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## Abstract

True altruism involves sacrifice and is thus incompatible, in people's minds, with benefits to the benefactor. Consistent with this prototype, selflessly motivated prosocial actors are perceived as less likely to benefit from their acts compared with selfishly motivated actors ("Nice guys finish last"), and prosocial actors who benefit are perceived as less benevolent than those who do not ("Guys in last are nice")—even in situations for which benefits are randomly determined and completely out of the control of the actor. The studies present supportive evidence of the reflexive association between a pure, selfless motive and sacrifice with respect to both individuals and organizations.

## Keywords

altruism, judgment and decision making, ethics/morality, helping/prosocial behavior, lay theories

Individual philanthropy and corporate social responsibility are highly valued and praised in our society. Prosocial behavior often brings social rewards and the expectation of such rewards can drive prosocial behavior (Grant & Gino, 2010). Moreover, companies invest a significant amount of resources in corporate social responsibility, expecting that the investment will pay off (Porter & Kramer, 2006). It is therefore important to understand when people give prosocial actors credit for their good deeds and when such acts are discounted as driven by self-interest.

In this article, we present theory and evidence that people's judgments about prosocial actors are based on a presumed negative relationship between selfless motives and benefits to the actor. Simply put, people believe that truly good deeds involve sacrifice and preclude benefits to the self. When a prosocial actor benefits, then their goodness is tainted by self-interest. Take the quintessential altruist, Mother Teresa—she founded the "Missionaries of Charities" whose members took vows of chastity, poverty, obedience, and free service to poor people. When awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, she refused the typical ceremonial banquet and donated the monetary prize. Mother Teresa is perceived as a model altruist, not just because of her many good deeds, but also because of her sacrificial stance about them.

## Theoretical Background

Individuals perceived as kindhearted and charitable enjoy higher status (Flynn, 2003; Hardy & Van Vugt, 2006) and greater respect (Price, 2006). Likewise, perceptions that a

company is benevolent and socially responsible have been linked to increased revenues, profits, brand equity, and investor confidence (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2007; Porter & Kramer, 2006; Sen, Bhattacharya, & Korschun, 2006). However, such rewards are not automatic. Merely doing good is insufficient; individuals and companies must also be perceived as good-hearted and selflessly motivated. People thus look for signals to differentiate selflessly motivated prosocial acts from selfishly motivated ones (Lin-Healy & Small, 2012). Suspicion about insincere motives can negatively affect perceptions of actors (Fein & Hilton, 1994; Struthers, Eaton, Santelli, Uchiyama, & Shirvani, 2008). For instance, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg's timed \$100 million donation to Newark's public schools 1 week before the premier of the movie "The Social Network" was widely perceived as a PR move to mitigate any reputational damage of the negative portrayal of him in the movie.

We theorize that when evaluating prosocial actors, people compare the act to a prototypical altruistic deed. What is prototypical altruism? We expect that the prototype evokes associations with selflessness and sacrifice that render true altruism incompatible with benefits to the prosocial actor. In

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other words, truly good deeds are believed to come from a pure motive to help others without expecting or hoping for something in return. If self-benefit is involved, it is not so charitable after all. Some prior research supports this view. When their prosocial actions are visible to others, people work less hard for a cause when there is a financial incentive attached (Ariely, Bracha, & Meier, 2009), and they prefer to contribute to a cause when it is expected that they will endure a painful as compared to a pleasurable contribution experience (Olivola & Shafir, 2012). It seems that prosocial actors try to avoid signaling selfish motivation by eschewing self-benefits and emphasizing their sacrifice.

## Hypotheses

### *Nice Guys Finish Last*

If prototypical altruism involves selfless motivations and sacrifice without reward, we expect that prosocial actors who are driven by true charitable concern rather than self-interest will be perceived as less likely to benefit, even when their character and motivation cannot affect their outcome. That is, when it comes to prosocial acts, nice guys finish last. Study 1 tests this prediction.

