 Claim Durability and Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem

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ABSTRACT— Bankruptcy has a tort problem. Chapter 11 predictably subordinates the claims of tort and other involuntary creditors to those of financial lenders, a fact which encourages firms to rely excessively on secured debt and discount the interests of those they might incidentally harm. For this reason, many scholars have advocated changing repayment priorities to move tort creditors to the front of the line. But despite broad academic support for a new “super priority,” the idea has yet to inspire legislative action.

This article proposes an alternative solution rooted in tort claims’ temporal durability rather than their priority. Chapter 11 subordinates tort claims only because of a convention that assets should emerge free-and-clear of prepetition debts if those who control the reorganization so elect. Bankruptcy courts could buck the convention and insist that tort claims follow a debtor’s assets out of Chapter 11 unless a deal otherwise is struck. The theoretical insight motivating our proposal is that durability and priority are close substitutes. In broad strokes, a super-durability norm should produce similar effects to a super-priority rule. In some respects, using durability may in fact be superior. It could avoid the need for costly, inaccurate judicial efforts to estimate the extent of debtors’ tort liability. It could also be implemented by judicial fiat and without new legislation. Whatever one thinks of implementation, taking claim durability seriously as a design variable raises questions—and extends recent debates—about when bankruptcy law needs to crystallize otherwise fluid legal relationships to achieve its ends.

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INTRODUCTION

Five months after the New Yorker surfaced allegations of sexual impropriety against Harvey Weinstein, the famed producer’s firm, the Weinstein Company, filed for bankruptcy. New leadership was needed. A sale of the business as a going concern promised to best preserve its value. But why route the transaction through bankruptcy? One doesn’t generally invoke Chapter 11 to sell a business. State law usually suffices. The Weinstein Company, a Delaware LLC, could have been sold under the eye of the able Court of Chancery. What the Company got from bankruptcy was neither especially sound execution nor especially prudent review. What it got was a way to transfer wealth from Mr. Weinstein’s alleged victims, many of whom had colorable claims against the Company, to the Company’s financial creditors.

If the Weinstein Company had been sold outside bankruptcy, the women might have sought damages from the buyer, as successor-in-interest. The Company used Chapter 11 to rule out that possibility. It was not a novel tactic. Bankruptcy is often used to extinguish claims that might otherwise follow a distressed business. Buyers will offer a premium for immunity. Presumably the Company fetched more in

3 Id. at ¶ 4 (explaining that the reason to file was “to permit an orderly sale of substantially all of the Debtors’ assets … in order to maximize the value of the estate for the benefit of creditors and other stakeholders”).
4 Indeed, the Company seems to have been lining up a sale outside bankruptcy until the putative buyer reneged at the last minute. Id. at ¶¶ 50–63.
Chapter 11 than it would have had it been sold in the ordinary course. Because sale proceeds are applied first to satisfy senior creditors, the predictable effect of using bankruptcy was to increase the secured lenders’ recoveries at the tort plaintiffs’ expense.8

The dynamic underlying the Weinstein Company case is an example of bankruptcy’s tort problem.9 As it is practiced, Chapter 11 subordinates tort and other involuntary creditors, who often receive token recoveries no matter how objectionable the conduct giving rise to their claims may be.

The ability to shed tort and environmental obligations in bankruptcy creates a judgment-proof problem.10 In a world of limited liability for shareholders and priority for secured creditors, tort victims bear insolvency risk. They must bear the costs of injury if the tortfeasor’s assets are insufficient. Yet they are not paid for doing so. Business managers therefore face an asymmetry in the way investors—broadly understood to include involuntary investors—respond to balance-sheet risk. Financial lenders charge less interest if they will be repaid first, but involuntary creditors cannot charge more for being made to rank last. To exploit the asymmetry, profit-maximizing companies will tend to employ excessive leverage and discount the harms they may inflict on others.11

Bankruptcy’s tort problem has taken on new urgency in recent years. It first emerged as a challenge in the 1980s with the asbestos cases. The toxin’s ubiquity and long latency period between exposure and serious illness posed conceptual as well as institutional challenges for reorganization practice.12 Recently, however, the treatment of tort

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9 We use “tort” expansively to include debts not established under a contractual or otherwise reciprocal framework. Thus we include, for example, environmental and regulatory debts. Cf. Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. REV. 120, 199–200 (2019) (describing prospect of free-and-clear disposition as disincentive to comply with environmental laws).


and other involuntary claims has emerged as the key theme of bankruptcies spanning a wide range of industries and sources of obligation—from responsibility for coal cleanup\(^\text{13}\) and wildfire deaths\(^\text{14}\) to liability for opioid abuse,\(^\text{15}\) child molestation,\(^\text{16}\) and sexual assault.\(^\text{17}\)

Scholars have long understood that bankruptcy can prevent companies from bearing many of the social costs of their behavior. Two remedial proposals have proved influential. One idea, most closely identified with Professors Hansmann and Kraakman,\(^\text{18}\) is to abolish limited liability for corporate torts—to allow tort victims to recover from shareholders the balance of any judgment a primary claimant problem pits those whose claims have matured at the time of a company’s bankruptcy against those whose claims are contingent or unmatured. It implicates the interests of tort creditors (as a class) to the extent there is a lag between unlawful conduct and injury. But it is fundamentally a conflict between earlier-in-time and later-in-time creditors (all of whom might be tort creditors). Our interest in this article is in conflict between higher- and lower-priority creditors, so we will not treat future claimant issues further. The curious reader should start with Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1984); and Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 Case W. L. Rev. 435 (1999). Professors Ayotte and Listokin should be consulted on trust design. See Kenneth Ayotte & Yair Listokin, Optimal Trust Design in Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 7 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 403 (2005); and Yair Listokin & Kenneth Ayotte, Protecting Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcies, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1435 (2004).
corporate wrongdoer’s assets prove insufficient to pay. The primary alternative, first developed by Professors Buckley, Heidt, and Leebron, is to establish a statutory super-priority for tort claims. Both proposals can be shown to improve managers’ incentives, at least in principle. The super-priority’s appeal in particular has become an article of faith among bankruptcy scholars with a wide range of perspectives. Academic popularity has not, however, translated into legislative action.

This article proposes and explores the merits of establishing what we call a “super-durability” norm. The idea is to insist that tort claims follow a debtor’s assets through and beyond Chapter 11, attaching to the reorganized debtor or, in case of a going-concern sale, to the buyer. Tort creditors would in effect choose whether to litigate against the post-bankruptcy company or accept what those in control of the Chapter 11 process offer to resolve the claims. The advantage of super-durability over the status quo inheres in the bargaining parameters it would underwrite. In brief, the parties’ estimates of the magnitude of liability could be expected to ground settlement discussions. Today, by contrast, the amount of liability is almost irrelevant in many cases. A debtor’s insurance coverage rather than its fault determines what tort creditors can hope to recover.

The central motivating insight is that durability and priority are close substitutes. At first approximation, a super-durability norm would improve incentives the same way as a super-priority rule. It would increase tort creditors’ recoveries at the expense of financial

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19 Id. Professor Roe suggested a similar doctrinal innovation, for similar reasons, five years earlier in response to the asbestos bankruptcies. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1, 40–42 (1986); cf Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 107 (1985) (arguing that “the magnitude” of limited liability’s tort problem “is reduced by corporations’ incentives to insure”).
23 The first suggestion of a super-priority rule seems to have been in a student note in the Stanford Law Review. See Painter, supra note _, at 1080–81.
24 See infra notes _ [part 1.B.].
25 See infra notes _ [part 1.B.2].
lenders’ recoveries. Lenders would thus have to recalibrate. They would have to increase interest rates or mandate more insurance for leveraged borrowers. They would have reason to insist on, and borrowers would have reason to agree to, cost-effective prophylactic measures. Despite such measures, however, risky businesses would see their capital costs grow and their footprints shrink. In short, they would better internalize the costs of the risks they impose if tort claims enjoyed either greater priority or durability.

Nevertheless, a super-durability norm might in fact be superior to a super-priority rule. For one thing, it does not require costly and inaccurate estimation procedures. A super-priority rule depends on just that. It calls on the bankruptcy judge to reduce to a point estimate her intuitions about how underlying causes of action would fare in a counterfactual world where they were prosecuted in state court. Valuation is, of course, a staple of bankruptcy practice. But it is not an especially reliable or attractive part of the practice. A super-priority rule would expand its domain to a realm where even the limited discipline of discounted cash-flow analysis is absent. Tort verdicts are notoriously uncertain. Lenders would be motivated to influence the judicial assessment. Whether dispersed, involuntary claimants would adequately protect their collective interests is an open question. In any event, the process would be expensive. Under a super-durability norm, by contrast, valuation would be left to the parties. If no deal were reached, the default would not be a hearing; the tort claimants would simply wait for the firm to emerge from bankruptcy and bring suit against the successor entity. A durability norm could thus encourage bargaining over litigation.

Moreover, a super-durability norm would not face the political-economy barriers that have frustrated super-priority proposals. The features of Chapter 11 that extinguish tort claims depend on judicial


27 An adequately funded statutory representative of tort claimants could mitigate their collective-action and liquidity problems.

28 In cases where the tort creditors themselves face a holdout problem, a committee or voting process could be used, either in an advisory or binding manner.
approval. Judicial disapproval could be the beginning of a super-
durability norm. The buck could start with the bench even absent legislative action.

To be sure, judicial implementation of a super-durability norm would face its own hurdles. In a world of liberal forum-selection rules, the norm could be expected to have real bite in large cases only if its wisdom were widely recognized. Judicial implementation would also require upsetting established patterns of practice. In the modern era, bankruptcy judges have been generally willing to extinguish claims at the behest of a sale or plan proponent. Their deferential attitude is consistent with the dictum that bankruptcy officials ought to do what they can to “maximize the value of the estate.” Super-durability works precisely because it does not maximize the estate’s saleable value. Its logic thus implies a qualification to prevailing ideas. If bankruptcy aims to put resources to their highest-value use, asset-value, not estate-value, should guide discretion.

One has to be careful, though, not to overstate the novelty of the judicial attitude we propose. The attitude is in fact deeply rooted in reorganization law. As far back as the railroad equity receiverships, courts have been willing to recognize extraordinary claim durability to ensure that disfavored creditors receive fair treatment. Indeed the upshot of the most famous of all the receivership cases, *Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd*,32 was that an empty-handed tort creditor could assert the full amount of his claim against a reorganized company notwithstanding the fact of an intervening foreclosure sale.33

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29 Reorganized firms frequently assume some prepetition obligations voluntarily. See Roe & Chung, supra note __, at 416–26 (tabulating data from large-corporate bankruptcies resolved through section 363 sale). But they do so to maintain a relationship with an important counterparty or to buy labor peace. Tort claims are not usually among the obligations voluntarily assumed, because most businesses have no relationship-specific investment in their tort creditors.


32 228 U.S. 482 (1913).

33 *Id.* at 502; cf. *Railroad Co. v. Howard*, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392 (1869) (holding that beneficiaries of a railroad’s guarantees could assert claims against purchasers of the railroad’s assets at foreclosure sale).
featured a creditor whom the reorganization had completely shut out even as it distributed value to shareholders, treatment the absolute priority rule today would prevent. Nevertheless, the case—and its forebears—can be read broadly to condone super-durability as a judicial strategy for ensuring a claim’s fair treatment.

The prospect of a durability norm for tort claims has implications for bankruptcy theory whatever one ultimately makes of the idea. In recent years, prominent scholars have joined a debate on the wisdom of the absolute priority rule. Critics of the rule object to the assumption embedded in it that bankruptcy must collapse future possibilities to achieve its ends. Bankruptcy can be imagined as a sieve. The critics reason that junior investors’ optionality can pass through the sieve without threatening any of reorganization law’s cardinal functions. This Article is among other things a provocation to widen the terms of debate. Our narrow thesis is that law might work better if tort claims can flow through the bankruptcy sieve. More broadly, though, we hope to show by illustration that the absolute priority rule is but one example of Chapter 11’s general tendency to truncate open-ended legal relationships.

35 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE UNWRITTEN LAW OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS (manuscript on file with authors).
37 Professors Casey and Morrison recently made just this point in another context. See Anthony J. Casey & Edward R. Morrison, Beyond Options, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW (Barry E. Adler ed. 2020) (examining truncation of senior creditors’ real option to foreclose).
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part 1 lays the foundation. It explains the problem and reviews the relevant academic literature. Part 2 sets out our proposal. It outlines two mechanisms by which bankruptcy judges could promote super-durability within the confines of existing law. Part 3 assesses the significance of a super-durability norm. It shows that in many cases, such a norm would force debtors and creditors to internalize some of the social costs of business and facilitate bargaining between tort claimants and other creditors. It then discusses more complex scenarios—in particular, where there is contingent or otherwise unknown liability, asymmetric information about the nature of liability, or what we call “hot potato” assets. Part 4 addresses the chief practical objections to our proposal: counter-strategies managers and financial creditors might adopt to frustrate our proposal. We conclude that a presumption in favor of super-durability would do much to solve bankruptcy’s tort problem.

