Feeling Like My Self: Emotion Profiles and Social Identity

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Individuals possess social identities that contain unique, identity-relevant attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs providing "what-to-do" information when enacting that identity. We suggest that social identities are also associated with specific discrete emotion profiles providing "what-to-feel" information during identity enactment. We show that consumers prefer emotional stimuli consistent with their salient social identity, make product choices and emotion regulating consumption decisions to enhance (reduce) their experience of identity-consistent (inconsistent) emotions, and that experiencing identity-consistent emotions aids in the performance of identity-relevant tasks.

I magine you are selling a new energy drink, targeted at two segments of consumers—athletes and business people. As you construct your marketing communications, you might emphasize different benefits for each target group (exercise longer vs. work longer) or use different imagery (muscular people working out vs. people in suits in a boardroom). But what if you wanted to elicit emotions in your ads? Which would you use? Should both target markets get the same upbeat, energetic appeal, consistent with the product's benefits, or should there be different emotional content for the two groups? To inform this question, you might begin by looking at research on social identity. In this literature,

it is well accepted that attitudes, brands, and beliefs associated with one social identity will be very different from another social identity (e.g., athlete vs. business person; Forehand and Deshpandé 2001). While previous work on social identity has suggested that evaluations of successful or failed identity enactment can lead to emotional outcomes such as pride or shame, this literature has had little to say about whether discrete emotions might be uniquely associated with an identity's knowledge structure, such that experiencing identity-consistent emotions can aid in creating identity-consistent behavior.

We propose a theory of emotions in social identity, whereby consumers seek out and manage their emotional experiences in order to conform to *emotion profiles* associated with specific identities. Thus, social identities, in addition to invoking relevant beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that guide identity-relevant action, also contain associations to specific emotion profiles (e.g., athletes are angry) describing how consumers with that social identity seek out, experience, and regulate emotional experiences. By implicating emotions in the structure of social identities, we provide a unique motivation for the experience and management of emotions and offer implications for the literature on social identity and the role of emotions in consumption.

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND EMOTIONS

Social identities are aspects of the self-concept deriving from social categories, roles, or groups to which an individual perceives himself or herself as belonging (Tajfel 1978). These identities are knowledge structures containing traits, attitudes, behaviors, brands, and goals relevant to that social category, which provide coherence, allowing indi-

viduals to understand and unify their everyday actions (Burke and Stets 2009; Kleine, Kleine, and Kernan 1993). Individuals possess a constellation of discrete social identities, varying in their salience and centrality that together with personal identities make up a person's global sense of self (Kleine et al. 1993).

Attitudes, values, behaviors, and brands that assist in performing a specific identity, over time and with repetition, become associated with it, subsumed into its knowledge structure; providing "what-to-do" information when expressing the social identity (Kleine et al. 1993). Ultimately, when the identity is salient, individuals make sense of the world using an identity-consistent mind-set (Oyserman 2009). This leads to heightened sensitivity to identity-relevant stimuli, shapes encoding and retrieval processes (Mercurio and Forehand 2011), leads to more positive evaluations of identity-consistent stimuli (Forehand and Desphandé 2001; White and Dahl 2007), and produces motivation to act in ways consistent with the social identity (Oyserman 2009; Reed 2004) while avoiding objects and behaviors that are inconsistent with it (Berger and Heath 2007; Escalas and Bettman 2005). Individuals thus rely on their social identities to provide self-categorization, behavioral guidance (Markus and Wurf 1987), and self-verification (Swann 1983) through processes of self-regulation that seek to calibrate attitudes, values, and behaviors according to salient identity standards (Oyserman 2009; Reed et al. 2012). For instance, a person may view herself as an athlete, suggesting that she should play a sport, work out regularly, and wear athletic gear.

While this literature has examined attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, and brands as constructs central to social identity enactment, identity theorists have typically viewed emotions as outcomes of successful or failed identity enactment, rather than as components of identity-consistent mind-sets. However, just like attitudes and beliefs, emotions have been conceptualized as mental constructs, interconnected within broader associative networks and knowledge structures (Bower 1981). In keeping with this, we propose that social identities are not only associated with mind-sets containing attitudes, behaviors, beliefs and other what-to-do information (Kleine et al. 1993) when expressing that identity, but also with *emotion profiles* that offer "what-to-feel" information; such that specific emotions can be part of a social identity's knowledge structure. Because identities carry with them a readiness to make sense of the world and motivation to act in identity-consistent ways (Oyserman 2009), we thus suggest that individuals will have more favorable attitudes toward emotional targets consistent with their identity's emotional profile, will prefer to experience emotions that are consistent with a salient social identity, will engage in identity-consistent emotion regulation processes such that they will upregulate identity-consistent and downregulate identity-inconsistent emotions, and will perform better at identity-relevant tasks when experiencing identity-consistent emotions.

WHAT TO FEEL: DISCRETE EMOTIONS AS COMPONENTS OF AN IDENTITY'S KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURE

The self has been described as possessing a unique duality: it is both a doer, on the one hand, and an object of evaluation on the other (Greenwald and Pratkanis 1984). From early conceptions of social identities, such as Cooley's "looking-glass self" (1902) to more recent work (Burke and Stets 2009), the experience of affect or emotion in identity has focused on the self as an object of evaluation, such that appraisals (by the self or others) of identity performance lead to emotional outcomes associated with self-esteem. Despite some differences in perspectives, identity theorists agree that positive emotions result from meeting one's identity enactment expectations while negative emotions result from enactment failures (Stets and Burke 2005). Recently, this literature has proposed that such reactions are not just positive or negative, but rather that discrete emotional reactions may be triggered by failures. For example, Higgins (1987) suggested that failure to enact the ought-self would lead to anxiety, while failure to enact the ideal-self would lead to depression. Stets and Burke (2005) proposed that internal attributions of responsibility for failure would lead to feelings of disappointment and sadness, while external attributions would lead to feelings of annoyance and anger. Each of these negative emotions signals a need for behavior changes to achieve greater congruence with identity standards, or to reassess whether one wishes to hold that identity. The strength of emotional reactions further signals the importance of that particular identity, helping to order, rank, and increase commitment to specific social identities (Stryker 2004).

While these perspectives have linked affect and emotions to social identity, they view emotions as *external* to the knowledge structures of the individual social identities, arising as an outcome of identity enactment appraisals. In contrast, consistent with a view of the self as a doer and not just an evaluator, we propose that discrete emotions can be *internal* to the knowledge structure of a social identity. We thus argue that when a social identity is salient, it can make active not just attitudes and behaviors that are consistent with that identity (Reed 2004) but also discrete emotions that are also part of the identity-consistent mind-set, influencing identity enactment in progress, rather than simply providing feedback on enactment success or failure.

Specific discrete emotions may become associated with individual social identities for several reasons. First, there may be well-known identity "prototypes" affiliated with certain discrete emotions (e.g., Ray Lewis is an athlete and is always angry). To the extent that individuals observe the co-occurrence of a discrete emotion and a specific social identity, they may encode that emotion as one of the key associations linked to that social category. Second, discrete emotions imply action tendencies (Frijda 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989) that may correspond to the characteristics and objectives of that social identity. Emotions arise when an individual attends to a situation and sees it

as relevant to his or her goals, leading to goal-related action tendencies. Work on "instrumental" emotion regulation (Cohen and Andrade 2004; Tamir 2009) suggests that emotion profiles could arise out of identity-specific goal pursuits: if an individual repeatedly experiences an emotion as relevant to serve the goals of a specific identity, she may come to acquire an association between the emotion and the identity, even absent goal pursuit. Thus, specific emotions may be uniquely linked to identity-relevant action readiness. For instance, anger leads to the desire to overcome obstacles and punish others—qualities that may aid athletes during competition. These explanations suggest that specific emotions may become associated with a social identity, becoming incorporated into its knowledge structure and playing a part in the identity mind-set that individuals use to guide meaning-making and self-regulation.

