The Emotion Deception Model: A Review of Deception in Negotiation and the Role of Emotion in Deception

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Abstract

Deception is pervasive in negotiations. Negotiations are characterized by information asymmetries, and negotiators often have both opportunities and incentives to mislead their counterparts. Effective negotiators need to contend with the risk of being deceived, effectively respond when they identify deception, and manage the temptation to use deception themselves. In our review of deception research, we integrate emotion research. Emotions are both an antecedent and a consequence of deception, and we introduce the emotion deception model (EDM) to represent these relationships. Our model broadens our understanding of deception in negotiations and accounts for the important role of emotions in the deception decision process.

On November 16, 1963, Steven Slotkin was born in New York’s Beth-El Hospital. As a result of medical negligence, Steve’s brain was damaged prior to delivery. He was diagnosed with cerebral palsy and was paralyzed, requiring constant care for the duration of his life.

The Slotkins filed a malpractice lawsuit (Slotkin v. Beth-El Hospital, 1971) against the hospital and negotiated a settlement. In the course of negotiations, the hospital and its primary insurer informed the Slotkins that the extent of the hospital’s insurance coverage was $200,000. The Slotkins settled for $185,000. Soon after settling, however, the Slotkins learned that they had been deceived: The hospital had additional insurance coverage of $1 million.

Deception is pervasive in negotiations (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Boles, Croson, & Murnighan, 2000; Koning, Van Dijk, Van Beest, & Steinel, 2010; Lewicki, 1983; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997; Olekalns & Smith, 2007; Schweitzer, 2001; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999; Tenbrunsel, 1998), and emotions are a fundamental part of the deception decision process (Barry, 1999; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008; Van Dijk, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Van Beest, 2008). Deception is a particularly important counterproductive work behavior (Raver, 2013). Deception in the interest of the organization may enhance the economic position of the organization in the short term but damage the reputation of the organization in the long term (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Further, norms regarding deception are labile; for example, deception in negotiations across organizations (e.g., buyer–supplier negotiations) may be perceived as productive and permissible, yet deception in nonnegotiation contexts or within organizations may be seen as counterproductive and impermissible.

In this article, we integrate research in psychology and economics that focuses on deception in negotiations and related contexts. We argue that deception is an integral part of negotiations. Negotiators routinely face temptations to use deception, regularly need to contend with the prospect of being...
deceived, and ultimately need to form a response once they detect deception. We review prior research, identify unanswered questions, and propose a model—the emotion deception model (EDM)—to expand our understanding of this persistent and significant negotiation challenge. Although emotions and deception pervade negotiations, surprisingly little prior research has considered the relationship between emotions and deception. This is a significant omission, as emotions are an integral antecedent and consequence of deception, and we cannot fully understand the deception decision process without understanding the role emotions play. The EDM accounts for emotions in deception decisions and broadens our understanding of deception in negotiations.

Deception in Negotiations

Negotiators can often gain leverage and profit by deceiving their counterparts (Bazerman et al., 2000; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Most negotiations are characterized by information dependence (Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Schweitzer, 2001, 2005); at the start of negotiations, individuals have private and asymmetric information (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). In addition, most people are poor lie detectors (Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Ekman, O’Sullivan, & Frank, 1999). As a result, negotiations are replete with tempting opportunities for the use of deception (Lewicki, 1983; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). These opportunities, however, may also entail significant costs; revealed deception may damage trust (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006) and reputations (Raiffa, 1982) as well as motivate retribution (Boles et al., 2000).

Integrating prior research (e.g., Boles et al., 2000; Lewicki, 1983; Murnighan, 1991), we introduce the following definition of deception:

Deception is the use of statements and/or behaviors, including acts of omission, that intentionally mislead a counterpart.

Deception in negotiation can take many forms. Although not all lies are self-interested, the most common lies are (Lewicki, 1983). These include self-interested misrepresentations, bluffs, and falsifications and represent what Erat and Gneezy (2012) termed selfish black lies, lies that increase liars’ payoffs at the expense of targets.

Another approach to classify lies involves distinguishing active deception (commissions) from passive deception (omissions). For example, Schweitzer and Croson (1999) found that negotiators were far more likely to lie by omission than commission, and related work has found that individuals perceive commissions to be more serious than omissions (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991).

Antecedents of Deception

What makes people more or less likely to lie? A substantial literature in psychology and economics has explored the deception decision process. In this article, we adopt a behavioral framework that focuses on the negotiation structure, the negotiators themselves, and the negotiation process (e.g., Neale & Northcraft, 1991). Each of these factors influences the deception decision process and interacts in important ways. Prior research has made substantial progress in recent decades, but many open questions remain.