I. Bankruptcy’s Tort Problem

The bankruptcy process systematically undercompensates tort creditors. By definition, a company’s insolvency implies that not everyone can be repaid in full. However, not only do tort creditors typically recover less than 100 cents on the dollar, but they recover less relative to other claimants than they ought to. We are by no means the first to say so. The predominant academic view holds, in response, that tort claims should have first dibs on a bankrupt debtor’s resources.38 Parts 2 and 3 outline and assess ways to implement a similar norm without congressional action. First we set the stage with an account of the problem—its legal source and economic significance—and sketch the two leading, but seemingly infeasible, proposals to curb it.

A. The Culprits

A common theme in corporate bankruptcies is that tort creditors fare poorly. Pennies on the dollar is standard compensation for prepetition injury.39 The Weinstein Company case described above is

38 See infra notes ___.
39 Sometimes debtors, especially small-businesses, file with (because of) a recent tort judgment. See Crowell Moring, List of Asbestos Bankruptcies (2019), https://www.crowell.com/files/list-of-asbestos-bankruptcy-cases-chronological-
a telling example but by no means unique. Black-letter doctrine and the bargaining dynamics of Chapter 11 ensure that tort creditors end up on the bottom of the heap.

Two features of the legal landscape—shareholder limited liability and the priority of secured debt—are the primary culprits. Limited liability sets an upward limit on the recovery available to all creditors at the value of the debtor’s assets. In doing so, it prevents tort creditor from recovering from the debtor’s shareholders.40 The priority of secured debt means that creditors with a lien on an insolvent corporation’s property are entitled to the value of the encumbered property (up to the amount of the claim). Together, the doctrine of limited liability and the priority afforded to secured creditors ensure that a bankrupt firm’s tort creditors’ compensation generally comes from whatever value remains after secured claims have been paid. Modern capital structures are often designed so there is little, if any, residual value left for tort creditors.41

Tort creditors’ weak bargaining position also reduces the amount that they are able to recover from bankruptcy. In theory, unsecured creditors should share roughly pro rata in the residual value after secured claims are paid.42 In practice, however, tort claimants often fare worse than other unsecured creditors because, almost by definition, they have nothing to offer a reorganizing enterprise. Other unsecured creditors, such as vendors, customers, and employees, may

order.pdf (listing all bankruptcies triggered by asbestos litigation). In many such cases we know the debtor’s tort liability. But in other cases, a debtor files before the claims are reduced to judgment. The liability can be estimated as part of the bankruptcy process, but it needn’t be if the plan of reorganization is consensual. See Kavya Balaraman, Judge Approves PG&E Wildfire Settlements, Bringing Utility Closer to Bankruptcy, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/bankruptcy-judge-approves-pge-wildfire-settlements-utility-reorganization/569304/.


continue to interact with the business. Debtors often find ways to pay these claims in full. Not so with tort creditors, whose claims are pure “legacy” liabilities and are treated as such. Their leverage, the right to block a plan of reorganization that “discriminate[s] unfairly” against them, is worth little in practice. Debtors take advantage of a variety of means to distribute value to the unsecured creditors they like best long before a plan of reorganization comes into view.

Moreover, investors’ expectations about how bankruptcy might affect competing claims informs capital-structure and investment decisions to the detriment of tort claimants. These decisions in turn increase the likelihood that a company will injure third parties and reduce the size of those victims’ recoveries. The basic problem—the reason we say tort creditors are undercompensated—is that existing norms encourage the managers of, and investors in, leveraged companies to discount excessively the risks their businesses pose and to maintain potentially inefficient capital structures precisely in order to push risk onto third parties.

To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical in a simple decisionmaking environment (featuring risk-neutral agents with complete information). Acme Corporation’s CEO, faithful to her shareholders, must decide whether to create a new subsidiary to undertake a risky project. There are two relevant periods. In period 1, the CEO will decide whether to invest in the project, which will cost $10,000 cash. In period 2, the project—if the subsidiary invests—will either succeed or fail. If the project succeeds, it will yield an asset worth $14,000. If the project fails, it will yield an asset worth $10,000, but will also cause the company negligently to injure strangers to the tune of $4,000.

43 One reason debtors may try to pay certain unsecured creditors is that doing so can be help preserve value. For example, a clothing manufacturer that purchases fabric on favorable terms from a fabric provider may want to continue paying the fabric manufacturer in order to avoid defaulting on the contract. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Janus Faces of Reorganization Law, 44 J. CORP. L. 1 (2018).


45 See, e.g., Skeel, The Empty Idea, supra note _, at 714–20 (documenting the most common methods of subordinating disfavored unsecured creditors).

46 See Michael Ohlrogge, Insolvency and Incentives for Efficient Care (manuscript on file with authors) (finding that, as firms approach insolvency, they become more likely to violate environmental laws).
The social decision rule is straightforward. Success generates a net return of $4000; failure generates a net social cost of the same amount. Acme should invest in the project if and only if it has at least an even-odds chance of success. But limited liability and the priority of secured debt encourage the CEO to underweight the expected cost of failure, to impose more risk than is socially warranted. (For simplicity, we will leave it to the reader to model the impact of the bankruptcy bargaining dynamics described above.)

1. Perverse Effects of Limited Liability

Consider first the CEO’s incentives if the project is to be financed entirely with Acme’s equity capital (scenario 1). If the project succeeds, Acme, the subsidiary’s sole shareholder, nets $4000. It captures the full social benefit of the venture. If the project fails, Acme suffers the full social cost: the tort victims are made whole from the value of the subsidiary’s asset, leaving Acme with $6000 of value, for a loss of $4000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario 1 [all-equity financing; limited liability]</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Victims</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
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On these facts, Acme fully internalizes the risk the project imposes on strangers. The CEO makes the socially optimal choice, undertaking the project only if success is more likely than failure.

The socially optimal result will not always hold, however. Suppose, for example, the same facts except that the project will yield a $30,000 asset if it succeeds and yield a $10,000 asset, but impose $20,000 of tort damages, if it fails (scenario 1a). The social calculus is identical. A socially motivated executive would invest only if success were at least as likely as failure. But the CEO faithful to her shareholders’ pecuniary interests would think differently. If the project succeeded, Acme would reap the full $20,000 of benefit. If it failed, its loss would be capped at $10,000, the amount of invested capital. Acme would “externalize” the other $10,000 of social loss. A CEO seeking to maximize shareholder value would thus invest in the project if it had as little as a 1-in-3 chance of success.
The general rule is that shareholders of a company that finances its operations entirely with equity will underweight the costs their business imposes on strangers to the extent those costs might exceed the value of the company’s assets. Nevertheless, in an all-equity financing structure, the interests of shareholders and strangers are reasonably aligned except in situations that might yield catastrophic mass liabilities.

2. **Perverse Effects of Secured Debt Priority**

Leveraged companies, especially those that rely heavily on secured debt, face more perverse incentives. To see this, consider a variation on the Acme hypothetical above. Suppose the company finds a lender that is willing to put up $9000 of the $10,000 needed to finance the project. In exchange, the subsidiary must give a security interest in all of its assets and promise to repay the principal when the project is completed (scenario 2). (It is a 0%-interest loan.)

The payoffs in this scenario are as follows. If the project succeeds, the lender is paid in full ($9000) and the shareholders receive the residual $5000 of value on an investment of $1000. If the project fails, the picture is more complicated. The lender, having first priority in a bankruptcy, recovers its full $9000 claim. (The loan is risk-free.) This means the tort victims recover only a fraction of their claim. The subsidiary has only $1000 of value left to be claimed, and limited liability insulates the shareholders from having to make up the difference. The shareholders, for their part, lose their $1000 investment.

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47 Mark J. Roe, *Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort*, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986). The asbestos cases of the 1980s revealed instances of this pattern. Some of the opioid cases seem to share it. Purdue, at least, seems to have carried very little if any funded debt.

48 We use a zero-interest loan to abstract from questions of capital cost and so make a comparison of nominal returns instructive. In reality, of course, the financing choice would be a function in part of the relative cost of equity and debt capital.
Scenario 2 [debt/equity financing; limited liability; secured debt priority]

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<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lender</td>
<td>9000 – 9000 = 0</td>
<td>9000 – 9000 = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1000 – 4000 = -3000</td>
<td>(1-p)(-3000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>5000 – (-1000) = 4000</td>
<td>0 – 1000 = -1000</td>
<td>(p)(4000) + (1-p)(-1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>-4000</td>
<td>(p)(4000) + (1-p)(-4000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CEO’s calculus ignores the effect of the project’s failure on the tort victims. She cares only about the fact that the shareholders stand to gain $4000 in case of success and to lose $1000 in case of failure. She thus will invest if the project has as little as a 1-in-5 chance of success.

The significance of secured debt under existing bankruptcy norms can be described in general terms: Priority allows investors to externalize the risk that their business will create harms that exceed the difference between the value of the company’s assets and the face amount of secured claims. The ability to impose tortious harm can be understood as a special kind of capital; it is an input to production. But because the size of a tort judgment doesn’t scale with the tortfeasor’s credit risk, the “price” of tort is invariant to a company’s leverage. Two conclusions follow. Companies will tend to take on more leverage than is socially optimal, and leveraged companies will tend to impose more tort risk than is socially optimal.


50 The first to observe this fact, as far as we are aware, is James H. Scott, Jr., Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. FIN. 1, 2 (1977) (“By the issuance of secured debt, the firm can increase the value of its securities by reducing the amount available to pay legal damages in the event that the firm should go bankrupt.”).

51 See, e.g., Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social Justice, 1994 U. Ill. L. REV. 1, 32 (1994) (“To the extent that a firm knows that it will not have to fully compensate its future tort victims, it has too little incentive to take care to prevent accidents in the first instance.”).
B. Extant Proposed Responses

The academic literature first recognized bankruptcy’s tort problem in the 1980s, during the wave of asbestos filings.\(^\text{52}\) Since then, scholars have proposed two solutions. Each proposal targets one of the two issues (limited liability and a priority claim for secured creditors) we identified above. The proposals, especially proposals to grant tort creditors a super-priority claim, enjoy broad academic support. We think both proposals would improve on the status quo, though both have very real downsides. Unlimited liability for corporate torts might make it more difficult for firms to raise capital. A super-priority for tort claims might force involuntary creditors to engage in costly and speculative valuation disputes. Moreover, it is not clear that either proposal could be implemented. And that proviso is fatal. Both proposals would require implementing legislation unlikely to come from Congress or the state capitals.

1. Unlimited Shareholder Liability

One suggestion, most closely identified with Professors Hansmann and Kraakman, would make shareholders liable on an unlimited basis for a company’s tort liabilities.\(^\text{53}\) The logic of the proposal is straightforward. It would put shareholders as a group on the hook for a company’s torts one way or another—either indirectly if the company pays (since the value of their shares will decrease by the amount of the payment), or directly if it does not. Under a rule of unlimited liability, the priority of secured debt is, at first approximation, irrelevant to tort creditors.\(^\text{54}\)

To see this, return to the hypothetical in which Acme’s leverage encouraged risk-taking, but now with a rule of unlimited shareholder liability (scenario 3). The way Acme’s value is distributed is identical to scenario 2. The lender is paid in full whether the project succeeds or fails. The shareholders take $5000 in case of success, but lose their

\(^{52}\) See, e.g., Painter, supra note __; Roe, supra note __; Roe, supra note __; Buckley, supra note __; Haidt, supra note __.


\(^{54}\) See, e.g., Leebron, supra note __, at 1639; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note __, at 1991–92.
$1000 investment in case of failure. And the strangers injured in case of failure recover only $1000 of their $4000 claim. The difference is that now the tort victims recover their $3000 deficiency claim from the shareholders in their individual capacities.

| Scenario 3 [debt/equity financing; unlimited liability; secured debt priority] |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
|                                 | Success         | Failure        |
| Lender                          | 9000 – 9000 = 0 | 9000 – 9000 = 0 | 0 |
| Victims                         | 0               | (1000 – 3000) + [4000] = 0 | 0 |
| Equity                          | 4000 – 1000 = 3000 | (0 – 1000) – [3000] = -4000 | (p)(3000) + (1-p)(-5000) |
| Social                          | 4000            | -4000          | (p)(4000) + (1-p)(-4000) |

Shareholders reap the gains from success and bear the losses associated with failure. (The lender does not bear the losses associated with failure because the loan is risk-free.) Their payoffs reflect the social cost-benefit trade-off, and the faithful CEO therefore has an incentive to choose well.

In theory, unlimited shareholder liability could perfectly resolve bankruptcy’s tort problem. In practice, however, the rule would cause some problems of its own. Among other things, unlimited liability discourages relatively wealthy investors, who anticipate being the primary targets of litigation, from owning shares alongside relatively judgment-proof investors.\(^{55}\) It encourages wealthy shareholders to spend resources monitoring their fellows and to arrange their own affairs to become as judgment-proof as possible. Together these undermine the fungibility of shares, diminish the value of secondary markets, and so undermine to some extent the corporate form’s utility in promoting capital formation.\(^{56}\) Unlimited liability may also be difficult to implement. The administrative costs of filing suits against potentially thousands of shareholders in multiple venues would be enormous.\(^{57}\) Legislation aimed at consolidation might drive investors


off-shore, making them effectively judgment proof. These challenges are, of course, but special instances of the generic downsides of unlimited shareholder liability.