### *Guys in Last Are Nice*

A heuristic based on the prototype of altruism may also work in the opposite direction: People may make inferences about an actor's character based on whether the actor benefits from a prosocial act. Once again, this appears to be a sensible rule of thumb. If a company supports a charity but stipulates that the charity widely publicize the donation, it makes sense to view them as less charitable than if they had donated without asking for anything in return. However, the heuristic could lead people astray in cases for which the benefit to the actor is random or otherwise out of the actor's control. According to classic attribution theories, in order to attribute an outcome to an actor's disposition, perceivers must first infer intent (Jones & Davis, 1965; Maselli & Altrocchi, 1969). Two conditions must be met in order to infer that an actor intended the outcome. First, the actor must have been aware that their actions would lead to the outcome, and second, the actor must have been able to bring about the outcome. Following this logic, randomly determined, unexpected, or uncontrollable outcomes are irrelevant to perceptions of an actor's internal qualities.

In reality, people do not treat outcomes as irrelevant when making inferences about intent and dispositional attributions (Knobe, 2003). For instance, a homeowner who kills a perceived intruder is deemed more blameworthy and negligent if the apparent intruder was an innocent victim rather than a criminal, though in both cases the homeowner acted assuming the latter (e.g., Alicke & Davis, 1989). Furthermore, decision makers are judged as more competent when the decision outcome is positive, even if the decision makers had equal skill, knowledge, and information prior to the decision (Baron & Hershey, 1988). In other words, people use outcome information to make

different post hoc character judgments for actors that were identical a priori.

We propose that the prototype of altruism leads to a different sort of bias between outcome and judgments of character. Because people have difficulty reconciling altruism with self-benefit, when a prosocial actor benefits, they are perceived as less charitable, even when the benefit is randomly determined or out of the actor's control. Just as nice guys finish last, guys in last are nice. Study 2 tests this prediction.

In sum, we propose that the prototype of altruism involves selfless motivation and cost incurrence. We expect that this heuristically affects judgments in two directions. First, people perceive selflessly motivated prosocial actors as less likely to benefit from their acts compared to selfishly motivated ones, even if the outcomes are randomly determined, unexpected, or uncontrollable ("Nice guys finish last"). Second, prosocial actors who benefit from their acts are perceived as less selfless than ones who do not benefit, even when outcomes are randomly determined, unexpected, or uncontrollable ("Guys in last are nice"). We demonstrate these effects for both individual philanthropy and corporate social responsibility.

## Pretest

Our predictions assume that people hold a certain prototype of altruism. This prototype involves a motive that is selfless and a sacrifice on the part of the actor. To validate this assumption, we first surveyed 175 undergraduates about their beliefs about the meaning of good deeds. The questions directly asked about the inferences of goodness from selfish and selfless motives and from prosocial actors' benefitting and sacrificing.

Our theorizing is about judgments of prosocial actors, and those actors could be individuals or companies. However, one possibility is that people's mental model of corporate prosocial acts is different from their model of individual ones. That is, because it is a company's responsibility to earn money (Porter & Kramer, 2002) and because companies lack a mind and feelings, people may conceive of all corporate actions as motivated by and serving the company (perhaps accurately so). Nonetheless, people often imbue companies with human-like traits (Aaker, 1997), so we expect that similar kinds of evidence should affect judgments of a company's selfishness as judgments of an individual's selfishness. To examine whether people's representation of altruism is the same for good deeds performed by people and by companies, half of participants (randomly assigned) were instructed to think about good deeds performed by one or the other.

Specifically, participants were asked to rate the extent to which each of several statements "is true about the meaning of being a good person (company)." The rating scale ranged from 1 = *completely false* to 7 = *completely true* with the mid-point labeled *neither true nor false*. Five statements were presented in random order. In the person condition, the statements included three that met our assumed definition of altruism: (1) The person sacrifices something to benefit other people or society, (2) The good deed is motivated by a desire to help others or

society, and (3) The person incurs a cost, such as money or time, in the service of others or society. The other two statements contradicted our definition: (4) The person benefits in some way, such as gaining fame and fortune as a result of the good deed, and (5) the good deed is motivated by a desire to benefit oneself. The word *person* was replaced by *company* in the company condition. The 5 items provided a reliable scale in the person condition ( $\alpha = .72$ ), but the scale had low reliability in the company condition ( $\alpha = .54$ ), so we report individual items as well as averages of the 5 items for person judgments and company judgments.