The Negotiation Structure

The deception decision process is dynamic, labile, and powerfully influenced by the negotiation structure. Research on the negotiation structure has focused on economic incentives, elasticity of information and rationalization mechanisms, power, and individuals and groups.
Economic Incentives

Early research describes negotiators’ decisions to use deception within a rational choice model of decision making (for discussions, see Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Gneezy, 2005). Lewicki’s (1983) decision model, for example, describes negotiators’ deception decisions as a product of their perceptions of the costs and benefits of using deception. Similarly, Akerlof (1970) assumed that sellers of used cars will always lie if it is in their interest to do so (e.g., if they can gain from deception and the economic costs of lying are low). These and similar accounts presume a *homo economicus*. As Gneezy (2005) explained, “An implication of this [homo economicus] assumption is that lies will be told whenever it is beneficial for the liar, regardless of their effect on the other party” (p. 384).

Empirical research supports important elements of the rational choice model of deception. In an experimental study, Tenbrunsel (1998) presented participants with a negotiation scenario that described the dissolution of a business partnership. Participants were informed that the relative value of the partnership was uncertain and that, consequently, the partners had decided to settle the dissolution in arbitration. Consistent with the rational choice perspective, Tenbrunsel (1998) found that participants in the high incentive condition (prospective $100 prize) were more likely to misrepresent information to the arbitrator than participants in the low incentive condition (prospective $1 prize).

Although incentives clearly influence negotiators’ decisions to use deception, the homo economicus account systematically fails as a descriptive model of behavior. In contrast to the rational choice model that predicts that self-interested negotiators will use deception in laboratory studies whenever there are monetary stakes and the probability and consequences of detection are very low, a number of studies have found that many participants never engage in deception (e.g., Gneezy, 2005; Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, 2005). For instance, Gneezy (2005) found that many people demonstrate concern for (anonymous) counterparts and respond honestly in deception games; players were less likely to lie for a gain of $1 if the loss for their counterpart was $10 than if the loss for their counterpart was $1. Similarly, Boles et al. (2000) found that the frequency of deception is far below that predicted by rational choice models. In their work, proposers and responders had 440 opportunities to deceive their counterparts. However, proposers were deceptive only 60 times, and responders were deceptive only 61 times. These and other studies demonstrate that individuals have an aversion to engaging in deception even when there are clear economic benefits and little or no costs to doing so (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Lundquist, Ellingsen, Gribbe, & Johannesson, 2009; Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004; Van Beest, Steinel, & Murnighan, 2011). In fact, in some cases, individuals even opt to avoid situations that offer the opportunity to deceive others (Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011).

Elasticity of Information and Rationalization Mechanisms

In many negotiations, parties possess information that is uncertain or vague. For example, rather than knowing the exact value of the inventory on hand, a seller might know that the value ranges between $2.3 million and $2.6 million. In these situations, the information is elastic (Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 1988; Hsee, 1995, 1996; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002).

Empirical studies show that elasticity gives negotiators leeway to justify to themselves the strategic use of elastic information. In negotiations, the strategic use of information may manifest as motivated communication or deception. In one study, Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) asked participants to assume the role of a prospective seller of a used car. All participants were told that the car’s odometer had been disconnected and that the actual odometer reading of 60,000 miles was unrealistically low. In the low-elasticity condition, participants were told that their personal estimate of the number of miles the car had been driven was between 74,000 and 76,000. In the high-elasticity condition, participants were told that their personal estimate was between 60,000 and 90,000 miles. Participants were then asked to specify the number of miles they would claim the car had and to assess how justifiable it would be to claim 60,000 miles. In contrast to the prediction of the rational choice model, Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) found that participants’ claims were lower in the high-elasticity condition than in the low-elasticity condition and that this
difference was mediated by differences in participants’ perceptions of how justifiable it was to claim the unrealistically low odometer reading.

Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2008a, 2008b) developed a theory of self-concept maintenance that describes why elasticity of information and related mechanisms influence motivated communication and deception, as well as why negotiators prefer to justify the use of motivated communication and deception. According to this theory, individuals balance two concerns: economic consequences and psychological consequences. Individuals strive to perceive themselves as honest. As a result, people may engage in small amounts of dishonesty as long as they can delude themselves into believing that they are moral (Gino & Ariely, 2012). As Mazar et al. (2008a) explained, “A little bit of dishonesty gives a taste of profit without spoiling a positive self-view” (p. 633). Further—and related to Schweitzer and Hsee (2002)—contextual characteristics influence the malleability of decisions, and increased malleability licenses dishonesty (Mazar et al., 2008a). This theory complements Schweitzer and Hsee’s (2002) findings and describes why the rational choice model fails as a descriptive model of ordinary dishonesty.

Future research is needed to understand how characteristics of the negotiation other than elasticity of information influence rationalization and deception decisions. For instance, negotiators who expect their counterpart to lie justify their own opportunistic use of deception (Tenbrunsel, 1998); future research should focus on characteristics of counterparts that influence negotiators’ justification decisions. Negotiators may also be more likely to justify their use of deception when their self-control resources are depleted (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009) or when the context primes negotiators to think creatively (Gino & Ariely, 2012). We call for future research to explore the justification process and the link between self-justification and the decision to use deception.