Unlimited liability for corporate torts might yet on balance be good policy. Where share ownership is relatively concentrated—as, for example, in family- and private equity-owned companies—the advantages of limited liability are small and the costs of unlimited liability therefore modest. Even where share ownership is relatively diffuse, companies could dampen the rule’s side-effects by keeping sufficient cash on-hand or maintaining sufficient insurance to pay anticipated tort claims without opening recourse to shareholders.

But the question is moot. Such a radical change would require major legislative upheaval, probably on a state-by-state basis. It is unlikely to come soon.

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60 The rule of limited liability is usually thought to be part of a corporation’s “internal affairs.” Its reach therefore has traditionally been a matter of the chartering state’s law. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should Discard the Internal Affairs Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 85 (2008). Presumably Congress could legislate on the topic. Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 346–48 (2018). Perhaps states could, too, with respect to torts committed in their respective territories. But legislation other than from chartering states would at least upend tradition.

61 If a state did abolish limited liability with respect to tort claimants, one would expect firms to reincorporate in states whose liability regimes were more favorable to equity. This “race to the bottom” would likely deter states from adopting such a radical reform unilaterally. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that there is a race to the bottom among state incorporation laws); Cf Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 251, 271 (1977) (arguing that there is a race to the top); See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 21 (Ann Petty ed., 1993) (describing specific instances in which competition among states has led to a race to the bottom and instances in which it has led to a race to the top); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992) (same)
2. **Super-Priority for Tort Creditors**

An alternative remedy for bankruptcy’s tort problem would grant tort and other involuntary creditors a super-priority lien on debtor assets. The idea is to expose involuntary creditors, who are not paid for taking on credit risk, to as little of it as possible. As with unlimited liability, the rule would make tort creditors indifferent to a company’s leverage. Secured credit could not be used to externalize tort risk.

To see this, return to the Acme hypothetical, now with limited liability and a rule that requires that tort creditors be paid first from a debtor’s assets (scenario 4). If the project succeeds, then, as before, the lender is repaid $9000 and the shareholders receive $5000. If the project fails, however, the tort creditors now recover their full damages ($4000). The lender takes the remaining $6000 of value. As in the previous example, the shareholders recover nothing.

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The distinctive feature of this scenario is that the lender bears some of the business’s tort risk. On the simplifying assumptions we have made—that the lender charges no interest and does not intervene in governance—Acme’s shareholders are still able to externalize the risk, now onto the lender instead of the victims. But proponents of a super-priority for tort creditors reason that it would provoke a dynamic response from financial creditors. The lender wouldn’t offer the same loan terms in a world where it knows it might not recover as much as it would in a world in which it is protected from tort risk, as it is in the scenario posited above.

Formerly high-priority creditors could be expected to respond in two ways: price and governance. Start with price. Because secured creditors face increased credit risk under a super-priority regime, they will charge more interest. In our hypothetical, the lender loses $3000 if the project fails. Suppose the lender believed the project had a fifty percent chance of success. It would need to make $3000— or charge 33% interest—in order to hold constant its expected nominal return of $0 (scenario 4a). Acme’s new interest expense in turn would drive down the profits available to shareholders if the project succeeds. Net of interest, the shareholders now would gain only $1000 in case of success. And, because they lose $1000 if the project fails, the lender’s adjustment to the rule change forces the shareholders to internalize their business’s tort risk.

**Scenario 4 [debt/equity financing; limited liability; super-priority]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lender</td>
<td>9000 - 9000 = 0</td>
<td>6000 - 9000 = -3000</td>
<td>(1-p)(-3000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4000 - 4000 = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>5000 - 1000 = 4000</td>
<td>0 - 1000 = -1000</td>
<td>(p)(4000) + (1-p)(-1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>-4000</td>
<td>(p)(4000) + (1-p)(-4000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scenario 4a [debt/equity financing; limited liability; super-priority]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lender</td>
<td>12,000 - 9000 = 3000</td>
<td>6000 - 9000 = -3000</td>
<td>(0.5)(3000) + (0.5)(-3000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4000 - 4000 = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>2000 - 1000 = 1000</td>
<td>0 - 1000 = -1000</td>
<td>(0.5)(1000) + (0.5)(-1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>-4000</td>
<td>(0.5)(1000) + (0.5)(-4000)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Secured lenders would also presumably respond to a super-priority rule by intervening more aggressively in the borrowers’ governance. In reality, unlike our hypothetical, the risks to which a lender will be exposed after funding are uncertain and prone to moral hazard. Borrowers therefore minimize the interest they must pay by inviting lenders to monitor, and in some instances veto, corporate activity, and also by bonding against excessive risk taking. Under a super-priority norm, more of the costs of corporate torts would fall on financial creditors than they currently do. The optimal amount of monitoring and bonding, including the use of third-party insurance policies, would increase. Risk-taking, in turn, would decrease.

Like the unlimited liability rule, a super-priority norm would solve bankruptcy’s tort problem only imperfectly. For one thing, it would not force managers and financial investors to internalize the expected costs of very large accidents. With limited liability in place, tort creditors could only ever recover up to the entire value of the tortfeasor’s assets. If the expected damages from a particular risk are very large relative to the value of a company’s assets, then a rule effectively assigning the company to tort victims would still undercompensate tort victims and fail to efficiently deter corporate risk-taking.

While a super-priority norm would increase tort claimants’ expected recoveries, it could also lead to complicated valuation disputes and might fail to provide adequate compensation for harms that have not fully manifested at the time of the bankruptcy. Frequently the magnitude of a company’s tort and environmental liability is unknown when it for bankruptcy. In some cases, including recently in PG&E and Purdue, companies file in large measure because they want a bankruptcy judge to sort out liability.

A super-priority rule might also provoke costly, strategic countermeasures. Managers and financial creditors of a company that faces large but unmatured tort liability might seek to wind down or otherwise alter the business’s scope before bankruptcy, even if doing so were wasteful. There is evidence, for example, that firms facing significant clean-up costs seek to separate valuable assets from

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64 Leebron, *supra* note __, at __.

65 For a discussion, see *infra* notes __ [Part 4.A].
environmental obligations. In doing so, they increase the likelihood that whoever takes over the valuable assets is able to do so without also assuming onerous cleanup costs.\footnote{See Macey & Salovaara, supra note __. Note, though, that a durability rule would not fully resolve this problem. Stronger fraudulent conveyance law is needed to reduce strategic pre-bankruptcy asset partitioning. See id.}

Despite its imperfection, we think that giving tort creditors a super-priority claim would be superior to the status quo.\footnote{For further discussion, see infra notes __ [Part 4.].} The idea’s biggest downside is the same as the unlimited liability idea’s: it doesn’t seem to be on the legislative agenda.

\section*{II. Implementing a Super-Durability Norm}

We propose to ameliorate bankruptcy’s tort problem by making tort claims durable to restructuring. More specifically, we encourage bankruptcy judges to extend a debtor’s tort liability to the entity that holds the offending business’s assets after the resolution of the bankruptcy. Under this approach, tort victims not paid in full or otherwise satisfied with their treatment in bankruptcy would be able to assert their claims outside it.

We expect that a norm change along these lines would lead to better tort recoveries through Chapter 11 itself, as parties formulate plans in the shadow of each constituent’s “outside option.” Part 3 will discuss the proposal’s economic implications. Here our aim is just to unpack the mechanism by which bankruptcy judges could implement this proposal under current law. To that end, we first describe the non-bankruptcy “durability” baseline and the Chapter 11 status quo. We then address the mechanics of judicial implementation. As we explain, there are at least two practical versions of a super-durability norm, corresponding to less and more aggressive norm change.

\subsection*{A. Durability Doctrines Outside Bankruptcy}

According to black-letter law, tort victims have only latent interests in a tortfeasor’s assets. Like all unsecured creditors, their primary right is \textit{personal}. It is a right that the debtor—and only the
debtor—should pay its debts. After a creditor reduces her claim to judgment, the state will assist her in seizing assets from a recalcitrant debtor. But until then, her interest in the assets is fragile. It can be extinguished if the debtor transfers his property after becoming personally liable but before execution. In general, an unsecured creditor can neither blame nor dispossess the transferee.

This orthodox statement of the implication of in personam liability obscures as much as it reveals, however. Where they apply, three exceptional doctrines allow an unsecured creditor to follow a debtor’s property into a transferee’s hands. These doctrines in effect make the creditor’s interest durable to transfer. For present purposes, we can bracket judgment lien and fraudulent transfer avoidance while simply noting their broad application and practical importance to law’s remedial function.

Successor liability is the durability doctrine most pertinent for thinking about how above-board restructuring transactions treat tort creditors. The presumptive rule of corporate succession holds that a buyer that purchases a company’s assets at fair value is not responsible for the seller’s debts. The debt belongs to the debtor. Successor liability defines the circumstances in which the presumption gives way. If the buyer voluntarily assumes the seller’s

68 See generally Joseph Henry Beale, The Exercise of ‘in Rem’ to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 HARV. L. REV. 107, 111 (providing a taxonomy of in rem and in personam rights).


70 This is not to say the unsecured creditor lacks any remedy during the interval. She may be able to attach assets to prevent their dissipation or get an injunction prohibiting transfer.

71 Every jurisdiction allows a judgment creditor to place a lien on at least some forms of debtor property. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 3201(a) (permitting judgment creditor to place a lien on the judgment debtor’s real property).

72 Unsecured creditors can recover property a debtor has transferred, or its value, to the extent the transferee gave the debtor less than “reasonably equivalent value” for it. See UNIF. VOIDABLE TRANSACTIONS ACT §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a), 7(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N, amended 2014).

73 The standard rule is that there is “no liability for the buyer.” Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2003); Aguas Lenders Recovery Group v. Suez, 585 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2009).

74 For discussion of successor liability’s relationship to M&A activity, see Albert H. Choi, Successor Liability and Asymmetric Information, 9 AM. L. & ÉCON. REV. 408 (2007); John H. Matheson, Successor Liability, 96 MINN. L. REV. 371 (2011); Richard
debts, then of course it is liable. Even absent voluntary assumption, the buyer can be held liable in most jurisdictions if a court finds that the buyer is a "mere continuation" of, or the result of a "de facto merger" with, the seller.

The prospect of successor liability is relatively strong where the proceeds of a financially distressed company’s sale yield tort creditors less than full recovery. This is not to say successor liability is ever a sure thing. The doctrine’s vague predicates are a case study in the indeterminacy of transcendental nonsense. Nevertheless, there are stronger and weaker cases. Vague as it is, the doctrinal language suggests common fact patterns. The paradigmatic going-concern transactions are designed either to “continue” the business in a new legal shell (with a healthier balance sheet and perhaps new owners) or to roll it up into an existing operation. Moreover, there is evidence that judges disproportionally find successor liability when failing to do so would yield less than full recovery for tort or other involuntary creditors.

A consequence is that acquisitions made under ordinary state-law processes reflect investors’ (probabilistic) expectations of tort liability. The more liability a buyer perceives to be associated with the seller’s business, the less he will pay for it. The discount might not be dollar-

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75 See Cargo Partner AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2003).
76 See, e.g., David R. Kuney, Successor Liability in Sales of A Debtor’s Assets: The Problem of the "Mere Continuation" Exception, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 269, 270 (1997) (“[U]nder existing law in most states, there is a serious risk that even bona fide, arm’s length sales of assets to existing owners will result in liability for the successor entity, even in the face of explicit documentation to the contrary.”).
78 See Frank Fagan, From Policy Confusion to Doctrinal Clarity: Successor Liability from the Perspective of Big Data, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 391 (2015) (analyzing factors that predict application of successor liability). There are good reasons for judges to focus the law this way. Absent successor liability, businesses expecting future tort judgments could sidestep liability by selling the business and paying the proceeds as a dividend to shareholders. Successor liability ensures that some pool of resources exists toward which tort claimants can look for satisfaction. See, e.g., __ [normative successor liability papers].
for-dollar, of course. Victims could opt to recover from the seller’s proceeds rather than from (or alongside) the buyer, or a court could decline to impose successor liability. The buyer is interested in what he expects to have to pay on account of the seller’s liabilities. But whatever the magnitude of the discount, its directional effect is predictable. Successor liability means that buyers will pay less for companies with existing or anticipated tort obligations.

B. Undoing Durability in Chapter 11

Chapter 11, as it is practiced today, allows debtors and their senior creditors to cut off successor liability.

Plans of reorganization. The conventional way to extinguish tort claims is through a plan of reorganization. When the Bankruptcy Code’s framers placed the plan construct at the center of corporate reorganization, they hoped doing so would produce flexibility, allowing dealmakers to tailor a resolution to a debtor’s unique circumstances. In that spirit, the Code omits mandatory distributional norms. Any plan that meets minimal statutory requirements and garners supermajority support from every class of affected creditor can be confirmed.