Several relevant literatures have suggested linkages between emotions, self-structures, and regulatory processes, providing further support for our perspective. Cross-cultural research has found differences in the perception (Matsumoto 1993), expression (Markus and Kitayama 1991), and desirability (Tsai, Knutson, and Fung 2006) of different discrete emotions based on cultural differences in the self-concept and related cultural norms (Aaker and Williams 1998). This research has suggested that cultural norms regarding self-construal often prescribe what an individual "should" feel, though discrepancies may arise between the normative state and actual felt emotion (Tsai et al. 2006). Organizational behavior and sociology have examined the ability to conform to emotion norms of a job as a component of workplace success, particularly in service industries (flight attendants, salespeople; Hochschild 1983). This study of "emotional labor" has focused on emotion expression as an instrumental component of job execution, and on the negative outcomes that arise (stress, job dissatisfaction) when emotion expression and authentic "deep feelings" differ (Scott and Barnes 2011). Together, these streams of research suggest that emotions can be associated with self-structures (Hochschild 1983; Markus and Kitayama 1991), and that they can support identity enactment (Simpson and Stroh 2004; Tamir 2009). We extend this work, examining the self at a different level of conceptual specificity and self-representation, emphasizing the self that stems from group membership and adoption of group characteristics into the self-concept, consistent with the social identity tradition (Brewer and Gardner 1996), and specifically linking social identities with emotion profiles.

For instance, mothers should be warm and caring, but those same women in the boardroom are expected to be coolly professional and possibly even aggressive (Simpson and Stroh 2004). Notably, conforming to the salient emotion profile enhances enactment of the relevant social identity: a woman who is warm and caring is more "motherly" than one who is aggressive (Smith-Lovin 1990). Being warm enhances a woman's match with the mother social identity both because it is part of the prototypical mother identity (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2004) and because warm emotions may augment feelings of affiliation and care (Smith-Lovin

1990). Because individuals are motivated to behave in identity-consistent ways, we predict that they will prefer to experience identity-consistent emotions and will engage in regulatory processes to enhance identity-consistent emotions while dampening identity-inconsistent emotions. Thus, seeking out and conforming to the salient emotion profile is a way to reinforce one's social identity, while also supporting identity-relevant behaviors.

We expect that individuals will conform to the salient emotion profile through the specific self-regulatory process of emotion regulation, by which individuals manage either the emotion antecedents or the subjective, physiological, and behavioral elements of the emotional response (Gross 1998; Gross and Levenson 1993). Theorists have described five distinct emotion regulation strategies, distinguished by the points at which they intervene in the emotion generation process (Gross 1998). From situation selection, where the individual approaches or avoids specific environments due to their expected emotional impact, to attention deployment, cognitive reappraisal, and suppression that all intervene during the emotion-eliciting event, to even response modulation, where one alters physical aspects of the emotion response, there are a variety of strategies by which individuals can intervene to change their emotional trajectory. We predict that the activation of a social identity, and its associated emotion profile, will motivate individuals to engage in emotion regulation in order to conform to, or remain consistent with, the emotion profile of their salient social identity.

In sum, consistent with previous work that has demonstrated that salient social identities sensitize individuals to identity-consistent cognitions, preferences, self-regulation, and behaviors, we predict that identity salience will heighten sensitivity to emotional stimuli, leading to more positive evaluations of identity-consistent emotions and preference for identity-consistent emotional experiences. In addition to demonstrating these basic effects of identity-consistency in emotions, we predict that individuals will engage in emotion regulation (Gross 1998) to seek out and amplify the experience of identity-consistent emotions and to avoid and dampen the experience of identity-inconsistent emotions, and that experiencing identity-consistent emotions leads to better performance at identity-relevant tasks.

We examine this in one exploratory study and five experiments, in which we predict and find effects of individuals' salient social identity on their emotion experiences. The exploratory study investigates lay beliefs regarding relationships between specific social identities and discrete emotions, identifying specific identity-relevant emotion profiles used in the subsequent experiments. The first two experiments study the implications of emotion profiles on preferences for identity-consistent emotional experiences. Experiment 1 demonstrates that an active social identity moderates the effects of discrete emotions on persuasion, such that individuals have more favorable attitudes toward an emotional appeal congruent with their salient social identity. Experiment 2 shows that individuals choose emotional experiences consistent with their active social identity. Experiments 3A and 3B dem-

onstrate that actual consumption is determined by the active social identity and its emotion regulation needs, such that individuals will consume more of a product that enhances identity-consistent emotions or dampens identity-inconsistent emotions. Finally, experiment 4 demonstrates that individuals experiencing identity-consistent (vs. inconsistent) emotions perform better at identity-relevant tasks. These studies establish that emotions are implicated within social identities, begin to articulate how social identity and emotions interact to influence persuasion and consumption, and suggest that emotions can play a role in identity enactment.

EXPLORATORY STUDY: DO EMOTION PROFILES EXIST?

To begin our investigation, this exploratory study focused on three social identities that are broadly held by our participants: athlete, environmentalist, and volunteer, and three negative emotions that have distinct appraisal patterns and action readiness tendencies (Frijda 1986): anger, disgust, and sadness. We drew upon the instrumental view of emotions (Cohen and Andrade 2004; Erber, Wegner, and Therriault 1996; Tamir 2009) to assess how useful experiencing specific emotions would be for enacting specific social identities. Consistent with this literature, we chose to focus on negative emotions for several reasons. First, positive emotions tend to lack specific action tendencies (Frijda 1986) and are characterized by more diffuse affective states. Due to the broadness of these emotions, they may not uniquely match any particular social identity and may, in fact, be relevant to many. In contrast to positive emotions, negative emotions are highly differentiated and contain specific appraisal tendencies and action readiness states (Frijda et al. 1989). Second, focusing on negative emotions also avoids a potential confound when examining emotion preferences and regulation. That is, if an individual chooses to experience or enhance their experience of a positive emotion, it may be difficult to determine whether this is due to the fact that the emotion matches their social identity's emotion profile or because it is hedonically pleasing (Tamir et al. 2008). For negative emotions, it cannot be due to the hedonically pleasing components of the emotion since negative emotions are unpleasant. Evidence suggesting identity-consistent outcomes for negative emotions can thus be more reliably attributed to the hypothesized social identity-emotion profile connection. Though we do not rule out the association of specific positive emotions with social identities, the remaining discussion and empirical tests will focus on identity-relevant negative emotions. Finally, and importantly, the previous literature on emotions and identity has suggested that negative emotions are an indication of failure of identity enactment and provoke identity reevaluation processes. In contrast, we suggest that these discrete negative emotions are valuable to identity enactment and can enhance performance of identity-relevant tasks.

Eighty-seven members of Amazon's Mechanical Turk (MTurk) pool were paid $1 for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to the athlete, environmentalist, or volunteer identities. They were asked to rate whether someone with that social identity would find experiencing certain emotions useful (Tamir 2009), from a set of 10 emotions: anger, disgust, and sadness, plus seven filler emotions (fear, guilt, disappointment, hope, worry, relaxation, pride, where $1 =$ not at all to $7 =$ extremely helpful). Thus, this exploratory study examines consumer beliefs about associations between specific social identities and discrete emotions.

Consistent with our theory, the pilot study results reveal distinct associations between social identities and several discrete negative emotions. For instance, participants believed that athletes were more likely to find anger useful ($M = 5.38$) than volunteers ($M = 2.42$; $t(87) = 5.169$, $p < .0001$) or environmentalists ($M = 3.58$; $t(87) = 3.162$, $p < .01$); volunteers would find sadness more helpful ($M = 3.82$) than athletes ($M = 1.45$; $t(87) = 3.558$, $p < .01$) or environmentalists ($M = 2.43$; $t(87) = 2.887$, $p < .05$). Finally, participants indicated that environmentalists should be more likely to find disgust useful ($M = 5.27$) than athletes ($M = 4.00$; $t(87) = 2.430$, $p < .05$) or volunteers ($M = 3.08$; $t(87) = 2.517$, $p < .05$). Of the filler items, both environmentalists and volunteers were seen as benefitting from guilt ($M_{env} = 5.25$, $M_{vol} = 4.94$; $p = .552$), yet athletes did not ($M = 2.25$; both $p < .01$), while the remaining filler items showed no difference between social identities (all $p > .15$), shown in table 1. These results imply associations between the athlete identity and anger, the environmentalist identity and disgust, and the volunteer identity with sadness.