Power

Power is the ability to influence outcomes for others (e.g., Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010). In negotiation contexts, power may arise from differences in information, resources, and alternatives (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2001). Past research shows that differences in power influence decisions related to the decision to use deception. For example, compared to less powerful negotiators, powerful negotiators develop higher aspirations (Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), demand more, and concede less (De Dreu, 1995). Does power also influence deception?

Research shows that some forms of power may corrupt negotiators. In an early study, Crott, Kayser, and Lamm (1980) found that high-power negotiators (negotiators with higher payoff positions) bluff more and communicate less than low-power negotiators. In a more recent study, Boles et al. (2000) found that high-power negotiators (negotiators with more information) are more deceptive than low-power negotiators. Other research on power finds that the pursuit of power may also increase deception. In a series of studies, Malhotra and Gino (2011) investigated negotiators who increased their power by investing in outside options. Malhotra and Gino (2011) found that investing in outside options enhances feelings of entitlement and licenses the use of deception in negotiations.

Other research, however, suggests that the relationship between power and corruption is more complex. For instance, DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, and Ceramic (2012) found that the psychological experience of power is associated with more self-interested behavior for those with a low moral identity yet less self-interested behavior for those with a high moral identity. Further, in a study focusing on threat power, Koning, Steinel, Van Beest, and Van Dijk (2011) showed that low-power recipients in an ultimatum game are more likely to use deception than high-power recipients.

Future research on power and the pursuit of power should further focus on long-term relationship contexts with repeated interactions and reputation costs. In addition, future research should focus on why power licenses deception, the related justification process, and how different sources of power influence deception in different ways. For instance, whereas deception that arises from differences in
information may reflect differences in opportunity, deception that arises from differences in payoffs may reflect differences in momentary temptation (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996; Tenbrunsel, 1998). In the absence of further research on the subtleties and complexities of power, the relationship between power and deception is surprisingly tenuous and certainly merits future research.

**Individuals and Groups**

Negotiation research suggests that groups may behave very differently than individuals. Compared to individuals, groups are more competitive and self-interested in the centipede game and prisoners’ dilemma games (e.g., Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeier, 2004; Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). Are groups also more likely to use deception?

Using a modified version of Gneezy’s (2005) deception game, Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, and Murnighan (2009) found that groups lie more than individuals when their counterparts’ responses are certain (i.e., when participants learn that their counterparts precommitted to following their message) and lie less when their counterparts’ responses are uncertain (i.e., when participants do not know whether their counterparts will believe their message). An analysis of participants’ responses revealed that groups are also more self-interested and strategic than individuals. Groups in the uncertain condition, for instance, lied less in pursuit of a reverse psychology strategy (“We thought the other group would think we were lying, so we told the truth to get more money;” Cohen et al., 2009, p. 1324) that would maximize the groups’ payoffs. Research by Sutter (2009) provided further evidence that groups make strategic decisions to act honestly when their counterparts’ responses are uncertain.

Why are groups more dishonest than individuals? Recent research on the dishonesty of individuals within groups offers insights into the dishonesty of groups. Some of these studies suggest that groups may more easily justify the use of deception than individuals. In a series of studies, Gino et al. found that the dishonesty of a single group member can define norms that substantially influence the dishonesty of other members (Gino et al., 2009; Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 2009). In this approach, the spread of dishonesty is similar to the contagion of organizational deviance (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998), such that people within groups may justify the use of deception by focusing on the dishonesty of similar others (Gino & Galinsky, 2012). Other related research on the dishonesty of individuals within groups shows that group members may also justify the use of deception when the benefits of deception are shared by other group members (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, forthcoming; Wiltermuth, 2011). In one study, Wiltermuth (2011) found that people who share their ill-gotten gains with others describe dishonesty as less immoral than people who capture the full benefits. Future research should deepen our understanding of when and under what conditions negotiators will justify the dishonesty of their group members and, as collectives, collude to use deception.

**The Negotiators**

Related research focuses on the negotiators. This work explores how the motivations and cognitions of individual negotiators influence the deception decision process.

**Motivation**

Social value orientation is a central focus of research on motivation in negotiations (e.g., Van Dijk, De Cremer, & Handgraaf, 2004). As developed by Messick and McClintock (1968), social value orientation describes individual differences in preferences for distributions of outcomes for the self and others in negotiations and interdependent situations. Negotiators who prefer to maximize their own outcomes are commonly described as proself negotiators; negotiators who prefer to maximize joint or others’ outcomes are described as prosocial negotiators (e.g., Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Van Lange, 1999).

