAS, R, Matlab, LaTeX, ArcGIS, Open-Source GIS (various), MS Office