Beyond identifying identity-emotion associations to be explored in later studies, these results also offer support for our central theory: emotion profiles exist. Some emotions —here anger, disgust, and sadness—are believed to be particularly useful for certain social identities but not others. The lay beliefs of our participants suggest that anger is a part of the athlete identity emotion profile, while sadness is a part of the volunteer identity emotion profile, and disgust

TABLE 1

EXPLORATORY STUDY: EMOTION PROFILES EXIST

Profile	Mean level of emotion helpfulness for each social identity		
	Athlete	Environmentalist	Volunteer
Anger	5.38	3.58	2.42
Disgust	4.00	5.27	3.08
Sadness	1.45	2.43	3.82
Fear	4.30	4.90	2.40
Guilt	2.25	5.25	4.94
Disappointment	4.27	3.88	3.77
Hope	6.25	6.26	6.39
Worry	4.41	5.41	4.80
Relaxation	4.25	3.81	4.39
Pride	6.09	4.76	5.67

NOTE.—Scale values ranged from 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely helpful. Cell sizes ranged from 17 to 24 in each condition. Emotions were measured within subjects. Additional details may be obtained from the first author.

is part of the environmentalist emotion profile. Anger may be associated with the athlete identity because its external locus of control (Frijda 1986) focuses attention on the obstacles impeding goal pursuit, inspiring the desire to overcome barriers. In fact, sports psychology has found that experiencing anger increases gross muscular peak force on dynamometer tests (Davis, Woodman, and Callow 2010). Sadness results from experiences of loss that cannot be avoided (Frijda 1986). However, it may be associated with volunteers because expressions of sadness indicate a need for help (Izard 1977) and promote feelings of sympathy (Small and Verrochi 2009), while feeling sadness in response to the plight of others promotes assessments that situations rather than individuals are to blame for needy circumstances (Small and Lerner 2008) and leads to a willingness to engage in prosocial helping behaviors (Small and Verrochi 2009). Recently, the conceptualization of disgust has been expanded from its core association with noxious physical stimuli to a broader association with moral judgments (Horberg et al. 2009). Moral disgust may be associated with environmentalists because it arises from appraisals regarding purity and contamination, not only of the self but also of the social order and context (Haidt et al. 1997). Such feelings of disgust heighten feelings of self-efficacy (Smith and Ellsworth 1985), make salient an avoidance tendency (Haidt et al. 1997), result in more severe moral judgments (Wheatley and Haidt 2005), and amplify the moral significance of protecting purity (Horberg et al. 2009), which may lead to greater sensitivity toward violations of environmental purity.

The next two experiments capitalize on these identified emotion profiles and assess the influence of social identity-specific emotion profiles on responses to emotional advertisements and selection of experiences. If emotion profiles are a true component of a social identity's associative network, we should find evidence of preferences for emotional targets that conform to the salient identity's emotional profile.

EXPERIMENT 1: EMOTION PROFILE-CONSISTENT ADVERTISEMENTS ARE MORE PERSUASIVE

Experiment 1 used a 4 (social identity: athlete, volunteer, environmentalist, control) × 3 (emotion: anger, sadness, disgust) between-subjects design. We expect participants with a salient athlete identity to have more positive attitudes toward angry (vs. sad or disgusting) advertisements, those with a salient volunteer identity should have more positive attitudes toward sad (vs. angry or disgusting) advertisements, and those with a salient environmentalist identity to have more favorable attitudes toward ads utilizing disgust (vs. sadness or anger). Past research on identity-based responses to advertisements has shown identity-consistency effects. However, these advertisements typically mention the identity directly (Reed 2004) or provide an identity-consistent spokesperson (Forehand and Deshpandé 2001). The advertisements in our study contain no identity-relevant material or context, other than emotional content. Thus, in a strong test of our proposed effects, observation of consistency effects (i.e., identity-relevant ads are evaluated more favorably) would support our contention that emotion profiles are contained within the salient identity structure.

Participants and Procedure

Two hundred ninety-five members of Amazon's MTurk pool (average age, 27 years; range 18–66, 61% female) were paid $1 for their participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four identity prime conditions: athlete, volunteer, environmentalist, or control. Following Reed (2004), participants were first instructed to write for 5 minutes about a specific time they had performed well as an athlete, volunteer, or environmentalist, or to write about what they had done the previous day (control condition). Next, they listed 3–10 things they could do to show they are an athlete (volunteer, environmentalist): "Think about the ways you would show someone else that you are an athlete (volunteer, environmentalist). Please think about behaviors you would do and steps you would take to demonstrate that you are an athlete (volunteer, environmentalist). Please list at least three behaviors you would show others you are an athlete (volunteer, environmentalist)." In the control condition, they were asked to list 3–10 things they planned to do the next day.

Immediately following the writing task, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated "advertising evaluation" study. The print ads (app. A) promoted STD testing, a topic equally unrelated to the three active identities. To manipulate emotion in the advertisement, two copy changes were made across conditions. The headline read, "I've never felt so angry (depressed; disgusted)" and the body read, "Finding out I had herpes made me feel so furious (helpless; repulsive). I felt completely enraged (My spirits were really low; I felt like I would vomit) for a long time following diagnosis." In addition, the picture featured the same woman expressing either anger, sadness, or disgust (validated photos from Beaupré and Hess 2005). Participants evaluated the ad, then were debriefed, thanked, and paid.

Results

Participants were asked to report their attitude toward the advertisement (Ad) on a 10-item scale (good, pleasant, nice, irritating, interesting, annoying, positive, favorable, believable, effective, where 1 = not at all and 100 = extremely; Williams and Drolet 2005). The 10 items were subjected to a factor analysis, and one factor emerged; thus, the items were averaged to create one index of Ad ($\alpha = .842$). A two-way ANOVA was run on the Ad ratings, with social identity and emotion as predictors. A main effect of social identity emerged ($F(3, 283) = 6.639, p < .001$), such that participants in the volunteer ($M = 34.96$) and environmentalist ($M = 33.86$) conditions evaluated the ads more favorably than participants in the athlete ($M = 27.15$) and control ($M = 24.98$) conditions. A main effect of emotion also emerged ($F(2, 283) = 3.946, p < .05$), such that the sad advertisement ($M =$

33.55) was evaluated more highly than the angry ($M = 29.05$) or disgusting ($M = 27.56$) ads.

The predicted two-way interaction between emotion and social identity was significant ($F(6, 283) = 10.079$, $p < .001$), shown in figure 1. Follow up contrasts show that participants with a salient athlete identity indicated higher attitudes when they viewed an angry ($M = 36.79$) relative to a sad ad ($M = 25.6$; $F(1, 283) = 6.20$, $p < .05$) or a disgusting ad ($M = 19.05$; $F(1, 283) = 11.73$, $p < .001$). In contrast, participants with a salient volunteer identity rated the sad advertisement ($M = 48.77$) more favorably than the angry ad ($M = 26.01$; $F(1, 283) = 15.60$, $p < .0001$) or the disgusting ad ($M = 27.89$; $F(1, 283) = 8.96$, $p < .001$). Participants with a salient environmentalist identity evaluated the disgusting ad ($M = 43.62$) more highly than either the angry ($M = 25.92$, $F(1, 283) = 10.54$, $p < .001$) or sad ($M = 32.06$; $F(1, 283) = 8.642$, $p < .001$) ads. In the control condition, there was no significant difference between the angry ($M = 27.49$) and disgusting ads ($M = 19.68$; $F(1, 283) = 3.03$, $p = .11$), or sad ($M = 27.75$; $p > .9$) ads, though there was a marginal difference between the sad and the disgusting ads ($F(1, 283) = 3.13$, $p = .08$).

Discussion

Results of experiment 1 support the hypothesized influence of emotion profiles on persuasion such that ads consistent (vs. inconsistent) with a salient social identity's emotional profile had more persuasive effect. As predicted, participants with a salient athlete identity had more favorable attitudes toward an angry ad, those with a salient volunteer identity had more favorable attitudes toward a sad ad, and those with a salient environmentalist identity had more favorable attitudes toward the disgusting ad.