Distributional norms enter the picture through rules governing confirmation absent unanimity. If an impaired class objects, the plan cannot be confirmed unless it honors familiar hierarchical distribution norms. In broad strokes these rules say that secured creditors must recover the full value of their collateral if the proposed plan would pay unsecured creditors anything; that certain classes of privileged unsecured creditors should be paid before unprivileged classes; that shareholders should recover nothing unless creditors are paid in full. Consensual plans thus take the shape they do, more or less producing hierarchical, “waterfall” recoveries, with a view to

79 We invoke expectations here loosely. Risk-averse buyers of course care about variance as well as mean. For discussion of the effect of risk aversion on acquisition prices, see Choi, supra note ; see also infra notes [3.B.2].
81 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a). One exception: any lone creditor can object to the extent it recovers less under the plan that it would in a liquidation scenario. Id. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii).
creditors’ respective rights to object—with a view, that is, to objectors’ “outside options.”

By default, confirmation of a plan extinguishes the ability of tort victims (and most other creditors) to recover outside the plan’s terms—which, because they have general unsecured claims, are not often generous. The Code accomplishes this result in two steps: discharge and asset-cleansing. The section dealing with plan confirmation declares that—“[e]xcept as otherwise provided … in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan”—confirmation “discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation.” 84 And it declares—again, “except as otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan”—that “property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and interests of creditors.” 85 In short, tort creditors take only what the plan gives them. They may not sue the reorganized debtor or follow its assets into the hands of another entity that might acquire the business under the plan.

Section 363 sales. An alternative way to extinguish tort claims is through an asset sale that receives the blessing of the bankruptcy judge. Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes debtors, “after notice and a hearing,” to “use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate.” 86 The provision was designed to allow a business in the process of reorganizing (read: shrinking) to shed productive assets, like equipment, it would no longer need, and to ensure the integrity of such a sale. Its language proved sufficiently broad, however, to justify a sea-change in Chapter 11 practice. In modern practice, section 363 is used to sell distressed businesses on a going-concern basis. Approximately one-third of all large-corporate debtors who file for Chapter 11 do so in order to sell the business. 87

The most important, though not the only, reason managers of a distressed business might wish to sell in Chapter 11 is to cut off durability doctrines. Section 363, unlike ordinary principles of state law, allows a debtor to sell property “free and clear of any interest in such property.” The obvious application is to liens, which are traditionally described as interests in property. With the court’s permission, a debtor can in effect solve a latent holdout dynamic among lienholders unlikely to recover in full on their claims. The Courts of Appeals most important for corporate bankruptcy practice have also, however, understood section 363 to permit sales that cut off successor liability. The reasoning is suspect. Successor liability is not founded on an interest in property, but is rather a theory of personal liability—a reason why one person ought to answer for another’s wrongs. But in any case, section 363 has evolved such that it now offers distressed companies a relatively cheap avenue to cut off tort liability and limit tort creditors to whatever is left of sale proceeds after senior creditors have been repaid.

In practice, section 363 sale orders routinely cut off the rights of tort creditors. Our analysis of section 363 sale orders issued by Delaware bankruptcy judges between 2014–2019 turned up no cases


91 In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 288–290 (3d Cir. 2003); see also In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 123–26 (2d Cir. 2009), vacated by Indiana State Police Pension Tr. v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2010); Illinois Dep’t of Revenue v. Hanmi Bank, 895 F.3d 465, 472–75 (7th Cir. 2018) (holding that 363 sale blocks tax collector’s statutory right to follow assets in bulk sale transaction).

92 One can endorse the substantive rule while recognizing the statutory interpretation problem. The American Bankruptcy Institute’s commission on Chapter 11 reform, for example, took the position that Congress should clarify the rule to resolve doubt. AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N, supra note __, at 141–45.
carving out tort claims from the free-and-clear disposition. Selling assets free-and-clear is consistent with the dictum to “maximize the value of the estate.”

Two exceptions to Chapter 11’s tendency to undo durability are worth noting, both relating to liabilities “unknown” at the time of the bankruptcy. First, tort liabilities sufficiently remote at the time of disposition—whether by plan confirmation or sale—are not extinguished. The free-and-clear provisions work through the notion of a “claim.” The word “claim” is a term of art in the Bankruptcy Code, one defined to invoke a broad but not unlimited notion of a “right to payment.” It includes even “contingent” rights. Yet in some instances where a debtor’s prepetition (unlawful) conduct manifests injury only after disposition, courts say that no claim accrued before disposition and, consequently, that a plaintiff can assert its case without regard to the bankruptcy. Second, a claimholder who receives insufficient notice of bankruptcy proceedings is not bound by a discharge. Publication notice can suffice for creditors of whom a debtor is unaware. Many tort victims may fit that description. But if a debtor fails to give personal notice when it could have identified claimants and given personal notice with relatively little effort, their claims will not be extinguished.

94 The discharge provision works through the notion of “debt.” But a “debt” is just a liability on a claim. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12).
95 A “claim” includes any “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.” Id. § 101(5)(A).
96 See In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Epstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995) (successor liability can be discharged if prepetition conduct created relationship between debtor and future claimant and liability arose from prepetition operations); Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (no extinction of successor liability in section 363 sale where injury occurred after sale and plaintiffs had no pre-sale relationship with debtor); Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) (no enjoining suit brought against buyer of debtor assets free-and-clear).
97 See, e.g., Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Inadequate notice is a defect which precludes discharge of a claim in bankruptcy.”).
98 Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988); see also, e.g., Dahlin v. Lyondell Chemical Co., 881 F.3d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 2018).
99 The General Motors bankruptcy involved a prominent argument on this score. The Second Circuit held that Old GM had given insufficient notice to people
The exceptions are, however, exceptional. As far as tort victims are concerned, the main tendency of Chapter 11 is to shorten the temporal horizon or recourse.

C. Proposal: Redoing Durability

We propose that bankruptcy judges should embrace successor liability by preserving or even strengthening the norm that tort claims follow a business.

The mechanism we have in mind is simple, although, as we will explain, it could be implemented in a couple of ways. The free-and-clear disposition of a debtor’s assets requires judicial buy-in. Section 363 sales are conditioned on judicial approval after “notice and a hearing.” 100 Property dealt with in a plan of reorganization passes free-and-clear only if neither the plan nor the confirmation order says otherwise. 101 These rules vest bankruptcy judges with enormous discretion, though the Code does not say how they should exercise that discretion. 102 It does not enumerate, much less exhaust, the facts that a bankruptcy judge should consider when authorizing a free-and-clear sale. Our suggestion is that they consider, and give weight to, a proposed sale or confirmation order’s treatment of tort claims.

Before explaining our proposal, we should answer what might be a temperamental reaction. To lawyers accustomed to the status quo, our proposal might sound outrageous, even unprecedented. Its very design aims to undermine lawful priorities, they might think, recalibrating debtors’ capital structures on an ad hoc basis and moving unsecured creditors to the front of the line.

In a sense the charge is accurate. The aim is to produce better outcomes for tort creditors than they get under prevailing norms. And we do anticipate case-specific application of general principles.

harmed by its ignition-switch defect, such that they could seek to establish successor liability against New GM. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 829 F.3d 135 (2d. Cir. 2016).

100 11 U.S.C. § 363(b).
102 Cf. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE UNWRITTEN LAW OF CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with authors) (characterizing reorganization law as essentially open-ended judicial power to ensure that those who control a reorganization treat all claimants fairly).
But that is as far as the criticism holds up. There is no generic priority scheme to summon for defense, no Platonic pecking order subsisting beyond the concrete rules and norms of the bankruptcy forum (subject to constitutional limitations, of course). The absolute priority rule—an important feature of Chapter 11, to be sure—says nothing about whom creditors can sue beyond the confines of bankruptcy. It governs only the distributions a contested plan or reorganization can make. Absolute priority and the hierarchy it presupposes are useful heuristics, but they no longer capture the variety of ways a debtor’s prepetition creditors share value, if they ever did. Critical vendor orders, debtor-in-possession loan roll-ups, gifting transactions, rights offerings, inducements to join a restructuring supporting agreement: these are just a few examples of practical innovations nowhere sanctioned in the Bankruptcy Code, but nevertheless in wide use as a matter of discretion and deeply inconsistent with a stock notion of priority.

Existing law even features analogs that work at a systematic level by establishing a kind of successor liability. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) provides the most telling example. The Act establishes private obligations to remediate or pay for the remediation of sites contaminated by the disposal of hazardous substances. It imposes joint and several liability on four categories of persons. For our purposes, CERCLA is interesting because it imposes liability not only on the persons who owned relevant facilities at the time hazardous materials were disposed—a kind of strict liability—and on persons


working for the owners in relation to disposal, 108 but also on persons who own a relevant facility when the CERCLA action is brought. 109 The effect is to establish a kind of successor liability. Whoever is holding the land at the time of recovery must pay. The Act makes bankruptcy irrelevant. It doesn’t matter if the current owner acquired the contaminated facility free-and-clear of claims against the polluter, because, as in traditional successor liability, the Act establishes the owner’s liability directly—not just derivatively—through the polluter. The owner can seek contribution from other responsible parties. But the owner is on the hook. That means acquirers, whether inside or outside of bankruptcy, must factor potential liability into their valuations.

Nor is successor liability limited to toxic waste sites. Other environmental laws have adopted less onerous versions of successor liability. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), for example, establishes “cradle-to-grave” liability for all parties involved in the generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. 110 The Surface Mining Coal Reclamation Act (SMCRA) requires that every coal mine operator post a bond to ensure that land used for coal mining be restored to its original state. 111 These bonds follow the land, not the coal miner that originally incurred the cleanup obligation.

Successor liability also operates outside of the environmental context. For example, the Supreme Court has found that the National Labor Relations Act imposes liability on successors “beyond the confines of the common law rule when necessary to protect important employment related policies.” 113 For this reason, labor law creates a

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108 Id. § 9607(a)(3), (4).
109 Id. § 9607(a)(1).
110 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
112 See id.
113 Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Construction Co., 632 F.3d 89 94 (3d Cir. 1964); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) (requiring a company to submit to arbitration with the union that represented employees of a predecessor company); NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, (1972) (same); In Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 182 (1973) (finding an asset purchaser to be a successor when purchaser had notice of labor dispute when purchaser acquired seller’s assets).
presumption of a “substantial continuity” between a buyer’s and seller’s business with respect to the buyer’s obligations to the seller’s employees. This presumption is intended to ensure that collective bargaining agreements are “not subject to the vagaries of an enterprise’s transformation.” Employment law, too, often imposes successor liability and affords purchasers little flexibility to acquire assets free and clear of seller’s liability under federal employment law.

That a judicially managed super-durability norm would be unexceptional in preferring one class of unsecured creditor over others (and even over secured creditors) does not, of course, prove that it’s a good idea. Perhaps no such rule is justified. Perhaps some are and others not. Some thoughtful commentators object to special pleading generally. (We do, too, usually, unless it’s justified.) We’ll argue the merits in part 3. The point here is just to see that our innovation structurally resembles common practices.

1. Preserving Successor Liability

The less aggressive way to implement the super-durability strategy would preserve state-law principles of successor liability. This implementation would not affirmatively add durability to what background principles of state law would provide; but it would undo the practice in bankruptcy of subverting those principles. The successful resolution of a Chapter 11 case, whether through a section 363 sale or a plan of reorganization, typically grants immunity to a transferee of assets who would otherwise face liability as a successor-in-interest for claims of the transferor’s tort creditors. The gist is just


115 Id. at 38.

116 Musikiwamba v. ESSI Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding successor liability for illegal employment practice on the ground that victim was unable to protect against change in business); E.E.O.C. v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 945 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that, when successor it aware of potential future liability, it will spend less to purchase the assets, and thus the seller that originally incurred liability will effectively bear the costs of liability); Einhorn v. M.L. Ruberton Construction Co., 632 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2011) (imposing of successor liability for employment discrimination when successor had notice, there was sufficient continuity of operations and workforce, and the seller failed to provide adequate relief).

117 See generally Roe & Tung, supra note __.
to refuse to allow bankruptcy to wash tainted assets “free and clear” of successor liability when successor liability would otherwise attach. This is a relatively “safe” implementation, politically speaking, because it requires little affirmative action by bankruptcy judges. However, because the reach of successor liability is uncertain and context-specific, its effect would accordingly be muted.

The consequence of this limited intervention might be relatively small. They would depend on the importance of successor liability under state law. The downside of this method of implementation is that successor liability is an uncertain doctrine. It might not be applied by a subsequent state court or by a court in a different state. So it would work only imperfectly. Still, we think this an improvement over the status quo, and one that could be achieved fairly easily.