In the person condition, the average of 5 items after reverse scoring the latter 2 items ( $M = 5.35$ ,  $SD = .71$ ) was significantly greater than the midpoint,  $t(87) = 17.97$ ,  $p < .001$ . Broken down, the first three statements were rated as more true than false ( $M_s = 5.98, 6.24, 5.19$ ,  $SD_s = 1.10, 1.56, 1.11$ ). Each is significantly greater than the midpoint,  $p < .001$ . Moreover, participants believed that the contradictory statements were more false than true ( $M_s = 3.47$  and  $3.18$ ;  $SD_s = 1.52, 1.17$ ). Each is significantly less than the midpoint,  $p < .005$ . In the company condition, the average of the 5 items after reverse scoring the latter 2 items ( $M = 4.88$ ,  $SD = .86$ ) was significantly different from the midpoint,  $p < .001$ . Broken down, the first three statements were also rated as more true than false ( $M_s = 5.34, 5.89$ , and  $5.36$ ). Again, each is significantly greater than the midpoint,  $p < .001$ . However, the contradictory statements were rated as neither true nor false ( $M_s = 4.11$  and  $4.08$ , respectively, *ns.*). Nevertheless, these contradictory statements were judged as less true than the former three statements (all pairwise comparisons significant,  $p < .05$ ).

In sum, this pretest revealed that people hold a view of altruism that involves sacrifice or cost and other-oriented motive. In general, the prototype for people is similar as that for companies. However for people, participants did not allow for gains or selfish motives. For companies, participants were more accepting of gains and selfish motives.

## Study 1: Nice Guys Finish Last

Study 1 tests the hypothesis that selflessly motivated actors would be judged less likely to benefit than selfishly motivated ones even when benefits are randomly determined or uncontrollable. In Study 1a, participants evaluated a donor to a charity raffle who donates for either selfless or selfish reasons. In Study 1b, participants evaluated a company that decides to implement an environmentally friendly manufacturing change for either selfless or selfish reasons.

### Study 1a

For this and all subsequent studies, we recruited participants online using Amazon Mechanical Turk. All participants were U.S. residents and received 30 cents for their participation.

**Method.** Seventy-nine participants ( $M_{\text{age}} = 35.21$  years,  $SD = 12.26$ ; 67% female) read a scenario about a spectator at a

professional football game. At the stadium, there is a charity raffle for a charity that helps local underprivileged children. Winners would get to have dinner with two players of their choice. Spectators who donated \$75 were entered into the raffle with a limit of one entry per person. The number of entries and winners was deliberately left ambiguous, so that actual winning probabilities could not be accurately deduced. The prize (dinner with players) was chosen because it does not have a clear economic or market value, thus minimizing inferences that the donor may have made a careful expected value calculation when donating.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions that each provided different motives for why the spectator entered the charity raffle. In the selfless motivation condition, the description of the spectator indicated that he donated after “thinking about all the children that needed help and feeling that he should do something.” In the selfish motivation condition, the description of the spectator indicated that he donated “after thinking about how great it would be to meet the players.”

After reading the description, the participants’ task was to judge the likelihood that the spectator would win the raffle. Specifically, participants answered, “How good a chance does the donor have of winning the raffle?” on a 1 (*almost no chance*) to 7 (*pretty good chance*) scale. The endpoints were chosen to avoid a floor effect as it is unlikely that a raffle will ever have an extremely high chance of a win. Participants also rated the probability, expressed as a percentage that the donor would win. As a manipulation check, participants rated the donor’s motivation on a 1 (*extremely selfless*) to 7 (*extremely selfish*) scale. Finally, we measured individual differences in belief in a just world (BJW) as a potential moderator (Lipkus, 1991).<sup>1</sup>

**Results.** Confirming the manipulation, ratings of selfish motivation were higher for the in the selfish motivation condition ( $M = 4.68$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ) than in the selfless motivation condition ( $M = 2.21$ ,  $SD = 0.96$ ),  $t(77) = 8.75$ ,  $p < .001$ .

Consistent with the hypothesis, the donor whose motivation was selfless was perceived as having a worse chance of winning the raffle than the donor whose motivation was selfish ( $M_{\text{selfless}} = 2.16$ ,  $SD = 1.41$ ;  $M_{\text{selfish}} = 3.00$ ,  $SD = 1.27$ ),  $t(77) = 2.80$ ,  $p = .006$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .09$ . The same pattern emerged for perceived probability ( $M_{\text{selfless}} = 8.63\%$ ,  $SD = 18.02$ ;  $M_{\text{selfish}} = 19.94$ ,  $SD = 26.70$ ),  $t(77) = 2.19$ ,  $p = .03$ . These results support the prediction that selflessly motivated individual prosocial actors are perceived as less likely to benefit from their good deeds compared to selfishly motivated ones, a finding consistent with the overall notion that true altruism does not benefit the actor.