One alternative explanation for these effects is that the social identity primes may themselves activate emotions—if that were the case, consistency effects could be explained not by identity-emotion associations, but by fluency caused by matching emotional states (Bower 1981). In order to demonstrate that the identity prime (writing task) is not priming specific emotions, we ran a four-group (athlete, volunteer, environmentalist, control) study where 77 members of an online research panel (54.4% female, average age = 33 years; range, 19–60) were paid $1 to complete the same identity prime task as in the experiments. Next, they rated their current emotional state: anger, disgust, and sadness were the target emotions, plus nine filler emotions (hope, worry, relaxation, happiness, fear, guilt, contentment, pride, and disappointment, where 1 = not at all experiencing the emotion to 7 = experiencing the emotion intensely). These emotion ratings were subjected to a MANOVA with identity prime as the predictor variable. There was no significant effect of social identity prime on ratings of experienced anger ($F(3, 73) = 1.745$, $p = .165$). There was also no significant effect of social identity prime on ratings of experienced sadness ($F(3, 73) = .215$, $p = .886$) or experi-

FIGURE 1

EXPERIMENT 1: EMOTION PROFILE-CONSISTENT ADVERTISEMENTS ARE MORE PERSUASIVE

NOTE.—Attitude toward the Ad scale items ranged from 0 to 100. Cell sizes ranged from 22 to 26 participants per condition.

enced disgust ($F(3, 73) = .102$, $p = .958$). Across all of the filler emotions, there were no significant effects of the social identity prime, affirming that asking participants to write about a specific social identity did not also cause them to experience the associated emotions. However, we would note that this does not mean that the writing task does not bring discrete emotions to mind: indeed, the idea that emotions are part of the associative network of specific social identities implies just that. Rather, this test and obtained null effects demonstrate that merely activating an identity does not, necessarily, also cause the individual to enter into a specific emotional state.

Importantly, experiment 1 demonstrates an effect of identity salience on advertisements that contained no direct reference to the active social identity. Traditionally, consumer research has demonstrated social identity-consistency effects for brands, products and advertisements that overtly match the active social identity (e.g., "Olympic athletes use Brand X!"; Reed 2004). However, experiment 1 made no such claims, instead leveraging the central proposition of the current research: when a social identity is active, so too is its emotion profile. By incorporating an emotion consistent with the emotion profile, social identity-relevance was achieved, and greater persuasion resulted. In experiment 2, we extend our examination of identity-consistent emotion profiles to determine whether consumers choose to experience identity-consistent emotions.

EXPERIMENT 2: CONSUMERS CHOOSE EXPERIENCES THAT ARE EMOTION PROFILE-CONSISTENT

When a social identity is salient, individuals are motivated toward identity-consistent actions and procedures (Oyserman 2009). One way that individuals can manage their emotions is through the situations they select to experience (Gross 1998). In the second experiment, we examine whether individuals will seek out emotional experiences consistent with their active social identity's emotion profile and avoid those that are inconsistent. In this experiment, we consider only two social identities (athlete and volunteer) and allow participants to choose among musical experiences featuring either angry or sad songs. Given the opportunity to choose songs, individuals should select—and value more highly—experiences consistent with the emotion profile of their active social identity.

The study used a three-group between-subjects factor (social identity: athlete, volunteer, control), with choice stimuli of two types (emotion: angry songs, sad songs) within-subjects, resulting in a mixed design. We expect that participants with a salient athlete identity will select more angry songs, while participants with a salient volunteer identity will select more sad songs; therefore, we examine whether the distribution of chosen songs varies between social identities. Additionally, we expect participants with an active athlete identity should be willing to pay more to see angry songs

performed than sad songs, but the reverse for those with volunteer identities.

Participants and Procedure

One hundred three individuals (average age, 20 years; range, 18–30; 53% female) from the Wharton Behavioral Lab at the University of Pennsylvania participated in this study and were paid $10 for their involvement in a 1-hour lab session containing multiple studies, of which this was one. They were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (athlete, volunteer, control) and exposed to 10 emotional songs (five angry, five sad). As in the previous study, participants first completed a "writing task" where they wrote about a time that they performed as an athlete or volunteer and listed three behaviors that demonstrate those identities, while those in the control condition wrote about the previous day and listed three things they would do tomorrow.

Participants then proceeded to an ostensibly unrelated "music preferences" task. They were told that they would be selecting four songs to create a playlist that they would listen to while waiting to start the next study. To create the playlist, participants were presented with 10 songs: each song was labeled with a letter (i.e., song A, song B, etc.) and was next to a button allowing participants to listen to a 15-second sample of it. Though not indicated to participants, five of the 10 songs were sad songs, and the other five were angry songs. To choose these songs, a pretest was conducted to identify alternatives that were equally unfamiliar to participants, but which reliably elicit either anger or sadness. Forty-seven participants rated the degree to which they experienced 15 emotions (happy, depressed, angry, proud, upbeat, excited, sad, inspired, relaxed, annoyed, cheerful, upset, anxious, hopeful, and energized; 7-point scale, 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely) while listening to a 15-second excerpt of each song. The angry songs were rated as more angry ($M = 4.83$) than the sad songs ($M = 2.61$; $p < .01$), and the sad songs were seen as sadder ($M = 3.86$) than the angry songs ($M = 2.37$; $p < .01$). They did not differ across the remaining emotions (all $p > .35$).

Following the playlist choice, participants were re-presented with the full list of songs (and their accompanying 15-second samples) and asked to imagine they had an opportunity to see the band that had recorded each individual song play a 2-hour concert. They were asked to provide a willingness to pay (WTP) for tickets to see each band perform. After completing the WTP task, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.

Results

We first examined whether social identity affected the number of sad or angry songs chosen. Number of sad songs chosen was subjected to a multinomial regression with the maximum number of sad songs a participant could have chosen set to 4. In this regression, social identity was included as a predictor, with three levels, where the control

condition was the dummy level, and thus significance tests are run in comparison to control. The Wald chi-square test revealed a significant effect of social identity on the number of sad songs selected ($\chi^2(2) = 16.806$, $p < .001$). The coefficient for participants with a salient athlete identity was significant and negative ($\beta = -.558$; $\chi^2(1) = 4.588$, $p < .05$), implying that they had a significantly *lower* likelihood of choosing a sad song than did participants in the control condition. In contrast, the coefficient for the participants with a salient volunteer social identity was significant and positive ($\beta = .522$; $\chi^2(1) = 4.505$, $p < .05$), indicating they had a significantly *higher* probability of choosing a sad song than did participants in the control condition, illustrated by the choice proportions in figure 2. Since the coefficient for the athlete condition is significantly different from zero and negative, but the coefficient for the volunteers is significantly different from zero and positive, these two conditions are also significantly different from each other, demonstrating that volunteers are most likely to choose sad songs ($M_{volunteer-sad} = 2.93$) and least likely to choose angry songs ($M_{volunteer-angry} = 1.07$), and athletes are least likely to choose the sad songs ($M_{athlete-sad} = 1.92$) but most likely to choose angry songs ($M_{athlete-angry} = 2.08$), as expected.

This pattern was further confirmed by participants' expressed willingness-to-pay for concert tickets. Participants were asked to provide WTP for tickets to see each band play, rating all 10 songs/bands individually. These ticket prices were then averaged to create an average ticket price for sad

and angry bands. The premium for sad songs was then calculated, subtracting the WTP-angry from WTP-sad. This sad premium was subjected to a one-way ANOVA with social identity as a predictor, revealing a significant effect of social identity ($F(1, 100) = 11.127$, $p < .001$). Follow-up contrasts show that the sad premium was significantly different across the three social identity conditions, such that participants with a salient athlete identity would pay significantly less to see sad bands ($M = -\$24.54$) than either the control ($M = \$6.03$; $F(1, 100) = 4.489$, $p < .01$) or volunteer participants ($M = \$26.46$; $F(1, 100) = 8.734$, $p < .001$).