2. Assumptions of Liability

A more aggressive approach would require that the reorganized debtor, or the buyer of the debtor’s assets in a section 363 sale, affirmatively assume liability for existing and future tort claims. In other words, the disposition of the debtor’s assets would establish successor liability without resort to uncertain, subsequent judicial implementation of the doctrine.

The aggressive implementation would call to mind Chrysler in some respects. The bankruptcy judge’s performance in that case is a matter of intense controversy.\(^\text{118}\) We want to be clear how our idea compares. The Chrysler and GM bankruptcies were devices by which the United States and Canadian governments poured money into the auto manufacturing industry. Chrysler was especially controversial

among bankruptcy scholars and practitioners because Judge Gonzalez signed off on a bidding process and sale—pushed by the Auto Task Force—featuring liability assumptions similar to what we propose.

Here is how it worked.\textsuperscript{119} Chrysler had almost $7 billion in secured debt outstanding. It entered bankruptcy with a scheme hammered out in consultation with the Obama administration’s Auto Task Force. The plan was for a government-backed entity called New CarCo to acquire Chrysler’s useful assets (and become integrated with Fiat, which held an equity stake in the acquirer). New CarCo made a stalking-horse bid to acquire Chrysler for $2 billion and to assume approximately $5 billion in unsecured obligations to retirees who were members of Chrysler’s chief labor union, the United Auto Workers. It is not unusual for a buyer to assume some of a debtor’s prepetition liabilities. But the magnitude of the assumption in \textit{Chrysler} was unlike any previous transaction.\textsuperscript{120} New CarCo also agreed not to seek modifications of the collective bargaining agreements and to give the VEBA an equity stake in the business. Thus, under the terms of the bid, the retirees’ unsecured claims would be mostly or completely made whole, while the secured creditors would receive 29 cents on the dollar.

What was controversial as a matter of judicial policy, though, as opposed to the governments’ political policy, was not the bid. It was Judge Gonzalez’s acquiescence (later modified in part\textsuperscript{121}) in New CarCo’s proposed bidding procedures. New CarCo proposed that any competing bids be required to assume the same liabilities and make the same commitment to honor existing labor contracts. This seemed designed to preclude bids that exceeded New CarCo’s $2 billion offer price, but that fell below its all-in investment of $10 billion. Secured

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{In re} Chrysler LLC, 405 Bankr. 84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
\textsuperscript{120} Mark J. Roe & Joo-Hee Chung, \textit{How the Chrysler Reorganization Differed from Prior Practice}, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 399 (2013) (comparing financial attributes of the Chrysler sale to those of previous section 363 going-concern sales).
\textsuperscript{121} David A. Skeel, Jr., \textit{From Chrysler and General Motors to Detroit}, 24 WIDENER L.J. 121, 136 (2015) (“The bankruptcy judge in \textit{Chrysler} did insist on a slight modification of the bidding rules. But the final rule fell far short of creating a meaningful auction. It required only that the debtor take a look at any non-qualifying bid, and then decide—after consultation with the U.S. Treasury and Chrysler’s unions (as well as the creditors’ committee), precisely the parties most interested in the government’s arrangement—whether the non-qualifying bid should be considered.”).
creditors were understandably unhappy about the order, as were many bankruptcy scholars, who saw an ad hoc political intervention displacing the market-based norms of reorganization practice. As in our scheme, a bidder required to pay certain unsecured prepetition obligations can be expected to reduce its bid, which means less for the creditors whose recovery will come through the bankruptcy.

There are a few important points of contrast. Most importantly, the case for boosting tort creditors is stronger than the case for supporting the UAW in Chrysler. Tort creditors deserve a priority claim because they can’t price insolvency risk. That’s not necessarily true for a large labor union. The reason to protect the UAW in Chrysler, depending on who you were, had to do with sustaining labor peace (similar to a critical vendor order), sustaining an industry during a financial crisis, or winning votes. Second, the bidding procedures order in Chrysler was pushed by a lender and buyer who had social ambitions and weren’t simply trying to maximize return. Most cases presumably will not feature a DIP lender and stalking-horse bidder who demand that tort creditors be compensated in full. Third, the Chrysler intervention was designed to be anomalous. Some observers worried it would have a precedentual effect. It seems not to have had one, though, probably because people recognized that

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122 To be clear, we take no particular view in this Article about how retiree obligations should rank. It’s just that the justifications for tort claims to rank first do not map comfortably to union-negotiated claims. Cf Musikiwamba v. ESSI Inc., 760 F.2d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding successor liability in part because employee was unable to protect against business sale).

123 See Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 727, 731 (2010) (“We can hope that the breach of proper practice will be confined to Chrysler. But the structure of the deal is not Chrysler-specific. Not only did the subsequent General Motors opinion rely heavily on Chrysler, 9 but other courts and plan proponents will inevitably cite Chrysler as precedent.10 Some already have.”) Ralph Brubaker & Charles Jordan Tabb, Bankruptcy Reorganizations and the Troubling Legacy of Chrysler and GM, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1375, 1377 (2010) (“Although one might with considerable justification argue that Chrysler and GM were sui generis—and as a matter of law should be politely and discreetly ignored as once-in-a-century aberrations having more to do with political and economic necessity than with legal precedent that anyone should take seriously—we suspect (indeed, to a virtual certainty) that such will not be the case.”).

the macroeconomic and political circumstances that led the administration to bail out the auto industry were unusual.125

III. ASSESSING A SUPER-DURABILITY NORM

At first approximation, the consequences of a super-durability norm for tort claims would mimic those of a super-priority rule. In fact, with a few simplifying but in many cases useful assumptions, their effects would be identical. Both would force corporate managers and financiers to internalize the costs of strangers’ injuries ex ante, and would do so without imposing a social loss ex post. Under real world conditions, a comparison is arguable. A super-durability norm may avoid some of the pitfalls of a super-priority rule, but would probably do so by exacerbating debt overhang problems.

This part assesses the effect of a super-durability norm. For ease of exposition, we consider the strong version of our proposal. To develop intuitions, we start with the world posited in part 1, where parties know the distribution of possible liabilities when financing decisions are made and know the extent of actual liability when restructuring becomes necessary. In this world, a super-durability norm performs exactly as a super-priority rule would. We then relax the model to consider scenarios where a debtor’s tort liability is uncertain at the time of restructuring, where potential investors are asymmetrically informed about the liability, and where the liability is likely to exceed (or amount to a large percentage of) the total value of the debtor’s assets. In these cases, our proposal could yield “ex post” inefficiencies that a statutory super-priority would not.126 We suspect that institutional responses would minimize the impact of these inefficiencies. But depending on one’s view, they could weigh in favor of a merely conditional or otherwise cautiously employed super-durability norm.

A. The Simple Case

Where the amount of a debtor’s tort liability is known and the amount is less than the total value of the debtor’s assets, a super-

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126 Note, though, that many of these ex post inefficiencies are equally present in a superpriority world.
durable claim would replicate the effects of a super-priority claim. In such a scenario, both rules allow tort victims to recover in full, at the expense of even senior financial creditors. Both rules therefore force lenders and borrowers to internalize the expected costs of tortious activity.

To see how the two rules compare, return to the Acme hypothetical developed above. Specifically, recall our model of existing law applied to a project financed with secured debt and equity (scenario 2).\(^\text{127}\) The project costs $10,000 and yields an asset worth either $14,000 (success) or $10,000 (failure), but in case of failure the business also generates $4000 of tort liability. If Acme were to finance the project with a 90/10 debt/equity ratio, the lenders would be made whole irrespective of the success or failure, and tort creditors, should there be any, would be undercompensated. The result was that Acme would be willing to finance the project if it had as little at a 1-in-5 chance of success, compared to the 1-in-2 chance that would make investment socially optimal.

| Scenario 2 [debt/equity financing; limited liability; secured debt priority] |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                         | Success         | Failure         | Expected         |
| Lender                  | 9000 – 9000 = 0 | 9000 – 9000 = 0 | 0                |
| Victims                 | 0               | 1000 – 4000 = -3000 | (1-p)(-3000)    |
| Equity                  | 5000 – 1000 = 4000 | 0 – 1000 = -1000 | (p)(4000) + (1-p)(-1000) |
| Social                  | 4000            | -4000           | (p)(4000) + (1-p)(-4000) |

We then showed that a super-priority norm would bring Acme’s incentives into line with the social optimum (scenario 4).\(^\text{128}\) If the project were to fail, tort creditors would be paid first out of the $10,000 the asset would fetch conditional on the project’s failure. The lender would recover only $6000. Holding the lender’s expected recovery constant at $0, we showed that the minimum terms on which the project could be financed 90/10 would have the lender charging 33% interest and Acme undertaking the project only if it had a 1-in-2 chance of success.

\(^\text{127}\) See supra notes __.

\(^\text{128}\) See supra notes __.
Consider now how the situation plays out under a super-durability norm. Unlike under a super-priority rule, the lender is entitled to be paid first from whatever the collateral realizes. The “waterfall” pays tort creditors only if there is value remaining after the lender is made whole. Now, however, the tort victims have a source of recovery outside the waterfall—namely, against the business’s post-bankruptcy owner. The amount the post-bankruptcy financier is willing to pay for the business therefore depends on its expectation of post-bankruptcy liability. Some simple algebra yields a unique solution. If the post-bankruptcy financier would pay $10,000 for the business “free and clear,” it pays only $6000 for the business subject to a super-durability rule. The lender is entitled to it all. This, after all, is what the bankruptcy estate receives and can distribute. The shareholders and tort victims get nothing from the bankruptcy. But because the bankruptcy yields them nothing, they can assert the entire $4000 of their claim against the post-bankruptcy business. The tort victims recover in full.

129 We are not the first to notice this dynamic. See, e.g., Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (“Zerand points out that the price received in a bankruptcy sale will be lower if a court is free to disregard a condition in the sale agreement enjoining claims against the purchaser based on the sellers’ misconduct. If the condition is invalid the purchaser will be buying a pig in a poke, never knowing when its seller’s customers may come out of the woodwork and bring suit against it under some theory of successor liability. This possibility will depress the price of the bankrupt’s assets, to the prejudice of creditors.”); David Gray Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic-Waste Cleanup, 50 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 120 (1987) (“A solvent buyer of [ ] encumbered property will discount the purchase price by the amount of the expected inherited personal liability, and to this extent, the recovery of present creditors will be diminished in bankruptcy….“).
Scenario 5 [debt/equity financing; limited liability; secured debt priority; super-durability]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Success</th>
<th>Failure</th>
<th>Expected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lender</td>
<td>9000 - 9000 = 0</td>
<td>6000 - 9000 = -3000</td>
<td>(1-p)(-3000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(0 - 4000) + [4000] = 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>5000 - 1000 = 4000</td>
<td>0 - 1000 = -1000</td>
<td>(p)(4000) + (1-p)(-1000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>-4000</td>
<td>(p)(4000) + (1-p)(-4000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Super-durability replicates the payouts under a super-priority rule. Both align Acme’s investment incentives with the socially optimal rule.

B. Complications

Under other, in some instances more realistic assumptions, a super-durability norm could produce ex-post inefficiencies that prevailing norms do not (and a statutory super-priority would not). Note, though, that whether super-durability would produce such inefficiencies in practice depends on the efficacy of inter-creditor bargaining and the finesse with which bankruptcy judges manage their cases. These problems thus follow from the administrative costs of negotiating under uncertainty and from facilitating coordination among tort claimants—not because debt overhang is a problem in and of itself.\textsuperscript{130} Below we explain why we expect parties to manage these ex post inefficiencies contractually. Here we outline potential downsides of a super-durability norm.

1. Claim Value Uncertainty (Symmetric Information)

The precise amount of a debtor’s tort liability is likely to be known at the time of a bankruptcy filing only in cases involving relatively small companies. For smaller businesses, an adverse judgment may be the cause of Chapter 11. Many debtors, including larger companies for whom tort liability is a factor in the decision to use bankruptcy, will by contrast face predominantly unliquidated claims. A dark

\textsuperscript{130} Ken Ayotte and David Skeel have made a related point in connecting debt overhang to coordination challenges. See Kenneth M. Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as a Liquidity Provider, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1573 (2013) ("[T]he debt-overhang problem, like the common-pool problem, is fundamentally a problem of coordinating multiple creditors.").
cloud hangs over the business, but no one is quite sure how much it will rain.

For purposes of modeling investor reactions, an assumption of certainty can be useful even in cases involving doubt. Experienced lawyers and litigation financiers can produce reasonably accurate liability estimates if relevant conduct and the number and demographic circumstances of claimants can be established.

In other cases, however, the standard error of even the best estimates is too large. Uncertainty might derive from a lag between culpable behavior and manifest injury. Parties might know about a debtor’s culpable conduct, but not the conduct’s reach or the harms it will eventually cause. The asbestos cases provide the most salient but hardly the only example. Some pharmaceutical liability has a similar structure. Uncertainty might alternatively derive from ignorance about the existence or nature of culpable conduct. Parties might not know, for example, that a debtor’s cars have been engineered to falsify carbon admissions.