### Study 1b

**Method.** Thirty-three participants ( $M_{\text{age}} = 32.36$  years,  $SD = 11.28$ ; 49% female) read about a regional company that makes snow removal supplies. The company decides to implement an

environmentally friendly change to its manufacturing process, incurring a significant onetime cost. In other words, yearly manufacturing costs would be the same before and after the change, but implementing the change requires a significant onetime expenditure. Based on random assignment, participants read that the company decides to implement the change for either selfless reasons (it is the socially responsible and morally right thing to do) or for selfish reasons (the company hopes to generate goodwill so that the decision benefits the company in the long run).

Participants were told that because the change was costly, the company would experience a profitable year only if the region experiences unusually high snowfall the following winter, above what was expected. Otherwise, the company would not experience a profitable year.

Participants rated the chance that the region would experience unusually high snowfall the following winter, thus allowing the company to profit despite the cost of making the change, on a 1 (*almost no chance*) to 7 (*pretty good chance*) scale. They also rated the probability, expressed as a percentage, that snowfall the following winter would be unusually high. As manipulation checks, participants rated agreement on a 7-point scale with the following statements: “Ultimately, Winter Solutions cares about its profits, and that drove the decision about whether to make the change,” and “Winter Solutions changed its manufacturing process because it was the morally right thing to do.”

**Results.** Confirming the manipulation, the selfless company’s decision was perceived as less driven by profits compared to the selfish company ( $M_{\text{selfless}} = 2.82$ ,  $SD = 1.55$  vs.  $M_{\text{selfish}} = 5.11$ ,  $SD = 1.45$ ),  $t(33) = 4.51$ ,  $p < .001$ , and more driven by morals ( $M_{\text{selfless}} = 5.82$ ,  $SD = 1.59$  vs.  $M_{\text{selfish}} = 4.17$ ,  $SD = 1.47$ ),  $t(33) = 3.21$ ,  $p = .003$ .

As predicted, the selfless company was perceived as having a worse chance of experiencing unusually high snowfall the following winter and thus profiting compared with the selfish company ( $M_{\text{selfless}} = 3.82$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ;  $M_{\text{selfish}} = 4.61$ ,  $SD = .92$ ),  $t(33) = 2.21$ ,  $p = .03$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .13$ . The same pattern emerged for perceived probability ( $M_{\text{selfless}} = 47.06\%$ ,  $SD = 17.59$ ;  $M_{\text{selfish}} = 57.67$ ,  $SD = 12.07$ ),  $t(33) = 2.09$ ,  $p = .04$ . In sum, we replicated the same pattern observed in Study 1a with regards to a company: People perceive that nice guys finish last.

**Discussion.** In two experiments, we find that people are sensitive to a prosocial actor’s motives when judging the likelihood of the actor benefiting from their prosocial acts. People judge a selflessly motivated prosocial actor as less likely to benefit than a selfishly motivated one. This pattern is surprising given that the benefits were transparently randomly determined or outside the actor’s control. We found similar effects among a set of participants that made a prediction about an individual who donated in a charity raffle (Study 1a) and among a different set of participants that made a prediction about a company that implements environmentally friendly practices (Study 1b).

## Study 2: Guys in Last Are Nice

Study 2 tested whether the perceived negative relationship between goodness of heart and good fortune operates in the opposite direction. We predicted that people judge prosocial actors that benefit as less benevolent than actors who do not benefit, even when the benefits are randomly determined or uncontrollable. Again, we tested this prediction for both individual philanthropy and corporate social responsibility by utilizing the same scenario contexts as in Study 1 (charity raffle and green technology). We also addressed a plausible alternative explanation—that people feel sympathetic toward nonbenefitting actors and thus make more favorable ratings about them. If this is true, then nonbenefitting actors should be rated more favorably in both prosocial and nonprosocial contexts. If, however, our theory is correct, then nonbenefitting actors should only be rated more favorably in prosocial contexts. In other words, we expect to find an interaction between whether the actor benefits and the act context (prosocial vs. nonprosocial).