Discussion

Experiment 2 supports the proposed link between social identity and emotional experience preferences. As expected, participants selected emotional experiences consistent with their salient social identity's emotion profile such that those with an athlete identity chose to listen to more angry music and avoid sad music, and were willing to pay nearly $25 more for angry music tickets, while participants with a volunteer identity chose more sad music and avoided the angry songs and were willing to pay more for sad music tickets.

These first two experiments demonstrate that individuals prefer emotional targets consistent with a salient identity's emotion profile. In experiment 2, consumers sought out emotional experiences that supported their salient identity's emotion profile, while avoiding those that violated it, which

FIGURE 2

EXPERIMENT 2: CHOOSING TO EXPERIENCE
EMOTION PROFILE-CONSISTENT EMOTIONS

NOTE.—Cell sizes ranged from 26 to 41 participants per identity condition.

supports our expectations regarding identity-consistency effects but also provides evidence of emotion regulation, in this case via situation selection. Expanding on those results, the next experiments examine how individuals engage in emotion regulation to maintain consistency with the salient identity's emotion profile, taking actions to upregulate identity-consistent emotional experiences and to downregulate inconsistent experiences.

EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B: CONSUMERS REGULATE THEIR EMOTIONS THROUGH CONSUMPTION TO MAINTAIN EMOTION PROFILE CONSISTENCY

In experiments 3A and 3B, we provide participants with a product positioned as enhancing or reducing their emotions and predict that they will consume more of those that enhance emotion profile-consistent emotions and that dampen emotion profile-inconsistent emotions. Research on affect regulation has suggested that individuals can strategically engage in a variety of behaviors to either repair a poor mood (eating fattening snacks, procrastinating; Grunberg and Straub 1992; Tice, Bratslavsky, and Baumeister 2001) or prolong a good one (exercising; Hsaio and Thayer 1998). This strategic affect regulation requires the assessment of current feelings and a forecast of the affective consequences of relevant behaviors or consumption choices, and thus occurs only when individuals believe that those behaviors or consumption choices will influence their future affective states in a desirable way (Bushman, Baumeister, and Phillips 2001; Cialdini and Kenrick 1976). In experiments 3A and 3B, we explicitly position products as regulating a consumer's emotional state to investigate whether individuals strategically consume products to maintain emotion profile-consistency. This manipulation is akin to mood freezing manipulations (Andrade 2005; Bushman et al. 2001), though we do not tell participants that their mood cannot be changed. Rather, we differentially position products as either emotion enhancing or emotion reducing. Participants then make consumption decisions based on their own assessments of the desirability of their current affective state and thus their preferences to either maintain or change that state. As in our previous studies, we examine only negative affective states (anger, sadness, and disgust). Thus, we examine not participant preferences for positive versus negative affective states (Andrade 2005) but their relative preferences for discrete negative emotional states that are identity consistent versus inconsistent. This study also extends experiment 1 to show that products can be positioned as social identity-relevant without mentioning the social identity but rather through simply positioning the product as aiding the consumer in maintaining consistency with their identity's emotion profile. We examine these effects in two experiments. Experiment 3A focuses on athlete and volunteer social identities, while experiment 3B examines the environmentalist identity.

Experiment 3A has a 3 (social identity: athlete, volunteer,

control) × 2 (emotion: anger, sadness) × 3 (product positioning: enhance emotions, reduce emotions, control) between-subjects design, where emotion is induced incidentally, and the product is positioned in an ad. We predict participants with a salient athlete identity will consume products that reduce emotion if they are experiencing sadness but not anger and will consume products that enhance emotion if they are experiencing anger but not sadness. Similarly, we expect those with a salient volunteer identity will consume products that reduce emotion if they are experiencing anger but not sadness and will consume products that enhance emotion when they experience sadness but not anger.

Participants and Procedure

Three hundred seventy-four participants (average age, 22 years; range, 18–68; 52% female) from the Wharton Behavioral Lab at the University of Pennsylvania were randomly assigned to one of the 18 conditions. They were paid $10 for a 1-hour lab session containing multiple studies, including this one.

The study was presented as two unrelated experiments: a writing task and a product evaluation study. First, participants completed the identity salience tasks as in previous studies. Next, participants were told that they would complete a product evaluation study, in which they would first watch a movie clip and then try a product, consistent with a cover story positioning the experiment as focused on understanding how people eat and drink at home while watching television. This second part contained both the emotion manipulation and the product evaluation.

Participants were seated at computers in individual cubicles. Next to their computer they found a numbered cup with a lid, atop a printed placemat stating that participants should leave the cup alone until instructed. Participants then watched a 45-second movie clip, pretested to reliably elicit either anger or sadness. In a pretest, 67 participants watched one of the two film clips and rated their emotions following the clip. Participants who watched the angry clip experienced more anger ($M = 5.08$) than participants who watched the sad clip ($M = 3.17$; $F(1, 65) = 26.95$ grams, $p < .001$). Participants who watched the sad clip experienced more sadness ($M = 4.82$) than those who watched the angry clip ($M = 3.24$; $F(1, 65) = 18.90$, $p < .001$). In the main experiment, participants were then asked to try a new tea product, first entering the number printed on their cup into the computer to receive information about the product. In their cup, they received approximately 200 grams of Revolution Tea orange chocolate green tea that was described in an ad shown on the computer (app. B): either as enhancing emotions (IntensiTea), reducing emotions (TranquiliTea), or having no effect on emotions (HerbaliTea).

After viewing the product information, participants were asked to taste their tea, drinking as much or little as they desired. Finally, they were instructed to place their cup back on the placemat, to be disposed of by the lab assistant, and then were debriefed, thanked, and paid. Prior to the start of the experimental session, the starting weight of each num-

bered teacup was recorded. At the end of each session, each cup was reweighed. This final weight was subtracted from that cup's starting weight to obtain the amount of tea consumed by each participant.

Results

The amount of tea consumed (in grams) was subjected to a three-way ANOVA with social identity, emotion, and product positioning as predictors. There was a significant main effect of product positioning on the amount of tea consumed ($F(2, 356) = 3.220$, $p < .05$) such that regardless of social identity or emotion, participants drank more of the reduce emotions tea (TranquiliTea, $M = 48.47$) than the control tea (HerbaliTea $M = 33.51$; $F(2, 356) = 2.483$, $p < .05$), but not any more than the enhance emotions tea (IntensiTea, $M = 45.73$; $p > .2$). There were no other significant main effects or two-way interactions (all $p > .35$); however, a significant three-way interaction of social identity, emotion, and product positioning emerged ($F(4, 356) = 5.901$, $p < .001$), seen in figure 3. Participants with a salient athlete identity who viewed the angry film clip consumed more of the tea positioned as enhancing their emotions (IntensiTea, $M = 63.52$ grams) than that positioned as reducing emotions (TranquiliTea, $M = 34.60$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 3.324$, $p < .05$), or the tea that had no emotion regulating properties (HerbaliTea, $M = 31.54$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 3.635$, $p < .05$). However, when they had watched

the identity-inconsistent sad movie clip, the pattern of results is reversed, such that they drank more of the reduce emotions tea (TranquiliTea, $M = 64.25$ grams) than either the enhance emotions (IntensiTea, $M = 32.62$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 3.783$, $p < .05$) or the nonemotional tea (HerbaliTea, $M = 26.125$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 3.915$, $p < .05$). Further, when participants with a salient athlete identity were presented with a product that would reduce their emotions (TranquiliTea), they consumed significantly more when experiencing sadness ($M = 64.25$ grams) than anger ($M = 34.60$ grams; $F(1, 356) = 4.820$, $p < .05$). However, when athletes were presented with an opportunity to enhance their emotions (IntensiTea), they drank more tea when they were experiencing anger ($M = 63.52$ grams) than sadness ($M = 32.62$ grams; $F(1, 356) = 5.207$, $p < .05$). These results point to athletes consuming more tea that aligned their emotional experience with their emotion profile: enhance anger and reduce sadness.