Across negotiation situations, proself negotiators are more deceptive than prosocial negotiators. In a recent study, Steinel, Utz, and Koning (2010) found that whereas prosocial negotiators are honest and
reveal their private information, proself negotiators strategically conceal and lie about their private information (see also Boles et al., 2000; O’Connor & Carnevale, 1997). Reinders Folmer and De Cremer (2012) further showed that proself negotiators also engage in more deception than prosocial negotiators in the domain of losses. Further efforts are needed to understand the interactions between motivational forces endogenous to negotiators and characteristics of negotiation structure.

Motivational forces exogenous to negotiators, although overlooked in prior research, may also influence deception decisions in negotiation. In research on dishonesty in organizations, Schweitzer et al. (2004) showed that people with specific unmet goals cheat more than people with vague goals. In other research, Gino and Margolis (2011) showed that subtle manipulations of motivational orientations also influence deception. Specifically, they found that people induced with a promotion focus cheat more than people induced with a prevention focus. Future research is needed to extend these findings to negotiation contexts as well as to identify other structural and interpersonal sources of motivation that consciously and unconsciously (e.g., Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003; Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs, 2011) influence deception. For instance, future research could focus on how characteristics of counterparts motivate negotiators to use deception that helps or hurts these counterparts. Related research suggests that the status (e.g., Moran & Schweitzer, 2008) and wealth (e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2010) of counterparts may all influence negotiators’ motivation to use deception. Physical attractiveness is another salient individual characteristic in negotiations that influences negotiator behavior (Solnick & Schweitzer, 1999) and may also influence the deception decision process.

Self-Continuity
In many domains, individuals experience internal conflicts such as the want–should conflict (Bazerman, Tenbrunsel, & Wade-Benzoni, 1998; Milkman, Rogers, & Bazerman, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2002). For example, many people want to diet but frequently deviate from their diets. In many domains, individuals also lack self-continuity—consistency through time (Strotz, 1956).

The self-continuity construct is relevant to conflict and deception. In most cases, the use of deception represents an intertemporal choice between maximizing one’s short-term (want or present self) interests and maintaining one’s (should or future self) self-concept and reputation (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011; Gino et al., 2011; Mead et al., 2009).

Conceptualizing the deception decision in negotiations as a self-continuity conflict may be a fruitful direction for future work. Negotiators who lack a sense of continuity may be more likely to use deception than negotiators who feel a sense of continuity. A recent study by Hershfield, Cohen, and Thompson (2012) has supported this proposition. Similarly, research on intertemporal choice demonstrates that people prefer should options to want options when making choices that take effect in the future. This suggests that outcome delays (e.g., Okhuysen, Galinsky, & Uptigrove, 2003) and final deadlines (Carnevale, O’Connor, & McCusker, 1993; Gino & Moore, 2008a, 2008b; Moore, 2004a, 2004b) in negotiations may profoundly influence deception decisions. Additional research is needed to fully understand the interplay between self-continuity, perceptions of time, and deception.

Cognitive and Motivational Biases
A number of scholars have argued that nonconscious biases cause people to behave dishonestly outside of their conscious awareness (Banaji et al., 2003; Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). In a series of conceptual articles, these scholars describe the influence of self-serving biases in the domains of negotiation (Bazerman, 2011) and related conflict situations (Bazerman, Moore, Tetlock, & Tanlu, 2006; Chugh et al., 2005; Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, & Bazerman, 2006).

Existing research, however, has focused very little attention on the influence of cognitive biases on the deception decision process. Kern and Chugh (2009) found that participants presented with negotiation outcomes in a loss frame are more dishonest than participants presented with negotiation outcomes in a gain frame. Future research should focus on other cognitive biases (e.g., fixed pie perceptions; Bazerman...
& Neale, 1983) that may influence deception decisions. For instance, future work could explore the influence of implicit beliefs in negotiation abilities (Haselhuhn, Schweitzer, & Wood, 2010; Kray & Haselhuhn, 2007; Wong, Haselhuhn, & Kray, 2011) on the deception decision process.

The Negotiation Process

The negotiation process includes the interaction between negotiators and negotiation structure, and this process will influence the deception decision process. Included in the negotiation process are the conflict frames and mental models of negotiators as well as the questions that negotiators ask in the process of negotiation.

Conflict Frames and Mental Models

Negotiations are profoundly influenced by negotiators’ perceptions of the situation (Bazerman et al., 2000; Zhong, 2011). These perceptions influence “how parties understand the game…a critical determinant of how they play the game” (Bazerman et al., 2000, p. 286). Research on deception has focused on conflict frames (Halevy, Chou, & Murnighan, 2012; Pinkley, 1990) and mental models (Steinel & De Dreu, 2004)—cognitive schemas that reflect perceptions of the negotiation. In this research, negotiators’ perceptions of conflict have been conceptualized as both static and dynamic constructs.

