Alexander Belyakov

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Education	The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2015–2020 PhD in Finance	
	New Economic School, 2011–2015 B.A. in Economics	
Research Interests	Private Equity	
Job Market Paper	Economics of Leveraged Buyouts: Theory and Evidence from the UK Private Equ Industry	
	Empirical analysis of a sample of companies with private equity (PE) ownership in the UK shows that PE firms act as deep-pocket investors for their portfolio companies, rescuing them if they fall in financial distress. In contrast, external financing is expensive for companies without PE-ownership in financial distress. The paper builds a model that shows how companies form rational expectations about the costs of financial distress, and how these expectations affect ex-ante policies. The model explains the empirically-observed differences in how companies with and without PE-ownership invest, pay dividends, and issue debt. In particular, the model fully explains the difference in leverage of companies with and without PE-ownership. The model shows that greater tax-shield benefits and superior growth of PE-backed companies can explain 6.4% of the abnormal return of PE firms. The conclusion that follows from the paper, however, is that abnormal returns PE firms cannot be replicated by other investors.	
Work in Progress	Omitted Variable in Capital Structure Regressions , available on SSRN	
	This paper addresses two puzzling empirical results in the capital structure literature: why leverage and profitability are negatively correlated, and why investments are explained by the cash flow in a regression controlled for the market-to-book ratio. The paper derives a model, in which firms are heterogeneous in the quality of their investment opportunities. Firms with ex-ante better investment opportunities 1) issue less debt that is not dedicated to finance invest- ments, and 2) are able to raise debt at a smaller rate conditioning on the leverage, which results in a smaller leverage over time in this group of firms. Firms with ex-ante better investment opportunities also invest more, have greater ex-post profitability and greater cash flows. The model presented in the paper is simple and tractable, yet it gives a very good quantitative fit to the data.	
	Leverage and Financing in Distress, available on SSRN	
	Very few firms issue equity to refinance their debt in distress. This simple observation has an important effect on the predictions of capital structure models. A model in which highly-levered firms needing external finance must issue debt explains the overall underleverage puzzle, fully replicates the fat right tail of cross-sectional leverage distribution, and produces realistic default probabilities	

needing external finance must issue debt explains the overall underleverage puzzle, fully replicates the fat right tail of cross-sectional leverage distribution, and produces realistic default probabilities across firms with different leverage values. The model succeeds even if bankruptcy costs are only 10% of firms assets, whereas the model that allows for equity issuance requires bankruptcy costs to exceed 60% in order to generate plausible average leverage.

Finance in Europe (Executive MBA, Wharton), 2018-2019 Prof. J. Gomes, Prof. B. Gultekin, and Prof. B. Yilmaz		
Behavioral Finance (MBA/Undergraduate, Wharton), 2017-2019 Prof. N. Roussanov		
Empirical Methods in Finance (PhD, Wharton), 2017 Prof. A. Yaron		
Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Grant, 2019		
Mack Institute for Innovation Management Research Grant, 2019		
Jacob Levy Equity Management Fellowship, 2018		
John Hodges PhD Prize in Finance for the best second-year paper, 2018 Awarded for the paper "Leverage and Financing in Distress"		
Best Corporate Finance Paper Award, Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, 2017 Awarded for the paper "Leverage and Financing in Distress"		
INSEAD-Wharton Doctoral Consortium, 2018		
Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, 2017		
Economics Letters, Journal of Monetary Economics		
VC Fund Runa Capital, Intern, 2014		
Trained Military Officer, Lieutenant		
English, Russian		
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	 Prof. J. Gomes, Prof. B. Gultekin, and Pr. Behavioral Finance (MBA/Undergraduate, W Prof. N. Roussanov Empirical Methods in Finance (PhD, Wharto Prof. A. Yaron Rodney L. White Center for Financial Resear Mack Institute for Innovation Management Resear Jacob Levy Equity Management Fellowship, 2 John Hodges PhD Prize in Finance for the be Awarded for the paper "Leverage and Finan Best Corporate Finance Paper Award, Austra Awarded for the paper "Leverage and Finan INSEAD-Wharton Doctoral Consortium, 2018 Australasian Finance and Banking Conference Economics Letters, Journal of Monetary Econ VC Fund Runa Capital, Intern, 2014 Trained Military Officer, Lieutenant English, Russian Joao F. Gomes (Chair) Howard Butcher III Professor of Finance The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Phone: (215) 898-3666 E-mail: gomesj@wharton.upenn.edu Bilge Yilmaz Wharton Private Equity Professor The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania Phone: (215) 898-1163 	