Similarly, participants with a salient volunteer social identity strategically consumed tea to achieve emotion profile-consistency and avoid inconsistency. Participants with a salient volunteer identity who had watched the inconsistent film clip (anger) consumed more of the tea positioned as reducing their emotions (TranquiliTea, $M = 68.86$ grams) than the tea that would enhance them (IntensiTea, $M = 35.00$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 4.310$, $p < .05$) and more than the nonregulating tea (HerbaliTea, $M = 29.86$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 4.528$, $p < .01$). In contrast, when they viewed the

FIGURE 3

EXPERIMENT 3A: WILL I DRINK MORE TEA IF IT HELPS ME
REGULATE MY EMOTION PROFILE-CONSISTENT EMOTIONS?

NOTE.—Cell sizes ranged from 13 to 30 across conditions.

identity-consistent (sad) clip, they consumed more of the enhancing emotions tea (IntensiTea, $M = 67.83$ grams) than the reduce emotions tea (TranquiliTea, $M = 36.07$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 3.044$, $p < .05$) and marginally more than the nonregulating tea (HerbaliTea, $M = 42.65$ grams; $F(4, 356) = 2.941$, $p = .082$). When participants with a volunteer identity had the opportunity to reduce their emotions, they drank more TranquiliTea when they were experiencing anger ($M = 68.86$ grams) than sadness ($M = 36.07$ grams; $F(1, 356) = 5.932$, $p < .05$). And, as predicted, when volunteers had the chance to enhance their emotional state, they drank more when experiencing sadness ($M = 67.83$ grams) than anger ($M = 35.00$ grams; $F(1, 356) = 6.282$, $p < .05$). As with the athlete conditions, these results indicate that when a volunteer identity is salient, individuals consume more of the products that align their emotional experience with their emotion profile: enhancing sadness and reducing anger.

For both athletes and volunteers, their consumption of the non-emotion-regulating tea (HerbaliTea) did not differ depending on their emotional state (all $p > .4$). Within the control social identity conditions, there were no significant differences in consumption of the tea based on either emotion or product positioning (all $p > .2$).

EXPERIMENT 3B: CONSUMPTION TO SUPPORT THE ENVIRONMENTALIST-DISGUST EMOTION PROFILE

To extend the results of experiment 3A to a third emotion profile, we replicated it using a 1 (identity: environmentalist) × 3 (emotion: anger, sadness, disgust) × 3 (product positioning: enhance emotions, reduce emotions, control) between-subjects design. As in study 3A, participants first completed the identity salience tasks, then watched a movie clip that has been shown to reliably elicit feelings of disgust (Gross and Levenson 1993). All other stimuli (the tea, the ads) and procedures were identical to study 3A.

Results

Two hundred twenty individuals (average age, 20 years; range, 18–39; 58% female) from the Wharton Behavioral Lab at the University of Pennsylvania participated in this study. As all participants were primed with the environmentalist identity, the amount of tea consumed (in grams) was subjected to a two-way ANOVA with emotion, and product positioning as predictors. There were no significant main effects (both $p > .25$); however, a significant interaction of emotion and product positioning emerged ($F(4, 211) = 8.939$, $p < .001$), seen in figure 4. Participants with a salient environmentalist identity who experienced anger consumed more of the tea positioned as reducing emotions (TranquiliTea, $M = 82.79$ grams) than the tea positioned as enhancing emotions (IntensiTea, $M = 33.75$ grams; $F(4, 211) = 5.705$, $p < .01$) or the tea positioned as having no effect on emotions (HerbaliTea, $M = 49.00$ grams; $F(4, 211) = 3.026$, $p < .05$). When participants watched the sad

clip, a similar pattern emerged, such that they drank more of the reduce emotions tea (TranquiliTea, $M = 74.90$ grams) than the enhance emotions tea (IntensiTea, $M = 43.72$ grams; $F(4, 211) = 3.350$, $p < .05$) and more than the tea positioned as having no effect on emotion (HerbaliTea, $M = 48.91$ grams; $F(4, 211) = 3.134$, $p < .05$).

In contrast, participants who watched the disgust-eliciting clip exhibited a very different pattern of consumption. Specifically, participants in the environmentalist-disgust condition drank more of the tea positioned as enhancing their emotions (IntensiTea, $M = 88.68$ grams) than the tea positioned as reducing their emotions (TranquiliTea, $M = 30.92$ grams; $F(4, 211) = 9.868$, $p < .001$) and more than the tea positioned as having no effect on their emotions (HerbaliTea. $M = 52.26$ grams; $F(4, 211) = 4.383$, $p < .01$). This pattern of results replicates those in experiment 3A and points to environmentalists consuming more of the tea that best aligned their emotional experience with their active emotion profile: enhance disgust and reduce anger and sadness.

Discussion

Experiments 3A and 3B build on the previous studies, showing that individuals engage in emotion regulation to enhance emotions consistent with their salient social identity's emotion profile or to decrease emotions inconsistent with that emotion profile. These two studies go further, however, demonstrating that individuals modulate actual consumption in service of such emotion regulation. As in experiment 1, the evaluative target was identity-irrelevant (tea) but was also effectively neutral in these experiments. Yet individuals changed their consumption in order to reap (or avoid) the benefits promised by each product. Using a different emotion manipulation than in previous studies, movie clips, experiment 3A showed that participants with salient athlete identities attempt to eliminate sadness and enhance anger, while those with active volunteer identities try to reduce anger and enhance sadness.

Perhaps more surprising, experiment 3B extended these findings, showing that participants with salient environmentalist identities will attempt to eliminate sadness and anger, while choosing to enhance experiences of disgust. These results are particularly intriguing as core, physical disgust is elicited by death, decay, and disease and is associated with the physical responses of expulsion and distancing (Rozin et al. 1999). Yet we find that when the emotion is identity-consistent, as for environmentalists for whom purity judgments and thus moral disgust is relevant, individuals will consume, or ingest, in order to enhance their feelings of disgust. Such emotional enhancement is likely relevant to processes of identity related meaning-making; in this case to judgments and concerns regarding environmental purity and contamination. Thus enhancing, rather than dampening, feelings of disgust may serve to reinforce relevant identity-structures. Similarly, previous research has suggested that individuals with more conservative political attitudes are more likely to feel disgust in response to purity-

FIGURE 4

EXPERIMENT 3B: HIGHER CONSUMPTION OF PRODUCTS THAT
SUPPORT ENVIRONMENTALIST-DISGUST EMOTION PROFILE

NOTE.—Cell sizes ranged from 19 to 27 across conditions.

related issues such as abortion and gay marriage (Inbar, Pizarro, and Bloom 2009), suggesting that disgust responses reinforce their political beliefs and identity.

Thus far, we have demonstrated that emotions appear to be similarly associated with social identities as are attitudes, beliefs, and values, providing what-to-feel information in identity enactment. These emotion profiles have led to differential receptiveness to emotional stimuli, as well as strategic use of emotion regulation in order to maintain emotion-identity consistency. In the final study, we examine the degree to which experiencing an identity-consistent emotion enhances performance on an identity-relevant task. In doing so, we suggest that emotion profiles have functional benefits that likely account for the preferences for and upregulation of identity-consistent emotions observed in the previous experiments.

EXPERIMENT 4: EMOTION PROFILE-CONSISTENCY ENHANCES IDENTITY-RELEVANT PERFORMANCE

Experiment 4 combines the identity prime and emotion with an identity-relevant task in a 3 (identity: athlete, volunteer, control) × 2 (emotion: anger, sadness) × 2 (task purpose: fitness, charity) between-subjects design. First, participants completed the identity salience task as in previous studies. Then they proceeded to an ostensibly unrelated "doing work" task in which they were told to click an on-screen button as many times as possible in 3 minutes (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier 2009). This task was framed in one of two ways: either as a way to gauge physical fitness or a way to raise money for charity. The fitness instructions read: "Click for Fitness!! On the next page you will see a button. For the next 3 minutes, we would like you to click that button as many times as you want. The more physically fit a person is, the more clicks they are able to do during the time period." The charity instructions read: "Click for Charity!! On the next page you will see a button. For the next 3 minutes, we would like you to click that button as many times as you want. For every click made during this period, $0.01 will be donated to the American Red Cross." Thus, the effortful activity was either identity-relevant (athlete-fitness, volunteer-charity) or identity-irrelevant (athlete-charity, volunteer-fitness). The number of clicks serves as the measure of successful task performance. The task was made challenging as every second the position of the button moved randomly on the screen. Participants had to track the location of the button to achieve a high level of performance, shown in a running count of the total number of clicks at the top of their screen.