Conflict frames are the lenses through which people understand and construct conflict situations such as negotiations (Pinkley, 1990). Early research on conflict frames focused on identifying and defining the frames that negotiators use to represent conflict situations. In an important inductive study, Pinkley (1990) found that negotiators represent conflict through one of three different frames: cooperate versus win, relationship versus task, and emotional versus intellectual. Other research similarly shows that conflict can be reduced to relatively few dimensions. For instance, Halevy et al. (2012) showed most negotiators represent conflict through one of four implicit payoff structures: maximizing difference, assurance, chicken, and prisoners’ dilemma.

Prior work has linked conflict frames to the use of deception in negotiations. In an experimental study using a seven-action prisoners’ dilemma game, Schweitzer et al. (2005) found that negotiators with win frames are more likely to use deception than are negotiators with cooperate frames. In a related work, Halevy et al. (2012) found that negotiators who perceive conflict as a game of chicken—a payoff structure that encourages the exploitation of cooperative counterparts—lie more in ultimatum games than do negotiators who perceive conflict as a game of assurance or prisoners’ dilemma. This work demonstrates that the deception process is powerfully influenced by how negotiators perceive conflict.

Similarly, mental models—cognitive representations of a negotiation (Bazerman et al., 2000)—can influence the use of deception in negotiations. In an information provision game, Steinel and De Dreu (2004) found that negotiators who perceive their counterparts as competitive misrepresent more information than negotiators who perceive their counterparts as cooperative. Future research should focus on other dimensions of mental models to more fully understand the complexities underlying perceptions and deception. Future research should also focus on how mental models jointly interact with negotiators’ cognitions, motivations, and emotions to influence deception decisions. Subtle cues may exert a great deal of influence over the use of deception in negotiations.

In Steinel and De Dreu (2004), perceptions were manipulated rather than measured (see also Halevy et al., 2012). This reflects an emerging assumption in research on negotiations: Conflict frames and mental models are dynamic (for a discussion, see Bazerman et al., 2000). In an important study, Pinkley and Northcraft (1994) measured negotiators’ prenegotiation and postnegotiation conflict frames and found that negotiators’ frames mutually influence each other and converge. This study and others suggest that negotiators can and do change the game (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996) and that future research should focus on the interpersonal dynamics of these cognitive representations of conflict and deception. For instance, research could focus on the influence of
others’ gain and loss frames on negotiators’ own conflict frames (Schweitzer & DeChurch, 2001) and the consequent decision to use deception.

Questions
One of the most relevant aspects of the negotiation process is the use of questions. The information accessible to negotiators is frequently a reflection of the questions they ask (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004; Malhotra & Bazerman, 2007). Questions, however, present a tempting opportunity for negotiators to use deception.

Prior work demonstrates that negotiators’ responses to questions are influenced by the types of questions they are asked. In an experimental study, Schweitzer and Croson (1999) found that when negotiators are asked direct questions, they are far less likely to lie overall, but are more likely to lie by commission than omission. This finding suggests that direct questions reduce negotiators’ overall risk of being deceived but may increase negotiators’ risk of being deceived by commission.

Other types of questions also influence the (dis)honesty of negotiators’ responses. Minson, Ruedy, and Schweitzer (2011), for instance, focused on three types of questions: general questions that pose broad inquiry, such as, “What can you tell me about the car?”; positive assumption questions that assume the absence of a problem, such as, “The car hasn’t been in an accident, right?”; and negative assumption questions that assume the presence of a problem, such as, “How many accidents has the car been in?” In a series of studies, Minson et al. (2011) showed that negotiators respond less honestly to general questions than they do to positive or negative assumption questions and less honestly to positive assumption questions than they do to negative assumption questions.

Given the pivotal role questions play in mediating the flow of information in negotiations, it is quite surprising that so little research has investigated the role of questions in negotiations. Consistent with the few studies that have explored the role of questions in negotiation, future work could develop our descriptive and prescriptive understanding of how questions influence the use of deception.

Consequences of Deception
As scholars, we know very little about the consequences of deception in negotiation. This is true for several reasons. First, in many natural settings, deception goes undetected and unnoticed. Second, the dominant experimental paradigm for studying negotiation involves a single-shot, dyadic, role-playing exercise. Within this paradigm, there are few opportunities for targets of deception to detect deception (e.g., by learning information later on from external sources), and there are few long-term consequences for deceivers (e.g., reputational consequences or repeated interactions). Third, as scholars, we have devoted surprisingly little attention to this issue.

Undetected Deception
The vast majority of individuals are poor lie detectors, and as a result, most deception in negotiations goes unnoticed in the short run (Schweitzer, 2005). Although most experimental studies of negotiation involve two parties, many negotiations involve more than two parties, and the use of deception may impact the deceiver, the target, and the observer.