Where the amount of a debtor’s tort liability is highly uncertain, and where the potential post-bankruptcy financiers are risk-averse, a super-durability norm may produce ex-post inefficiency that a super-priority rule would not. Reckonings have value. In the presence of uncertainty, risk-averse financiers will discount their bids. Moreover, as uncertainty increases, so too does the chance that the highest bid represents not the best use of the debtor’s assets, but merely the owners least sensitive to uncertainty. A super-durability norm is not designed to produce certainty. Prevailing bankruptcy norms are. “Free and clear” sales give the buyer certainty—not perfect certainty, given the doctrine, but a good measure. Proceeds are paid out

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133 Though, as we explain presently, a super-durability norm could facilitate negotiation between tort claimants and other stakeholders. In such cases, a super-durability norm would not lead to increased uncertainty.

134 See supra notes [Part 2.C].
under a strict waterfall, especially if the case is converted to Chapter 7, or else under agreed terms. “Free and clear” plans allocate cash and ownership interests in the reorganized company according to a negotiated settlement or, if need be, judicial estimation. Not so with a super-durability norm. If tort claims are durable, and if tort creditors insist on durability rather than an alternative proposed recovery through the bankruptcy process, then neither a sale nor a plan can fully resolve uncertainty.

Note, though, that certainty for financial creditors under a super-priority regime does not mean that super-priority is clearly preferable to super-durability. When future tort liability is uncertain, tort claimants will recover based on an estimate of the value of their claims. Bankruptcy judges cannot know the precise value of tort claims that will only manifest years in the future. Under a super-priority rule, bankruptcy judges will set aside funds to pay the tort claimants based on an estimate of the damages tort victims will suffer in the future. There is therefore a tradeoff between a super-priority rule and a super-durability rule. In settling all the debtor’s affairs in the bankruptcy proceeding, the super-priority rule gives financiers certainty about the extent of tort liability they will be exposed to in the future. In doing so, a super-priority rule increases the likelihood that assets will continue to be put to productive use.

Certainty for financial creditors, however, comes at the expense of certainty for tort creditors, whose claims might be able to be valued

135 See, e.g. Olson v. Frederico (In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.), 445 B.R. 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that known tort claims are paid by the seller—not the buyer—in a 363 sale, but that the buyer remains liable to future tort victims who had not yet been injured at the time of the sale); Epstein v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995). Asbestos litigation led to a number of these trusts, and difficulties assessing the magnitude of harms caused by asbestos exposure left many of these trusts underfunded and left future claimants uncertain about their ability to recover. See Mark D. Plevin, Leslie A. Epley & Clifton S. Elgarten, The Future Claims Representative in Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 277 (2006) (summarizing this phenomenon in the context of the Johns-Manville asbestos trust); Stephen Labathon, The Bitter Fight Over the Manville Trust, NYT (July 8, 1990) (stating that the Manville Trust was “looted” just two years after it was created); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 75 (2007) (“The Manville trust proved to be a perilous institution . . . with large numbers of claims quickly overwhelming its initial capitalization.”).
with precision if they were brought when the harm occurs but not when their claims must be settled prospectively. Neither rule is perfect, and the superiority of one regime may depend on one’s views about whether it is preferable to allow financiers to extend credit without being exposed to future tort liability, or whether it is preferable to give tort claimants an opportunity to collect based on the harms they actually suffer—not the harms they expect to suffer in the future.

Moreover, the extent of ex post inefficiency that would result from a super-durability norm depends on the ability of parties to negotiate among themselves. As we discuss in more detail below, judicial finesse and bargaining among creditor representatives are key to the ex-post efficiency of a super-durability norm in the presence of uncertainty. If a debtor’s investors—understood broadly to include both financial creditors and involuntary claimants—can realize a surplus from including a free-and-clear provision, then there is at least a notional (Coasean) deal to be struck. Especially in smaller cases, that ought to work fine. A universally agreed deal might be less likely to emerge in mass tort cases with hundreds or thousands of tort claimants, especially if they lack aggregate representation, or if there are multiple, differentially situated classes of tort claimant. We see a role for judicial discretion to encourage surplus-yielding deals.

2. **Claim Value Uncertainty (Asymmetric Information)**

A more pointed complication arises where parties are asymmetrically informed about the amount of a debtor’s uncertain tort liability. Outsiders who might finance a business post-bankruptcy worry about a form of adverse selection. If tort claims can be asserted against the post-bankruptcy business, then the value of that business is a function of the amount of the liability. And if outsiders think that insiders have both superior information and the capacity themselves to become post-bankruptcy financiers, then outsiders will

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138 The value also depends, of course, on the cash flows the assets are expected to produce. Insiders can have private information about either variable; we just happen to be focused on tort liability rules. For discussion of asymmetric information about the value of debtors’ assets, see Ayotte & Skeel, *supra* note __, at 1579–85.
reduce their bids, relative to what they would bid if information were symmetric, so as not to become cursed winners.\textsuperscript{139} The intuition is straightforward: why would insiders allow a bid to win unless they believe it underestimates the magnitude of liability? In equilibrium, information asymmetry tends to lock incumbents in place and depress investors’ recoveries.\textsuperscript{140} Dynamically, the expectation of asymmetric information will tend to increase the cost of capital in industries most likely to generate opaque tort liabilities.

But the problem of asymmetric information is endemic in all bankruptcies and not unique to tort claimants.\textsuperscript{141} Managers simply know more than an arm’s-length financier about every facet of operations that can’t be or in any case isn’t quantified. That can be true about the size of contingent or unmatured tort liabilities, the likelihood that a product will turn out to be defective, and the firm’s production costs and operating expenses.

Still, there is reason to think that asymmetric information is especially problematic in the context of tort claims. Insiders are more likely to know if the company has dumped toxic chemicals—and if so where and how much—or if its products have proved faulty or dangerous in some circumstances, or if allegations of harassment made to Human Resources constitute a pattern or practice, and so on. Disparities in information will loom larger in some cases than others.

One should not overstate the role that asymmetric information about tort liability is likely play in the ordinary case, however. To repeat what we have said already, in a significant fraction of cases, especially those involving smaller businesses, the extent of tort liability will be common knowledge. In cases where the amount of liability is highly uncertain, the people with relevant knowledge may not be potential post-bankruptcy financiers. A prospective, outsider financier will mainly be concerned about the information-base of banks and investment funds with longstanding relationships to the debtor. But how likely are they to know much more than an outsider about, say, the cause of wildfires in Northern California, or the extent

\textsuperscript{139} Cf. Choi, \textit{supra} note ___ (modeling the dynamic in M&A rather than bankruptcy setting).

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.} For a general model of common-value auction dynamics with asymmetric information, see Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al., \textit{11 J. MATHEMATICAL ECON.} 161 (1983).

\textsuperscript{141} See Ayotte & Skeel, \textit{supra} note __, at 1579–81.
of junior employees’ bid-rigging or bribery? The answer, of course, is that it depends.

In any event, the prevailing free-and-clear norm unwinds adverse-selection dynamics to a large extent.\(^{142}\) It does so not by equalizing access to information, but by making information about expected tort liability irrelevant. The amount of prepetition tort liability matters to the value of the post-bankruptcy business only if tort creditors can assert claims against it. That’s what a free-and-clear norm says is off the table.

A super-durability norm, by contrast, exacerbates the information-asymmetry problems that already exist in bankruptcy. Just as one might expect incumbent management to be well-informed about the value of the assets it is selling, so too would one expect managers to have a more accurate sense of future tort liability than prospective buyers. In this way, a durability norm creates an additional reason for buyers and financiers to worry that sellers are refusing to disclose information that is relevant to the purchase price.

But again, there are compelling reasons to think that institutional responses will mitigate—or even eliminate—the moral hazard problem generated by information asymmetries. Information asymmetry is not unique to bankruptcy. It is also one of the principal challenges in ordinary mergers and acquisitions.\(^{143}\) Yet parties have developed a contractual solution to the issue. Representations and warranties—often referred to as “reps”—are contractual promises about the veracity of a fact that is relevant to an asset sale.\(^{144}\) According to Professor Gilson, the “primary purpose” of the representations and warranties sections of acquisition agreements is “to remedy conditions of asymmetrical information in the least cost manner.”\(^{145}\) Reps offer an elegant solution to the information asymmetry problem, because they encourage the party that has information relevant to an assets price to disclose that information.

\(^{142}\) For an analogous mechanism, see Ayotte & Skeel, supra note __, at 1594.

\(^{143}\) See Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 856 (“The challenge of contract design is largely the management of information problems.”).

\(^{144}\) Technically, a representation does not give rise to liability unless a party justifiable relied on the representation whereas warranties are provisions of the contract that give rise to liability regardless of whether or not there was justifiable reliance. See CBS, Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 75 N.Y.2d 496 (1990).

\(^{145}\) See Gilson, supra note __, at 268.
Buyers use reps to protect themselves against all sorts of claims, from sexual harassment to labor liability to false or misleading information regarding the seller’s assets and liabilities.\footnote{See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation & Warranty Insurance in Mergers & Acquisitions, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming).}

It is in the interest of both buyers and sellers for sellers to make their private information available to prospective buyers. A buyer that fears that a seller has information that would depress the buyer’s evaluation of the value of the business will pay less—or perhaps not even submit a bid in the first place—in response to the possibility that the buyer is hiding negative information. The disclosure thus reduces uncertainty and eliminates the transactions costs the seller incurs trying to acquire information relevant to its offer price.\footnote{For extended discussion of this phenomenon, see Gilson, supra note __, at 268–74.}

Unlike ordinary mergers and acquisitions, an insolvent firm is unlikely to be able to use reps to resolve the information asymmetry problem. An insolvent seller will distribute the proceeds of a sale and wind up its business. The buyer cannot indemnify the seller against false representations for the simple reason that the buyer lacks the resources to do so. A seller will therefore find scant assurance from a contractual provision in which the seller agrees to cover any future liabilities that result from the seller’s behavior if the seller ceases to exist or lacks the funds to honor that commitment.

It is not clear, however, why insurance would fail to mitigate this issue. Professor Griffith has recently documented the rapid growth of representation and warranty insurance (RWI) in private M&A deals.\footnote{See Sean J. Griffith, Deal Insurance: Representation & Warranty Insurance in Mergers & Acquisitions, 104 MINN. L. REV. 4 (forthcoming) (finding that RWI was used in 30-50\% of private deals, which refer to deals in which neither party is publicly traded).} Though this form of insurance was extremely rare just a decade ago, today at least twenty insurers offer RWI, with coverage extending as high as $1 billion.\footnote{See id.} As a practical matter, then, it seems that there is a market for insurance against future tort liability—at least in the context of M&A, where buyers bear some risk of being held liable for the activities of the seller.

Under current bankruptcy law, there is no reason for an insurance company to offer protection against an insolvent debtor’s tort liability. Because bankruptcy allows buyers and sellers to externalize the costs
of tort liability onto victims by selling assets free and clear of encumbrances, neither buyers nor sellers in a bankruptcy proceeding will expect to bear the costs of sellers’ tortious conduct. The ability to use bankruptcy to shed tort liability thus ensures that there is no demand for insurance against claims that stemmed from a bankrupt debtor’s tortious conduct.

However, if bankruptcy judges developed a durability norm in which a seller’s tort liability passed on to the buyer, they would thereby create a market for insurance that would protect buyers from liability for sellers’ tortious conduct. A leveraged company might purchase insurance in order to reassure prospective buyers about their potential exposure to future liability. Alternatively, the acquirer would purchase insurance for the deal itself. Either way, the insiders would bear the cost of the asymmetry, because it will result in a discount to what the outsiders will pay. Given the robust market for insurance in M&A deals, there is reason to think that such a market would emerge in bankruptcy if buyers were held liable for the debtors’ tortious conduct.

Insurance would, moreover, encourage distressed firms to continue to monitor their activities and limit their tortious conduct. Professor Ohlrogge recently found that distressed firms are seven times more likely to engage in Clean Water Act violations, and that the prospect of successor liability has a substantial deterrent effect. The implication is that distressed firms have little reason to comply with environmental laws when they can expect to socialize those costs in bankruptcy, but that successor liability encourages distressed firms to comply with environmental laws because doing so helps to reassure prospective buyers that the sellers’ assets are saddled with environmental obligations. Insurers, too, could be expected to investigate a firm’s exposure to tort liability and charge lower premiums when it appears that a firm has little exposure to tort

150 Painter, supra note _, at 1076 (“In general, if a firm’s voluntary creditors are threatened by tort claims, they will have an incentive to monitor the manufacturer’s potentially tortious behavior and to force the manufacturer to purchase adequate insurance.”)

151 See Michael Ohlrogge, Insolvency and Incentives for Efficient Care (manuscript on file with authors).
liability.\textsuperscript{152} To the extent that insurance would cover tort liability, it would go a long way towards resolving the information asymmetry problem.