At the same time, participants listened to one of two soundtracks, each composed of three 1-minute song excerpts, pretested to elicit either anger or sadness. In the pretest, 47 participants at the University of Pittsburgh indicated the emotions evoked by the soundtrack (7-point scale, 1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). The angry soundtrack was rated as evoking more anger ($M = 4.83$) than

the sad one ($M = 2.61$; $F(1, 45) = 3.481$, $p < .01$), and the sad soundtrack was rated as evoking more sadness ($M = 3.86$) than the angry one ($M = 2.37$; $F(1, 45) = 3.842$, $p < .01$). The two soundtracks were equally unfamiliar to participants (0–100 scale: $M_{angry} = 8.79$, $M_{sad} = 2.37$; $p > .40$). We anticipated that individuals with a salient athlete identity (vs. volunteer or control) would produce more successful clicks when they were experiencing identity-consistent angry (vs. sad) emotions (listening to the angry soundtrack). In contrast, we expected that individuals with a salient volunteer identity (vs. athlete or control) would produce more successful clicks when they were experiencing identity-consistent sad (vs. angry) emotions (listening to the sad soundtrack). Following this study, participants were debriefed, thanked, and paid.

Results

Two hundred sixty individuals (average age, 20 years; range, 18–46, 54% female) from the Wharton Behavioral Lab at the University of Pennsylvania participated in this study. A three-way ANOVA was run on the total number of clicks, with identity, emotion, and task as predictors. There were no significant main effects; however, all three two-way interactions were significant, as seen in figure 5. There was a significant interaction of identity and emotion ($F(2, 257) = 7.018$, $p < .001$). Participants with a salient athlete social identity who listened to angry music clicked

more times ($M = 935.03$) than when they heard sad music ($M = 826.22$; $F(1, 257) = 8.137$, $p < .005$). Participants with a salient volunteer social identity had the opposite pattern of results, performing better when they heard sad music ($M = 930.46$) than angry music ($M = 836.23$; $F(1, 257) = 5.990$, $p < .05$). There were no performance differences by emotion for the control participants ($F(1, 257) < 1$, $p > .8$).

There was a significant interaction between identity and the purpose of the clicking task ($F(2, 257) = 5.798$, $p < .005$), such that a match between the identity and the task led to more successful clicks. Specifically, when participants with a salient athlete identity were asked to click for fitness, they clicked more times ($M = 934.87$) than when they were clicking for charity ($M = 826.37$; $F(1, 257) = 8.091$, $p < .005$). Volunteers, on the other hand, clicked more when they were clicking for charity ($M = 920.46$) than fitness ($M = 846.23$; $F(1, 257) = 3.717$, $p = .055$). There were no differences in performance for control participants ($F(1, 257) < 1$, $p > .9$).

Interestingly, there was also a significant interaction of emotion with task purpose ($F(1, 257) = 23.455$, $p < .0001$). In this case, participants who listened to angry music performed better on the fitness task ($M = 927.26$) than the charity task ($M = 807.20$; $F(1, 257) = 14.232$, $p < .0001$), while those who listened to sad music performed better on the charity task ($M = 909.68$) than the fitness task ($M = 808.58$; $F(1, 257) = 9.530$, $p < .005$).

FIGURE 5

EXPERIMENT 4: EMOTION PROFILE-CONSISTENCY SUPPORTS
IDENTITY-RELEVANT TASK PERFORMANCE

NOTE.—Cell sizes ranged from 19 to 26 across conditions.

Finally, the three-way interaction between identity, emotion, and task purpose was tested through a quadratic contrast to examine whether the interaction between emotion and task was different in each identity condition, as predicted. The quadratic fit the data, such that the athlete and volunteer interactions are significantly different from the control ($F(1, 257) = 4.327$, $p < .05$). To decompose this pattern of results, contrasts were run within each identity condition. Participants with a salient athlete identity who engaged in a "fitness" task performed better when listening to angry music ($M = 1,040.40$) than to sad music ($M = 829.35$, $F(1, 257) = 15.459$, $p < .001$), yet when working on a "charity" task, there was no difference between the angry ($M = 829.65$) and sad ($M = 823.35$) music on performance. In contrast, participants with a salient volunteer identity working on a "charity" task performed better when listening to sad music ($M = 1,018.42$) than to angry music ($M = 822.50$, $F(1, 257) = 13.344$, $p < .001$), and there were no differences between angry ($M = 849.95$) and sad ($M = 842.50$) music when the task was testing fitness. Finally, for the control identity participants working for charity, performance was enhanced by listening to sad music ($M = 887.53$) versus angry music ($M = 769.45$; $F(1, 257) = 3.873$, $p < .05$), while performance on the fitness task was aided by listening to angry music ($M = 891.43$) rather than sad ($M = 753.89$; $F(1, 257) = 4.847$, $p < .05$). Importantly, on the fitness task, when listening to angry music, participants with salient athlete identities ($M = 1,040.40$) outperformed control participants ($M = 891.43$; $F(1, 257) = 5.535$, $p < .05$), and those with salient volunteer identities ($M = 1,018.42$) outperformed control participants ($M = 887.53$; $F(1, 257) = 4.524$, $p < .05$) on the charity task while listening to sad music.

Discussion

The final experiment tested whether emotion profile-consistency would reinforce an identity and assist in identity-relevant task performance. Participants engaged in an effortful task, which was framed as being either identity-relevant or identity-irrelevant. Across both the athlete and volunteer social identities performance was enhanced when participants were exposed to identity-consistent emotion profile stimuli during the task. While there was no observed deterioration in performance for the emotion profile-inconsistent conditions, it is possible that the identity-relevance of the task was enough to counterbalance the emotional inconsistency. However, performance enhancement in the emotion profile-consistent conditions was significantly greater than control, implying that one function of emotion profiles is to support and reinforce social identities during identity performance (Reed et al. 2012). As in the previous study, where we found disgust led to counterintuitive increases in consumption when it was identity-consistent; here we also find unusual results for sadness, which is typically conceived of as being associated with low levels of arousal and with a tendency to withdraw (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). However, in our results, when sadness is identity-consistent, it results in high levels of engagement

and performance. These two studies suggest that when emotions are associated with identity-relevant meaning, the benefits of identity-consistency lead to identity reinforcement, supporting the idea that emotions can be incorporated into an identity's knowledge structure and lead to identity-relevant sensitization and motivation (Oyserman 2009).

The results from this study are concordant with work on instrumental emotion regulation, which suggests that individuals may choose to experience hedonically unpleasant emotions because they support goal-related action tendencies (Erber et al. 1996; Tamir 2009). We similarly find benefits associated with identity-consistent emotions, as identity-relevant task performance was enhanced through emotion profile consistency. As noted earlier, this alignment between an emotion's action tendency and an identity's typical goal may be one reason why emotion profiles exist: over time, the association between the emotion and the identity becomes incorporated into the identity's knowledge structure. However, the results from experiments 1–3 importantly suggest that the association between identities and emotions is not predicated on having an identity-relevant task to perform as the instrumental emotion regulation literature implies. Rather, it appears that while the identity-consistent emotion can augment task performance (experiment 4), results from experiments 1–3 suggest that emotions are, in and of themselves, components of a social identity's knowledge structure, and that even absent identity-relevant goal pursuit, approaching identity-syntonic emotional stimuli can be both potentiated and automatized (Oyserman 2009), as experiencing the emotion validates and reinforces identity enactment (Reed et al. 2012).