For deceivers, undetected deception may accomplish several goals. First, it may enable deceivers to claim greater profits. Second, it may give deceivers practice that ultimately enables them to use deception more effectively in the future. Ultimately, the successful use of deception may embolden negotiators to use more deception in the future. This feedback loop, however, may be tempered by threats to one’s self-concept and motivations to restore an intact sense of self (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2011; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). If deceivers are able to justify their dishonesty or the ethical dimensions of the deception decision “fade into the background” (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004, p. 223), the self-concept
threat will be weak (Mazar et al., 2008a, 2008b; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011). Future research should
disentangle these predictions and use both experimental and naturalistic paradigms that study repeated
negotiations (e.g., O’Connor, Arnold, & Burris, 2005), external feedback, and long-term consequences. A
broader investigation into undetected deception will enhance our understanding of what happens when
deception is ultimately detected.

Detected Deception

From the few studies that have explored the consequences of detected deception, we know that detected
deception harms trust (Boles et al., 2000; Haselhuhn et al., 2010; Schweitzer et al., 2006) and increases
retribution (Boles et al., 2000; Wang, Galinsky, & Murnighan, 2009). In a repeated trust game, Schweit-
zer et al. (2006) found that trust harmed by deception is never fully repaired; even after the deceived tar-
get receives a promise to change and an apology, and observes a sequence of honest behaviors, trust is
never completely restored.

A number of factors are likely to moderate the consequences of detected deception. For example, tim-
ing of detection may matter. Deception may be detected immediately after misrepresentation, after a
short delay, or after a very long delay. The process by which negotiators realize they were deceived may
also moderate the consequences of detected deception. In addition, the timing (Lount, Zhong, Sivana-
than, & Murnighan, 2008) and nature of the violation (Kim, Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Kim, Ferrin,
Cooper, & Dirks, 2004) are likely to matter.

Other work on the consequences of detected deception has focused on retribution. In an ultimatum
bargaining game with two-sided imperfect information, Croson, Boles, and Murnighan (2003) found
that detected deception increases the likelihood that deceivers’ offers are rejected (see also Boles et al.,
2000). Indeed, research in experimental economics has found that negotiators readily punish deceivers
(Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2000; Brandts & Charness, 2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Wang et al.,
2009). With respect to negotiations, future work should explore the relational and reputational conse-
quences of both suspected and detected deception.

Contending with a Deceiver

Prescriptively, what should negotiators do after detecting deception? Abrupt confrontations may change
behavior but risk relationship rupture. The power dynamics between negotiators and the importance of
saving face for the negotiators are likely to determine the appropriate reaction. The challenge of contend-
ing with a deceiver is a critical question that has been largely overlooked in prior research. Important
work remains to understand how and when negotiators should respond to revealed deception.

The Emotion Deception Model

Our review indicates that extant research on deception has largely assumed a cognitive decision process
and has overlooked the pervasive influence of emotions (see also Gino & Shea, 2012). This omission is
striking, as the decision to use deception is complex, and research suggests that complex decision pro-
cesses are most susceptible to the influence of emotions (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer,
2012; Schwarz, 1990). Further, recent experimental studies demonstrate that feelings are a fundamental
antecedent (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008) and consequence (Ruedy, Moore,
Gino, & Schweitzer, 2013; Zhong, 2011) of deception decisions. This research indicates that we cannot
understand the deception decision process without understanding the role of emotions in this process
(see also Gino & Shea, 2012). To address this, we introduce the EDM (see Figure 1). Our model inte-
grates research on deception (e.g., Lewicki, 1983) and emotion (e.g., Barry & Oliver, 1996; Bower, 1981;
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and describes the role of emotions in the deception decision process.

**Emotions**

Emotions are physiological reactions, action tendencies, and subjective experiences (Lazarus, 1991) that differ from moods (general positive or negative feelings) in that they are more intense, shorter in duration, and characterized by a number of appraisals (Schwarz, 1990; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). These appraisals include the primary appraisal of valence as well as the secondary appraisals of control and certainty (see Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). For instance, fear and anger share a primary appraisal of valence (negatively valenced) but differ in the secondary appraisals of control and certainty; fear is characterized by situational control and uncertainty, and anger is characterized by other-person control and certainty. In many domains, these appraisals profoundly influence perceptions and decisions. Lerner and Keltner (2001), for instance, showed that fearful people express pessimistic risk estimates and risk-averse choices, and angry people express optimistic risk estimates and risk-seeking choices. For this reason, we expect emotions, even similarly valenced emotions, to differently influence the deception decision process.

We propose that emotions may imbue the deception decision process in two ways. First, current emotions—emotions that negotiators experience in the moment of the deception decision—may influence deception. Second, anticipated emotions—negotiators’ expectations of the emotional consequences of the deception decision—may influence deception decisions. Our model describes the determinants and effects of current and anticipated emotions.

**Current Emotions: Incidental and Integral**

Current emotions reflect negotiators’ feelings in the moment immediately prior to making the deception decision. Current emotions include incidental emotions, those triggered by a prior, unrelated context, and integral emotions, those triggered by the negotiation context.