3. **Liabilities Exceed Value of Business**

A third important complication involves what we call “hot potato” assets. This problem arises when the amount of a debtor’s tort liability equals, or even exceeds, the value of the cash flows its assets can be expected to generate. This is a type of debt overhang problem.\textsuperscript{153} In extreme circumstances, the debt overhang problem might cause potentially productive assets to go unused. No one wants to acquire an asset that comes with liability that is equal to or greater than the value of the asset. It is plausible, though, that even these extreme cases would not idle productive assets. It would be rational for tort claimants to either accept payment in exchange for waiving their claims against the successor entity, or themselves to take equity in the successor entity. Durability would thus facilitate bargaining between tort claimants and other creditors. And in less extreme cases, debt overhang may cause an owner to underinvest in complementary resources.\textsuperscript{154}

In theory, though, debt overhang could pose genuine challenges to the development of a super-durability norm. The ceiling on potential liability in mass tort is almost unlimited. Think of asbestos, tobacco, or opioids. The fact that a given line of business has proved to generate large liabilities also diminishes asset values. Certain environmentally degraded parcels of land arguably exhibit “hot potato” qualities.\textsuperscript{155} There are statutes imposing clean-up liability on

\begin{footnotes}
\item[154] See sources cites supra note 146.
\end{footnotes}
owners. These operate like successor liability rules. Some plots are not worth owning at any price, because the statutory liability will doubtless exceed the value of correlative cash flows. Imagine, for example, that a bankruptcy judge insisted that the firm that purchased the Weinstein Company’s film rights compensated the victims of Harvey Weinstein’s sexual assault in full, and that the prospect of doing so deterred all prospective buyers from purchasing the company’s film rights. In such circumstances, the durability norm would harm all parties. The movie rights are, presumably, worth something. All claimants—including tort claimants—would prefer to realize that value and not have the specter of future liability block an asset sale that would have allowed them at least a partial recovery.

Indeed, debt overhang is one of the central problems toward which bankruptcy is addressed. The free-and-clear norm avoids the “hot potato” problem. Since the free-and-clear norm allows buyers to shield themselves from the bankrupt debtor’s tort liability, it eliminates debt overhang and, in doing so, avoids the hot potato problem.

There are, however, reasons to think that a durability norm would not create a hot potato problem. Debt overhang is a “problem” in only a subset of the situations in which it prevents assets from being put to productive use. Outstanding debts may block asset transfers for a number of reasons, only some of which are inefficient. When the social costs of using an asset exceed its expected future cash flows, the asset should not be considered an asset. It should be considered a liability. If the only way for an asset to generate value is for owners to shed liabilities that unavoidably accompany the use of the asset, then the asset has a negative social value, and it should be abandoned. Environmental liabilities can sometimes be understood in this way. If, for example, the costs of reclaiming a coal mine exceed the expected future cash flows that the coal mine can be expected to generate, then the coal mine imposes costs that exceed the market value of the coal

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157 See, e.g., Ayotte & Skeel, supra note __, at 1570–72.

158 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note __, at 1592–94.
the mine could produce. Regulations are designed to force firms to internalize some of the social costs associated with an activity. If bankruptcy allows firms to extricate themselves from these regulatory costs, and if doing so is the only reason that an asset retains a positive value, then the problem is that bankruptcy allows entities to continue to make a profit off of goods even when the costs of using those goods exceed their value.159

Other liabilities, however, are not intrinsic to an asset. A durability norm that prevents asset transfers might be inefficient in these situations. There is reason, for example, to think that the Weinstein Company’s film rights are valuable despite Harvey Weinstein’s alleged sexual assault. The fact that Harvey Weinstein’s actions generated massive tort liabilities does not mean that his film rights have a negative value. It would harm tort claimants if successor liability prevented would-be buyers from purchasing the Weinstein Company’s film rights. Tort claimants can be expected to recover something from an asset sale, but they would recover nothing if the prospect of successor liability prevented the company’s films from being put to productive use. It is in these circumstances that a super-durability norm generates a debt overhang problem.

It is not clear, however, that the debt overhang problem would be a problem in practice. Concern about debt overhang is based on the view that administrative costs would prevent tort claimants and potential buyers from reaching a mutually beneficial agreement. In addition to the possibility, discussed above, that firms would purchase insurance to protect themselves from precisely this type of situation, there is also reason to think that tort victims would not block asset sales when doing so would bar them from recovery. Bankruptcy judges routinely appoint a “future claimants representative” (FCR) to advocate on behalf of parties whose claims have not yet matured and who therefore are unable to participate in bankruptcy proceedings. When bankruptcy judges expect future claims to be significant, they often create a trust to pay these claimants and issue a “channeling injunction” that channels claims away from the debtor and into the trust. The channeling injunction prevents future claimants from

asserting claims against anyone other than the trust that was established to pay future claimants.¹⁶⁰

Though bankruptcy judges now have statutory authority to appoint an FCR and issue a channeling injunction,¹⁶¹ these devices originated not from Congress, but from bankruptcy judges who felt that they needed to protect future asbestos claimants who could not represent themselves in the asbestos bankruptcies.¹⁶² While it is difficult to calculate the size of future liabilities with precision, these trusts have allowed assets to be put to productive use while ensuring that tort claimants are able to bring that might otherwise have been foreclosed by the debtor’s decision to file for bankruptcy protection.¹⁶³

Super-durability, if applied blindly, has downside in mass liability situations. But tort victims would only harm themselves if they prevented themselves from recovery by blocking asset sales. When a company’s tort liability threatens to block an asset sale, tort claimants can be expected to bargain in the shadow of the law. While coordination or holdup problems might deter prospective buyers, who do not want to negotiate directly with potentially thousands of tort claimants, current law gives bankruptcy judges authority to mitigate these challenges. By appointing a future claimants’ representative to negotiate on behalf of tort claimants, bankruptcy judges could appoint a representative who would have a legal obligation to negotiate in good faith on behalf of tort victims. When debt overhang threatened to block an asset sale, the FCR would likely accept a payment from a would-be buyer and agree to forfeit claims against the reorganized firm. The alternative would be to prevent tort claimants from receiving any compensation. In fact, courts have held that the FCR must be impartial and diligently represent the interests of future claimants.¹⁶⁴ It would likely be a violation of this duty of the representative’s refusal to settle impeded an asset transfer that would have allowed future claimants to receive some compensation.

Thus, when there is a significant debt overhang, it is reasonable to expect a super-durability norm to precisely mimic the effect of a super-priority rule. A durability norm theoretically would give tort

¹⁶³ See id.
¹⁶⁴ In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 n.45 (3d Cir. 2004).
claimants a right to collect from the entity that emerges from bankruptcy (or that acquires the bankrupt’s assets in a 363 sale). Instead of blocking an asset sale, a durability norm might instead facilitate bargaining between tort claimants and prospective buyers.

C. Institutional Responses

The previous section explained how uncertainty, asymmetric information, and debt overhang pose challenges for our super-durability proposal. It also argued that there are reasons to think that these concerns are overstated. The existence of insurance in ordinary asset sales suggests that insurance companies would offer to protect buyers from a bankrupt debtor’s tort liability. Moreover, even when tort claims threaten to block an asset transfer, tort victims can be expected either to take over the bankrupt firm’s assets themselves, or to authorize a free and clear sale to maximize their own recovery. There is, however, one additional reason to think that corporations will be able to manage a super-durability bankruptcy norm: When buyers have been held liable for the debts of their bankrupt predecessors, they have managed those risks successfully.

1. Insurance

There is reason to think that insurance companies will provide coverage against an insolvent debtor’s tort liability to companies that purchase assets from a bankruptcy estate. There are exceptions to the general rule that a bankruptcy estate should emerge free and clear of debts and encumbrances. In some situations, those exceptions are significant. The obligation to reclaim land degraded by coal mining, for example, remains with whatever company acquires the coal mine. The coal mining industry is currently in significant distress. At least sixty percent of coal is mined by companies that have filed for bankruptcy protection in the past five years. Nonetheless, more than $10 billion of coal reclamation obligations is guaranteed by third-

Those insurers have agreed to reclaim coal mines in the event that the coal mine operators—most of whom purchased the mines in the recent wave of coal bankruptcies—is unable to do so.\(^{168}\)

Nor is coal mining unique. As discussed above, many environmental obligations—and not simply coal cleanup obligations—stay with the land and therefore pass on to the entity that purchases land with which environmental obligations are associated. A robust market for CERCLA insurance has emerged to protect toxic polluters from CERCLA liability, and today, a majority of CERCLA claims involve disputes about how to allocate costs among different insurance providers.\(^{169}\) Similarly, not all tort claims are wiped out in bankruptcy. Tort claims that were unknown at the time of the bankruptcy can often be brought against the reorganized firm. The rapid development of RWI, in addition to the existence of insurance that protects specifically against successor liability claims, again implies that markets will devise ways to put socially valuable assets to productive use, even if firms could not shed tort liabilities incurred by the bankrupt debtor.\(^{170}\) Insurance, it seems, is capable of managing the potential costs of a durability norm.

2. Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law

There is also reason to think that the prospect of sizeable successor liability would facilitate—not impede—bargaining among parties to the bankruptcy proceeding. In the wave of coal mining company bankruptcies that swept across the country between 2015 and 2017, state environmental regulators were legally entitled to insist that companies fully reclaim coal mines.\(^ {171}\) There was a plausible argument that the liability was nondischargeable. The problem,


\(^{168}\) See id.


however, was that bankrupt coal firms seemed unable to honor their cleanup obligations. Environmental claimants were thus in a position to prevent coal companies from reorganizing. In doing so, however, environmental regulators would have hurt themselves, because the expected distribution would not have covered the costs of reclamation. But instead of blocking coal mining companies from selling their assets, environmental regulators instead agreed to accept a superpriority claim on some of the bankrupt coal mining company’s assets. These agreements ensured that coal mining companies were able to emerge from bankruptcy and thus increased the likelihood that land used for coal mining would be reclaimed.

In fact, when tort claimants are in a position to block bankruptcy sales, they seem to prefer to accept a reduced payment. In recent opioid bankruptcies, pharmaceutical companies’ tort liability dwarfed other claims. It would have been impossible for tort victims to insist that they be made whole. They therefore accepted a settlement and agreed to waive future opioid-related claims. Again, there is little evidence that tort claimants will block an asset sale when doing so is harmful to their own interests. It instead appears that strong tort claims simply allow tort claimants to get a seat at the bankruptcy table and negotiate to receive some of the proceeds of the reorganization or asset sale.

D. Summary

A super-durability norm would improve on the status quo in many, if not all, circumstances. In situations where the magnitude of a debtor’s tort liabilities is relatively certain and not so large as to preclude a post-bankruptcy financier’s making complementary investments, super-durability mimics a super-priority rule. It


173 See id.


175 See id.


177 See id.
produces better ex-ante incentives than the status quo rule does without sacrificing realized value ex post.

The calculus is more complicated in cases where tort liabilities are highly uncertain and debt overhang is a worry. It would of course be a strike against super-durability if the norm were apt to interfere with the imperative that productive resources be put to their best use. Skeptics might worry that durability could impede high-value asset sales and reorganizations. After all, if new owners believe they will be buried under a mountain of tort debt irrespective of what happens in bankruptcy, or if they struggle to estimate exposure, they will incline to bid cautiously and abstain from complementary investment. Consequently the value of the debtor’s assets could be depressed. A virtue of existing bankruptcy practice, under this line of thought, is its capacity to match the debtor’s assets with an optimal balance sheet.

But this line of criticism understates the capacity both of market institutions to respond to the possibility of a new source of debt overhang and of creditors themselves to bargain around the problem when it manifests. Despite the conventional wisdom—and the approximation we ourselves have indulged—that a buyer or reorganized company takes the debtor’s assets free-and-clear of involuntary claims, the reality is more complicated. Existing law draws exceptions to the rule. Tort claims arising post-petition, for example, can pass onto the reorganized firm.178 Many environmental obligations likewise pass through bankruptcy to successor entities.179 These rules do not seem to have prevented resources from being put to productive use, however. What they have done is encourage the development of insurance markets to reduce risk and, if the empirical results are to be believed, induce legal compliance.180

There is also every reason to think that tort claimants would bargain with other stakeholders to relinquish durability when debt overhang would otherwise threaten their joint return. In cases where

178 See In re Resources Technology Corp., 662 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing the history and justification of administrative expense priority).

179 See, e.g. United States v. Apex Oil Co. 579 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2009).

180 Michael Ohlrogge, Bankruptcy Claim Dischargeability and Public Externalities: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (unpublished manuscript, Feb. 14, 2020) (finding evidence that a judicial decision making certain clean-up orders non-dischargeable in bankruptcy caused firms within the decision’s territorial jurisdiction to become more cautious in their disposal practices and tightened credit to such firms).
it might matter, tort claimants—or a representative in the bankruptcy—should be willing to relinquish durability. If an asset sale is the preferred resolution and an attractive buyer requires certainty or lower leverage, tort creditors can maximize their own recovery by surrendering durability. If a bona fide reorganization is the preferred resolution, tort creditors might be able to maximize their recovery by accepting equity. This is not to say that every mutually agreeable deal will in fact be concluded. That would be a fantasy. But between direct bargains and third-party mediated solutions, a super-durability norm seems unlikely to challenge the economic imperative of assuring the productive use of resources. Instead it looks like a mechanism for putting involuntary creditors in a stronger bargaining position and thereby increasing their expected recovery.