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Though social identity has a long and extensive tradition of research within psychology and consumer behavior (Berger and Heath 2007; Forehand and Deshpandé 2001; Kleine et al. 1993; Tajfel 1978), this research has not considered the role of emotions in social identity knowledge structures. Affect and emotion have typically been incorporated into social identity as part of an identity-performance feedback loop: evaluations of successful or unsuccessful identity enactment give rise to emotional responses (e.g., pride, depression; Higgins 1987; Stets and Burke 2005), which then calibrate future effort. We proposed that social identities are associated with what-to-feel emotion profiles, defined as the emotions individuals perceive to be useful for enacting individual social identities. In an exploratory study and five experiments, using three different social identities, emotions, and emotion manipulations (music, ad copy, and film clips) we show that social identities are not merely collections of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors but also include connections to specific emotional states. The exploratory study examined lay beliefs regarding emotions and identities and provided "emotion profiles" for several social identities. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that individuals prefer identity-consistent emotional stimuli, even when those stimuli do not explicitly reference the salient identity. Building on findings

that demonstrate individuals approach products and enact behaviors that are identity-consistent while avoiding those that are inconsistent (Oyserman 2009; White and Dahl 2007), we find that individuals regulate their emotions in identity-consistent ways. Experiments 3A and 3B show that individuals use consumption to strategically regulate their emotional experiences in order to amplify identity-consistent emotions and to dampen identity-inconsistent emotions. Importantly, experiment 4 demonstrates that these preferences and emotional regulatory goals are functional as individuals experiencing social identity-consistent (vs. inconsistent) emotions perform better at identity-relevant tasks, suggesting that emotion profiles reinforce identity enactment.

Previous research in organizational behavior and cross-cultural psychology has similarly suggested relationships between self-structures and emotions, which provides valuable underpinnings to the present work. Organizational behavior has examined conforming to the emotion norms of a job as an important component of workplace success, particularly when emotion expression is central to a worker's job, as in service industries (Hochschild 1983). This area of study has been termed "emotional labor," as appropriate emotion expression becomes part of an individual's job description and execution (Hochschild 1983). Crucially, this literature emphasizes extrinsic motivations to comply with emotion norms in the workplace and examines how individuals respond to those norms and the social repercussions (e.g., depression, rejection, job withdrawal) that occur when emotion expression violates them (Scott and Barnes 2011; Simpson and Stroh 2004). In contrast, we propose that emotion profiles are internal structures, part of the salient social identity's meaning, which individuals are intrinsically motivated to conform to, and that individuals who do so will feel the least amount of dissonance, and may experience positive outcomes for well-being and behavior.

The cross-cultural literature has shown that distinct self-construals (independent vs. interdependent) implicate unique cognitions, motivations, and emotions (Markus and Kitayama 1991). Interestingly, the social identity literature has also shown that specific self-structures (identities) are associated with distinct cognitions and motivations (Forehand and Deshpandé 2001; Oyserman 2009) but has not considered emotions within the identity's knowledge structure. Thus, our work is consistent with the cross-cultural literature, as we suggest that social identities include what-to-feel information in addition to attitudes, values, and beliefs. However, social identity and cross-cultural psychology conceive of the self at different levels, based on the degree to which the self-concept extends beyond the personal. Cross-cultural research emphasizes relative tendencies to define the self along personal versus relational dimensions (Brewer and Gardner 1996). In contrast, the social identity literature focuses on the collective self, wherein the sense of self is derived from what it means to be a member in broader collectives or social categories (Brewer and Gardner 1996).

Both the limitations and implications of our research suggest many topics for future research. For instance, we examine only three social identities and one emotion from each emotion profile. Additional research should generalize these findings to other stimuli, social identities, or emotions. Another limitation is an inability to examine identity centrality and emotion profiles. Previous literature might suggest that individuals for whom the identity is more central would show heightened levels of the effects observed in our experiments, relative to those for whom the identity is less central (Kleine et al. 1993; Reed 2004). As mentioned previously, the identities chosen were selected partly because they are commonly held among research participants, making it more likely we could observe the proposed identity emotion profile relationships. In a pretest, 91% of participants endorsed identifying as a volunteer; 86% as an environmentalist; and 84% as an athlete. However, the ubiquity with which the identities were held, which ensured that participants possessed the relevant knowledge structures to observe the proposed effects of identity salience on emotions, inhibits our ability to test for the effect of identity centrality. This is an important area for future research, as there could be competing hypotheses: some previous research has found that it is those individuals who have less central identities who are most motivated to engage in identity-consistent behavior (Gao, Wheeler, and Shiv 2009), and yet it is consumers with more central identities who have the richest knowledge structures (Klein et al. 1993) and may be most likely to have strong ties to emotions within each identity.

Future research could expand on the growing social identity reinforcement and repair literature, which has found that choosing symbolic products can bolster consumers' self-confidence on specific dimensions of the self (reading sophisticated books to feel intelligent; Gao et al. 2009). In experiment 2 participants chose situations that would create identity-consistent emotional experiences. Did this make them feel truer to the identity? Would experiencing emotion profile-consistent emotions lead to self-enhancement, boosting identity-esteem? To the extent that feeling identity-consistent emotions aids in identity performance, as in experiment 4, it can play a role in the appraisal process whereby individuals assess their success or failure as identity actors and experience emotions arising from that verification process (Burke and Stets 2009). Thus, an athlete who feels anger may appraise her identity performance as more successful, leading to feelings of pride. This suggests a chain of emotional outcomes, with the regulation of one set of emotional experiences leading to appraisals that provoke a different set of downstream emotional consequences. Interestingly, our focus on negative emotions suggests a process by which identity-relevant experience and enhancement of anger, sadness, or disgust can lead to subsequent positive emotions, such as pride, indicative of a process by which negative emotions are consumed in service of later positive outcomes (Andrade and Cohen 2007; Tamir 2009), which should reinforce the salience and centrality of that identity over time. It may also be interesting to examine whether experiencing identity-inconsistent emotions leads to negative effects as found in the emotion labor literature. Would

athletes feeling sadness appraise their identity enactment more negatively and thus have lower identity esteem?

In summary, this research builds a connection between social identities and discrete emotion profiles that are integral to identity enactment. We find that identities are associated with discrete emotions, which leads to preferences for identity-consistent emotional experiences and regulation of emotions in order to coincide with a salient identity's emotion profile. These contributions suggest a new way in which the emotion regulation process may be initiated and managed (via social identity) and describe a process by which discrete emotions are used to achieve social identity-consistent outcomes, expanding conceptualizations of the relationship between emotions and social identities. In addition, this research demonstrates that social identity-marketing appeals can be positioned as identity-consistent without directly mentioning the social identity, by simply leveraging an emotion profile-consistent frame, and provides evidence that individuals can and do consume products that regulate their emotional experiences in ways that are consistent with their salient social identity. This research also suggests that, along with attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs, marketers should also incorporate emotions into their efforts to maintain identity-consistency when targeting specific social identities.

APPENDIX A

EXPERIMENT 1: EMOTIONAL ADVERTISEMENTS

Condition	Advertisement: Facial Expression	Advertisement: Text
Angry		**"I've never felt so angry"** **Finding out I had herpes made me so furious. I felt completely enraged for a long time following diagnosis.** While I can manage the symptoms, there is no cure for herpes…
Sad		**"I've never felt so depressed"** **Finding out I had herpes made me feel so helpless. My spirits were really low for a long time following diagnosis.** While I can manage the symptoms, there is no cure for herpes…
Disgusted		**"I've never felt so disgusted"** **Finding out I had herpes made me feel repulsive. I felt like I would vomit every time I thought of the diagnosis.** While I can manage the symptoms, there is no cure for herpes…

APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B: EMOTION REGULATING PRODUCT POSITIONING

Condition	Advertisement
Enhance emotions (IntensiTea)	IntensiTea An energizing blend of herbs and spices enhances the mind and emotions. Increase the connection with your feelings; hear the voice of your mind. Drink IntensiTea and boost insightful emotions. Feel. Experience the world fully. **Increase your emotional insights: IntensiTea.**
Reduce emotions (TranquiliTea)	TranquiliTea A soothing blend of herbs and spices calms the mind and emotions. Reduce the distractions of your turbulent feelings; still the noise of your mind. Drink TranquiliTea and eliminate distracting emotions. Focus. See the world clearly. *Increase your mental control: TranquiliTea.*
No emotion regulation (HerbaliTea)	HerbaliTea A blend of herbs and spices enhances your health. Increase your water consumption and balance your body. Drink HerbaliTea and boost your body's functioning. Drink. Experience true health. **Increase your health: HerbaliTea.**

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