### Study 2a

**Method.** One hundred four participants ( $M_{\text{age}} = 34.94$  years,  $SD = 12.03$ ; 75% female) read about a spectator to a football game who enters a raffle in which the prize is dinner with the players. Unlike Study 1a, participants received no information about the spectator’s motivations. Instead, they were told of the raffle outcome: The spectator either wins or does not win.

We also manipulated the raffle type. In the charity raffle conditions, spectators gain entry in the raffle by making a charitable donation. In the noncharity raffle conditions, spectators gain entry in the raffle by purchasing a souvenir helmet. This manipulation served to rule out the alternative explanation that sympathy causes people to rate nonwinners more favorably. The study thus employed a 2 (raffle outcome: wins vs. does not win)  $\times$  2 (raffle type: charity vs. noncharity) design. In all conditions, spectators pay \$75 and are limited to one entry per person.

Participants rated the spectator on four measures of charitable traits and three measures of prosocial habits, all on a 1–7 scale. Specifically, they indicated how nice, altruistic, kind, and generous the spectator is; and how likely he is to regularly donate blood, donate used clothes, and give to homeless people.

**Results.** The seven measures were averaged into a composite score (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .89$ ).<sup>2</sup> Unsurprisingly, there was a strong main effect of raffle type; entrants in the charity conditions were perceived as more charitable,  $F(1, 100) = 31.40$ ,  $p < .001$ . There was also a main effect of outcome such that winners were perceived as less charitable than nonwinners,  $F(1, 100) = 4.91$ ,  $p = .03$ . This main effect, however, was qualified by an interaction between raffle type and outcome,  $F(1, 100) = 5.63$ ,  $p = .02$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .05$ . In the charity conditions, winners were judged less charitable than nonwinners ( $M_{\text{winner}} = 4.75$ ,



$SD = .92$ ;  $M_{\text{nonwinner}} = 5.42$ ,  $SD = .84$ ),  $F(1, 100) = 10.96$ ,  $p = .001$ . In the noncharity conditions, however, raffle outcome did not affect perceptions of the actor ( $M_{\text{winner}} = 4.28$ ,  $SD = .55$ ;  $M_{\text{nonwinner}} = 4.26$ ,  $SD = .55$ ),  $F(1, 100) = .01$ , *ns*. These results support the “Nice guys finish last” hypothesis with respect to individual prosocial behavior.

### Study 2b

**Method.** One hundred sixty-seven participants ( $M_{\text{age}} = 34.32$  years,  $SD = 11.89$ ; 71% female) read about a regional company that makes snow removal supplies. We manipulated two factors: Whether the company acted prosocially and whether they benefited. In the prosocial action conditions, the company incurs a onetime cost to make an environmentally friendly manufacturing process change. In the nonprosocial action conditions, participants were only told that the company’s manufacturing process is not particularly environmentally friendly, but inspectors verified that it meets government standards. The company was not described negatively or as selfish; there was simply no mention of prosocial activity. Participants were also told that the following winter, snowfall in the region was either unusually high, above what was expected; or unusually low, below what was expected. As a result, the company performed either better or worse than expected financially. The study thus employed a 2 (whether the company takes a prosocial action)  $\times$  2 (whether the company subsequently benefits) design.

Participants rated the company on four measures of social responsibility adapted from Rifon, Choi, Trimble, and Li (2004), all on a 1 (*completely disagree*)–7 (*completely agree*) scale. Specifically, they indicated the degree to which they believed that the company is socially responsible, makes decisions according to what is morally right, cares about its impact on the environment, and is highly concerned about environmental issues.