Ultimately, though, a durability norm could be expected to produce partially offsetting effects relative to the status quo: pro-social ex-ante incentives, but at the risk of putting assets to less than their highest-value use ex post. How these effects should be expected to trade off depends on facts about bankruptcy institutions—roughly speaking, the agility of creditors and judges—on which reasonable minds can differ.

IV. Objections

We have promoted the super-durability strategy on pragmatic grounds. A motivating premise is the political infeasibility of legislative solutions to bankruptcy’s tort problem. State legislatures are not going to revoke shareholder limited liability for corporate torts, and Congress is not going to add a super-priority rule for tort creditors to the Bankruptcy Code any time soon. Because turnabout is fair play, our own proposal must survive a reality check. In this Part, we outline and respond to the two most important practical objections to our approach.

A. Chapter 11 Avoidance

The first objection is that those who would lose from a system with super-durable tort claims will avoid using Chapter 11 even where using it would maximize economic value. Chapter 11 is not the only
way for a company’s financial distress to be resolved.\textsuperscript{181} A variety of state-law mechanisms—the receivership, the foreclosure sale, the assignment for the benefit of creditors—can preserve a going concern, even if they are frequently clumsy for sizeable operations. The same mechanisms, along with Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, can also be used to resolve distress with a piecemeal liquidation of the business’s assets.

The financial creditors of a company with significant tort liabilities might lobby to use one of these other mechanisms if Chapter 11 were to become sufficiently hostile. Claimants may prefer to be paid first out of a relatively small pool of assets than to be paid second out of a relatively big pool. The risk is that super-durability becomes a kind of Maginot principle. If the interests of tort creditors are heavily fortified in Chapter 11—but only there—then the managers and financial creditors of a distressed business might just go around it.\textsuperscript{182}

There is, however, reason to suspect that Chapter 11 avoidance would have only modest effects on the managerial incentives to take precautions that motivate our project.

First, state-law reorganization mechanisms do not reliably extinguish tort creditors’ claims. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, properly conducted foreclosure sales extinguish junior liens,\textsuperscript{183} but do not shield buyers that are “mere continuations” of the seller from claims founded on successor liability.\textsuperscript{184} Successor liability theories likewise survive a receiver’s sale of assets on a going-concern basis, even if the sale order says otherwise.\textsuperscript{185} State-law reorganization mechanisms thus resemble our “less aggressive” implementation of super-durability in their treatment of tort creditors. Put differently, our “less aggressive” proposal is a proposal to undo the bankruptcy-

\textsuperscript{181} For an accessible account of many of the regimes, see Stephen J. Lubbén, The Law of Failure (2018).

\textsuperscript{182} Strategic behavior in a world where substantive entitlements depend on the distress-resolution mechanism has been a perennial concern in bankruptcy policy. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815 (1987).

\textsuperscript{183} Unif. Commercial Code § 9–617(a)(3).

\textsuperscript{184} See, e.g., Call Center Technologies, Inc. v. Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Publ. Corp., 635 F.3d 48, 52–55 (2d Cir. 2011) (reversing summary judgment for the buyer of assets in a properly conducted Article 9 sale, on the ground that buyer may be a “mere continuation”).

\textsuperscript{185} See, e.g., Teed v. Thomas & Betts Power Solutions, LLC, 711 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2011)
specific practice of extinguishing successor liability. Financial creditors might for that reason prefer state-law mechanisms to our “more aggressive” implementation. But the magnitude of the difference is uncertain and would have to be traded off against the procedural advantages of a bankruptcy forum. In short, it will be hard to escape some kind of super-durability rule if reorganization rather than liquidation is in the cards.

Piecemeal liquidations, by contrast, generally do extinguish successor liability. They prevent any one buyer of a debtor’s assets from plausibly being understood as the debtor’s “mere continuation.” 186 Buyers in a liquidation therefore have no need to discount their offers, as they do in a going-concern sale. At the margin, a Chapter 11 norm of super-durability for tort claims should thus tip financial creditors toward Chapter 7 or another form of liquidation. 187 If, that is, a debtor’s assets would be equally valuable sold piecemeal or as a going-concern, financial creditors would have reason to prefer and lobby for liquidation.

It is likely, however, that the magnitude of any dislocation will be small. Simple economics are the most important reason. The assets of viable businesses are typically worth much more sold intact than as scrap. 188 But financial creditors have an incentive to lobby for liquidation only if the expected proceeds from liquidation exceed those from a going-concern sale (or the value otherwise received in a reorganization). For most viable companies, that condition could be satisfied only if they tort claims were perceived to be very large.

Managerial freedom to choose a debtor’s path is at its ebb in just such cases. Debtors can face immediate judicial second-guessing if they pursue a wasteful liquidation in bankruptcy. In extreme cases,

187 Cf. Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Kovacs and Toxic Wastes in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1199, 1202–03 (1984); see also Teed, 711 F.3d at 768–69 (“[A]n insolvent company, seeking to maximize its value, might decide not to sell itself as a going concern but instead to sell off its assets piecemeal, even if the company would be worth more as a going concern than as a pile of dismembered assets. In the latter case there would be as we said no successor liability, and successor liability depresses the going-concern value of the predecessor, so the insolvent company might be better off even though it was destroying value by not selling itself as a going concern.”).
junior creditors may seek to convert a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 11. Bankruptcy judges would presumably be especially keen to offer relief in precisely the cases where financial creditors might be tempted to sacrifice aggregate value for individual priority. Debtors face less immediate scrutiny if they seek to wind up a business under state law, but the scrutiny comes. The directors of insolvent companies are liable to their creditors for waste. To be sure, waste is not easy to prove. Judges are hesitant to use generic doctrines of corporate law to protect creditor interests. But it is hard to imagine a stronger case than where it looks like the existence of large tort debts has motivated a board to dissipate value through an unnecessary liquidation.

On top of that, outside of bankruptcy, piecemeal liquidations do not always extinguish successor liability. Some courts have created a “product line” exception to the general rule of non-liability for successors. Under this exception, if the successor uses a product developed by the seller, and the product turns out to be deficient, the successor can be held liable for tort claims that can be tied to the use of the deficient product. Versions of the product line exception are now used in California, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Pennsylvania. The product line exception is a judicial innovation. Bankruptcy judges, too, could use their equitable powers to impose successor liability on whatever entity purchases assets that give rise to tort claims.

None of this is to say that a super-durability norm could be implemented without any strategic reaction. On the margin, such a norm would induce financial creditors in cases with large tort liabilities to avoid Chapter 11. But the costs of that effect could (a)

189 11 U.S.C. 706(b) ("On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11 of this title at any time.").


194 See id.
occasionally be managed by bankruptcy judges, and (b) look to us second-order.\textsuperscript{195}

B. The Political Economy of Bankruptcy Courts

The other important objection is that the political economy of bankruptcy courts will prevent implementation of our approach however sound it may be in theory. The idea is that our approach will not in fact be implemented in cases where it matters. We take this objection seriously, but it misses the register of our argument and overestimates the stability of current practice.

Bankruptcy’s liberal venue rule underlies a contentious literature about the political economy of Chapter 11.\textsuperscript{196} A corporation may initiate bankruptcy in the judicial district in which it is incorporated, the district in which it conducts its principal business, or, crucially, in any district in which an affiliate’s case is pending.\textsuperscript{197} With minimal advance planning, then, businesses of any size can in effect choose from among the 94 judicial districts. In practice, most large companies file in one of only a very few districts, including Delaware and the Southern District of New York.

Commentators are divided on what to make of these facts. Some explain the dominance of a few districts as the product of a “race to the bottom.”\textsuperscript{198} They argue that flexible venue, coupled with judges’ natural and subtle—yet pervasive—interest in participating in important and interesting reorganizations, yields a perverse political economy.\textsuperscript{199} In equilibrium, cases are predominantly filed in districts

\textsuperscript{195} We should also note that the Chapter 11 avoidance criticism applies with equal force to proposals for a statutory super-priority. If you like that idea, then Chapter 11 avoidance is no reason to dislike a conventional super-durability.

\textsuperscript{196} For an early assessment of the terms of debate, see Barry E. Adler & Henry N. Butler, On the “Delawarization of Bankruptcy” Debate, 52 EMORY L.J. 1309 (2003).

\textsuperscript{197} 28 U.S.C. § 1408.


with local rules and procedures favorable to managers and others (especially senior creditors) who decide where to file—and all the more so if bankruptcy judges actively cater to the interests of these “case placers.” Others argue that competition for cases has yielded generally efficient practices, through a combination of judicial expertise and network effects. On this view, the predictability of modern Chapter 11 practice, which is possible only if a few courts handle most of the complex reorganizations, attracts capital to distressed businesses and so (in expectation) may be to everyone’s advantage.

One need not have a general view of the venue debate, however, to sense that tort creditors might not fare well. For venue competition to yield an efficient result on a particular matter despite managers’ unilateral power, a feedback mechanism of one kind or another is crucial. In other words, the managers who select venue must be forced to “pay” for their choices, and so internalize the costs of those choices on others. There are plausible mechanisms when it comes to financial creditors, who can take collateral, charge excess interest, or decline to lend altogether to distressed businesses who provide inadequate assurances about how bankruptcy, if necessary, will go. If the feedback mechanism is robust, then the “selected” venues will be those that pay heed to financial creditors’ and managers’ interests. Tort victims, by contrast, have no leverage and so in a competitive system will tend to be on the wrong side of discretionary calls. Super-durability strategies depend on judicial discretion. Therefore, the argument goes, super-durability is not part of a stable equilibrium.

We have three responses. First, the objection misses the register of our project. Our appeal is directly to bankruptcy judges’ sense of what

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it means to judge well. We are saying that the right way to handle debtors with substantial tort claims is to cause those claims to persist through bankruptcy. It is no answer to such an argument to respond that corporate managers won’t like it. To be sure, there are situations where a course of action is so plainly incentive incompatible, or so obviously depends on universal virtue, that it is useless to propose. But a super-durability strategy is nothing of the sort. Bankruptcy judges are first and foremost lawyers who have taken an oath to apply legal principles impartially. The bankruptcy bench consists of a relatively small group of people—350 at last count—who associate professionally and socially and share a culture. No one’s career or well-being is on the line.

Second, and related, it is easy to overstate as a matter of fact the competitive pressure to disregard best practices that protect tort victims. The future-claimant trust is a case in point. A major problem in the asbestos cases in the 1980s was that not all who had been harmed by exposure had manifested symptoms by the time a producer’s bankruptcy.

If all of the available assets were distributed to existing creditors as of the time of the bankruptcy, the so-called future claimants would recover nothing. The answer developed specifically for the asbestos bankruptcies—deposit assets in trust for the future claimants—is sound in cases likely to see future claimants. But preserving assets for future claimants also diminishes the recoveries of current claimants, including financial creditors, shareholders, and managers. A theory of robust competition predicts that bankruptcy courts would therefore disfavor their use. To the contrary, however, future-claimant trusts have become a standard feature of practice in bankruptcy courts throughout the country.

Third, the liberal venue rule itself may not last. Bills introduced in both houses of Congress in the last two years would curtail managers’ ability to choose their bankruptcy court, requiring them instead to file in the judicial district of their principal place of business. Attempts

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to alter bankruptcy venue have come and gone since the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978. Recent attempts could of course likewise prove fruitless. But there is reason to think support for constraining managers is stronger now than in the past. If venue choice is eliminated or even sharply restricted, then objections to our approach grounded in bankruptcy’s political economy would be moot. Congress, it seems, is more likely to eliminate forum shopping than it is to give tort claimants a super-priority claim.

**Conclusion**

For decades, bankruptcy’s tort problem has facilitated antisocial conduct. Bankruptcy has allowed debtors to pay financial creditors before sexual abuse victims, opioid addicts, environmental claimants, and wildfire casualties. Academic solutions that look elegant in theory have proven impossible to implement. This Article has shown that a durability norm is in many respects theoretically equivalent to the super-priority rule for which scholars have long advocated. Unlike a super-priority rule, however, bankruptcy judges could implement a super-durability norm without congressional action.

This is not to say that a super-durability norm is without costs. Uncertainty, asymmetric information, and debt overhang could prevent buyers from purchasing assets even when those assets could be put to productive use. As we have explained, however, there is reason to think that these problems are not intractable. Even a durability norm that blocked socially productive asset sales would not necessarily be fatal to our argument. Bankruptcy involves tradeoffs. By definition, an insolvent firm cannot honor all of its obligations. There is a real cost to preventing valuable assets from being put to productive use, but so too is it inefficient to allow firms to exploit the bankruptcy process to externalize social costs. In a world of tradeoffs, it is not obvious that the benefits of ensuring that socially valuable assets are put to productive use always outweighs the benefits of forcing firms to internalize the costs of socially harmful behavior.

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