In our model, we consider the direct and indirect influences of incidental and integral emotions on deception. Direct effects are those that are mediated by changes in awareness of the opportunity to use deception. Direct effects are those that are not mediated by changes in awareness; these effects influence deception through the (mis)attribution of emotions to the deception decision.

*Figure 1. The emotion deception model (EDM).*
**Incidental Emotions**

Incidental emotions, emotions that are unrelated to the negotiation and thus normatively irrelevant, profoundly influence negotiations (Tsay & Bazerman, 2009). In a recent study, Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) showed that negotiators who feel incidentally anxious make low first offers, exit negotiations early, and ultimately obtain poor outcomes. Modest manipulations can greatly influence negotiator decisions and outcomes.

Incidental emotions may influence deception directly by shaping negotiators’ thoughts—what negotiators think. The emotion-as-information perspective (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 2003) suggests that negotiators may ask “How do I feel about this?” and then use their current feelings, even misattributed feelings, to inform their deception decisions. Emotions characterized by other-person control may be particularly important in this misattribution process, as negotiation is inherently interpersonal (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006), and emotions are more likely misattributed when the dimensions of emotions (e.g., other control) correspond to the dimensions of decisions (e.g., other negotiator; Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). For instance, prior research shows that incidental anger decreases interpersonal trust (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005); in the context of negotiation and deception, this finding suggests that incidental anger will increase negotiators’ expectations of a dishonest and untrustworthy counterpart and license negotiators to use defensive deception (Tenbrunsel, 1998).

Incidental emotions may also influence deception indirectly by impacting the process of thought—how negotiators think. The emotion-priming perspective suggests that emotions increase the salience of and focus attention on emotion-consistent information (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995). In this emotion-based conceptualization of bounded awareness (Bazerman & Chugh, 2005), emotions may focus negotiators on the emotion-consistent dimensions of the negotiation and therefore influence recognition of the opportunity to use deception. For instance, the emotion of incidental gratitude—triggered by a recent encounter with a generous colleague who is not associated with the negotiation—may focus individuals in an unrelated negotiation context on the compassionate and cooperative dimensions of their interaction and decrease awareness of the dark side of negotiations.

**Integral Emotions**

Integral emotions, emotions triggered by the negotiation itself, profoundly influence negotiation decisions and outcomes (Barry, 2008; Barry, Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; Druckman & Olekalns, 2008; O’Connor, Arnold, & Maurizio, 2010). For instance, integral emotions influence preferences for self-centered outcomes (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989) and rejections of profitable offers in ultimatum games (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). These studies suggest that integral emotions are likely to influence deception decisions.

Integral emotions may influence deception directly by impacting what negotiators think. For example, Moran and Schweitzer (2008) found that upward social comparisons induce feelings of envy that motivate deception. In their study, envy influenced deception through perceptions of the deception decision; envy increased the psychological benefits and decreased the psychological costs of deception. These results highlight the importance of emotions in the deception decision process (see also Olekalns & Smith, 2009).

Moran and Schweitzer (2008) focused on the influence of integral emotions on deception directly; integral emotions, however, may also influence deception indirectly by impacting how negotiators think. The emotion-priming model suggests that emotions may focus negotiators on the emotion-consistent dimensions of the negotiation (Bower, 1981; Forgas, 1995; see prior discussion on Incidental Emotions). For instance, deadlines may intensify adrenaline-laden feelings of competitive arousal (Malhotra, 2010) that might, in turn, increase awareness of the potential use of competitive tactics such as deception. Other aspects of the negotiation, such as the negotiation frame (e.g., Kern & Chugh, 2009; Reinders Folmer & De Cremer, 2012; Schweitzer et al., 2005), may also influence awareness. For instance, loss
frames may induce feelings of anxiety that, paradoxically, increase awareness of compensatory mechanisms such as deception.

A particularly important dimension of the negotiation is the emotions of counterparts. In this interpersonal perspective on emotions (e.g., Barry, 1999; Barry & Oliver, 1996; Barry et al., 2004; Morris & Keltner, 2000; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008), counterparts’ emotions may influence negotiators’ deception decisions in at least two ways. First, counterparts’ emotions may evoke reciprocal or complementary emotions (Friedman et al., 2004; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004) that influence deception directly and indirectly. Second, counterparts’ emotions may provide information about intentions, decisions, and gullibility (Jakobs, Manstead, & Fischer, 1999; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010; Van Kleef et al., 2004)—strategic information that may influence negotiators’ deception decisions through more cognitive processes.

**Anticipated Emotions**

The second influence on deception decisions—anticipated emotions—refers to negotiators’ predictions of the emotional consequences of deception; that is, anticipated emotions are emotions that negotiators expect to experience, rather than emotions that negotiators actually experience in the moment of the deception decision. In many decision models, people anticipate the emotional consequences associated with different choices and then use these expectations—“How will I feel about this?”—to influence their decisions (e.g., Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999).