**Results.** The four dependent measures were averaged into a composite social responsibility score (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .97$ ). Unsurprisingly, the company that implements green technology was perceived as more socially responsible than the one that did not,  $F(1, 163) = 565.67$ ,  $p < .001$ . Importantly, there was an interaction between prosocial action and whether the company subsequently benefits,  $F(1, 163) = 7.29$ ,  $p = .008$ ,  $\eta_p^2 = .04$ . In the prosocial actions conditions, the company that benefited financially was perceived as less socially responsible than the company that suffered ( $M_{\text{high}} = 5.59$ ,  $SD = .97$ ;  $M_{\text{low}} = 6.03$ ,  $SD = .88$ ),  $F(1, 163) = 4.83$ ,  $p = .03$ . In the nonprosocial action conditions, the company’s subsequent financial benefits did not affect perceptions of social responsibility ( $M_{\text{high}} = 2.65$ ,  $SD = .93$ ;  $M_{\text{low}} = 2.34$ ,  $SD = .81$ ),  $F(1, 163) = 2.60$ , *ns*. Thus, the results support the “Guys in last are nice” hypothesis with respect to companies’ prosocial pursuits.

**Discussion.** In two experiments, we find that people make inferences about a prosocial actor’s character and prosocial habits

based on benefits they receive. People judge prosocial actors who benefit as more selfish than those who fail to benefit. Once again, this pattern is surprising given that the benefits were transparently randomly determined or outside the actor’s control. We found similar effects among a set of participants who judged an individual that donated in a charity raffle (Study 2a) and among a different set of participants who judged a company that made environmentally friendly changes (Study 2b).

Our experiments also rule out a potential alternative explanation—that people feel sympathetic to those who are unlucky and rate them more favorably as a result. If this were true, we would expect that for both prosocial and nonprosocial acts, actors who benefit would be rated less favorably than those who not. In support of our theory, however, we found that benefits only influence perceptions of actors when the benefits were tied to a prosocial act.

### Conclusions

Prosocial behavior is motivated by different desires and is arguably rarely, if ever, purely selfless (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997), yet people hold a view of true altruism that involves sacrifice and precludes benefits to the self. Prosocial acts are thus judged based on their perceived purity and are discounted to the extent that they appear tainted by self-interest.

This article finds support for the heuristic that true altruism is incompatible with benefits to the actor. We theorized that the heuristic works in two directions. First, “Nice guys finish last”: Selflessly motivated prosocial actors are judged less likely to benefit from the act than selfishly motivated actors. Second, “Guys in last are nice”: Prosocial actors who do not benefit from the act are judged as more selfless than those who benefit. Four experiments find support for both judgment pathways. Importantly, our studies demonstrate evidence for this heuristic in contexts for which benefits to the actor are transparently random or outside the actor’s control.

Our findings diverge from established theories of BJW (Lerner & Miller, 1978), and moreover, individual differences in BJW never moderated results in our studies—why? One possibility is that BJW is mainly a protective mechanism for dealing with severe negative events—the literature has overwhelmingly focused on people’s responses to tragedy and victimhood (Furnham, 2003). Perhaps fear and threat are important moderators for inducing BJW beliefs, which were not present in the current context.

In addition, recent research finds that people sometimes engage in prosocial behavior in attempt to control the uncontrollable through “karma” (e.g., when waiting for a test result; Converse, Risen, & Carter, 2012) and they feel more vulnerable to become a victim when they fail to comply with a request to help others victims from the same misfortune (Kogut & Ritov, 2011). These findings are driven by people’s desire to control the future and magical beliefs thereof. However, desires to gain and avoid tempting fate are focused on the

self and do not have direct implications for beliefs about others' motives and outcomes.

Finally, the present research focuses on good deeds and prosocial motivation. Do people likewise expect that bad deeds and harmful motivation are positively related to benefits to the actor? Although theories predict that blame results when an agent causes harm to another with intention to do so (Shaver, 1985), sometimes individuals are judged as blameworthy merely for possessing "wicked desires," even when not causally responsible for a harmful outcome (e.g., Inbar, Pizarro, & Cushman, 2012). This evidence suggests that people may go beyond logical cause-effect reasoning and judge beneficiaries of harmful deeds as more blameworthy (and those with harmful motivation as more likely to benefit).

In summary, we find evidence for a reflexive negative association between pure, selfless motives, and benefits to a prosocial actor consistent with a prototype of altruism that commands sacrifice. When prosocial acts are believed to come from selfless motivation, the actor cannot benefit from the deed; if the actor benefits, then the act must have been selfishly motivated. In the eyes of observers, nice guys finish last.

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### Notes

1. We measured this in all studies but never found moderation and thus do not discuss it further.
2. While the trait and habits measures loaded onto two separate factors, the same pattern emerged when analyzed separately.

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