In our model, beliefs about the emotional consequences of deception may influence the deception decision process. For instance, the expectation of guilt, regret, or other negatively valenced emotions may curtail the use of deception in negotiations (Frank, 1988). This forecast of emotion, however, is prone to bias. For instance, some negotiators may expect to experience negative emotions but actually experience positive emotions (especially if their use of deception goes undetected and they earn additional payoffs). In contrast, other negotiators may expect to experience positive emotions but actually experience negative emotions (e.g., if their use of deception is detected; see Boles et al., 2000; Lewicki et al., 1998; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Schweitzer et al., 2006).

Although there are myriad influences on anticipated emotions, the negotiation context and prior emotional consequences seem particularly important. First, the negotiation context may function as a mechanism for negotiators to rationalize their dishonesty and escape the anticipated guilt that they would forecast (Mazar et al., 2008a, 2008b; Shu et al., 2011). Lewicki et al. (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Lewicki & Stark, 1996) found that many morally ambiguous tactics are perceived as acceptable in negotiations (see also Fulmer, Barry, & Long, 2009), a finding that is consistent with Carson’s (1993) recommendation that “(i)t is usually permissible to misstate one’s bargaining position when one has good reason to think that one’s negotiating partner is doing the same” (p. 317; see also Strudler, 1995).

Second, prior emotional consequences may offer negotiators insights into the emotions that they may experience. Prior work has presumed that deceitful negotiators experience negatively valenced emotions (Eisenberg, 2000; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007; Zhong, 2011). Yet, negotiators’ tendencies to focus myopically (Moore, 2004a, 2005) and to rationalize deception through the negotiation (Mazar et al., 2008a, 2008b; Shu et al., 2011) suggest that negotiators may escape experienced guilt (Ruedy et al., 2013; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008). As Greville (1757) avowed, “No man was ever so much deceived by another as by himself” (p. 1). Further, other research suggests that negotiators may actually experience positive emotions when they engage in deception. In a series of studies, Ruedy et al. (2013) found that participants who behave dishonestly experience more positive emotions than those who behave honestly. This research demonstrates that undetected dishonesty can induce feelings of elation (cheater’s high) and suggests that the emotional consequences of deception may be far more complex than prior work has assumed.
Conclusion

In this article, we argue that deception is an integral but poorly understood aspect of the negotiation process. Substantial gaps remain in our understanding of the antecedents of deception; our review of the literature identifies a number of gaps, and our model, the EDM, develops a foundation for inquiry into the interplay between emotions and deception. Importantly, we know relatively little about the consequences of deception.

Our approach has been focused on developing our descriptive understanding. Ultimately, however, we will need to develop prescriptive advice for guarding against the temptation to engage in deception, deterring deception, and contending with counterparts when deception is detected. Regrettably, the prescriptive advice we have to offer negotiators is thin. And in some cases, it may be simply wrong. For example, the common recommendation to meet in person may actually afford the deceiver opportunities to monitor the target’s gullibility and to tell more convincing lies (Schweitzer, Brodt, & Croson, 2002). Other advice to develop a relationship with one’s counterpart may also fail to curtail deception (Jap, Robertson, & Hamilton, 2011). It may be more difficult to detect a deceiving relational partner, and, in some cases, individuals with high levels of rapport may be more tempted to engage in deception.

As we expand our investigation into deception in negotiation, we will be able to use our existing experimental paradigms to answer some, but not all, of our questions. In many cases, we will need to develop new paradigms, such as repeated interactions (e.g., Schweitzer et al., 2006) and long-term interactions with longstanding relationships. Indeed, with few exceptions, existing work has focused on single-shot interactions between anonymous participants in controlled settings. This observation suggests another critical limitation of existing deception research in negotiations: the lack of field research to validate and extend laboratory findings. Field research, although overlooked, is particularly important for future research on emotions and deception, as emotions manipulated in the laboratory may be cold and different from the hot emotions that pervade negotiations at the bargaining table (Barry et al., 2004; Bazerman et al., 2000). We may need to adopt more qualitative methods; the recent corporate scandals detailed in the media and documented in depositions, trial testimony, and other litigation documents should provide a rich source of data. The literature on crisis negotiations and behavioral business ethics may also offer guidance for negotiation scholars seeking a broader set of field methods.

Finally, we call for additional research to explore the role of deception across different domains, industries, and cultures. Norms regarding the appropriate use of deception and related constructs, such as the loss of face surrounding accusations of deception, are likely to vary dramatically (e.g., Aquino, 1998; Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002; Mazar & Aggarwal, 2011). Another concern is that the empirical studies in this review were largely conducted with Western and well-educated samples that may well differ from broader populations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010).

When it comes to understanding deception within negotiations, we can tell prospective negotiators to avoid the temptation to use deception, to be watchful, and to be wary. It is our hope that in the near future we can offer guidance that is far more specific and far more useful.

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